Chinese State Counselor Yang Jiechi (楊潔篪) visited Washington earlier this month and met with US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson for bilateral talks. The two discussed issues including North Korea and bilateral trade, and announced that China and the US are to hold a Diplomatic and Security Dialogue in the second half of this year.
On the surface it appeared to be a routine dialogue, but there was more to the meeting than meets the eye.
During the past year or so, Yang has made a number of trips to the US and was responsible for handling important affairs between the two nations. Whether dealing with US President Donald Trump’s provocations over China’s so-called “one China” policy, organizing the first summit between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) or last year’s inaugural US-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue, Yang has discharged his duties with aplomb.
However, Yang’s latest diplomatic mission was particularly tricky since the talks touched on the essence of the US-China relationship, the US-Chinese strategic relationship, the US-Chinese stance on nuclear weaponry, trade issues and the thorny problem of Taiwan.
During a visit to Beijing in March last year, Tillerson appeared to endorse some of China’s so-called “14 principles” — Chinese diplomatic speak imbued with hidden meanings.
Tillerson referred to the US-China relationship as “built on non-confrontation, no conflict, mutual respect and always searching for win-win solutions.”
This was interpreted by Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) as an endorsement of Xi’s “new model of major power relations,” and Tillerson was subsequently attacked by US media and think tanks as having inadvertently handed Beijing a diplomatic coup.
At the time, Tillerson referred to the adoption of the “one China” policy and the Three Communiques, which he said have allowed for long-term stability between China and the US and would assist in providing the framework for the next 50 years of China-US relations.
Few could have predicted what followed: There is now no trace left of the trumpeted US-China 50-year framework. The Trump administration has instead announced a succession of reports: the National Security Strategy report, National Defense Strategic Outline and the Nuclear Posture Review, which not only define China and Russia as “rivals” and “strategic competitors,” but also classify the two nations as “revisionist powers” seeking to challenge the global order and global values.
If the US is using phrases such as “rival,” “strategic competitor” and “revisionist power” to describe China, how does it define its relationship with China now and moving into the future?
During a news briefing on Feb. 8, US Department of State spokeswoman Heather Nauert said: “We’re not seeking an adversarial relationship with the Government of China. We are simply identifying actions that China has taken that undermine a rules-based order.”
There will clearly be a difference of opinion between the two nations, which would be reflected in bilateral exchanges on areas including trade, security, the Internet, human rights, democracy and freedom of the press, and these exchanges can be expected to be extremely frank and direct.
Some understanding of Yang’s thoughts following his meeting with his US counterpart can be gleaned from a statement by Chinese Ambassador to the US Cui Tiankai (崔天凱).
The basic position of the US-China relationship is one of mutual respect and beneficial cooperation, Cui said, adding: “We don’t think there is a zero-sum game between China and the US.”
Cui went on to say that China does not seek hegemony, has never been afraid of external forces and absolutely would not abandon its legitimate rights. This statement shows that there is potential for the conflict between the two nations to turn red hot.
The “Taiwan problem” is undoubtedly an issue that Beijing wishes to discuss, but that the US is unwilling to engage in.
China’s Xinhua news agency claimed that when Yang clarified China’s position on Taiwan during the talks and asked the US to deal with the issue seriously and conscientiously, Tillerson said the US continues to uphold the “one China” policy.
However, Tillerson’s reply does not adequately reflect the growing number of Taiwan-friendly bills passing through the US Congress.
Edward Chen is a chair professor in the Chinese Culture University’s political science department.
Translated by Edward Jones
Jan. 1 marks a decade since China repealed its one-child policy. Just 10 days before, Peng Peiyun (彭珮雲), who long oversaw the often-brutal enforcement of China’s family-planning rules, died at the age of 96, having never been held accountable for her actions. Obituaries praised Peng for being “reform-minded,” even though, in practice, she only perpetuated an utterly inhumane policy, whose consequences have barely begun to materialize. It was Vice Premier Chen Muhua (陳慕華) who first proposed the one-child policy in 1979, with the endorsement of China’s then-top leaders, Chen Yun (陳雲) and Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), as a means of avoiding the
The last foreign delegation Nicolas Maduro met before he went to bed Friday night (January 2) was led by China’s top Latin America diplomat. “I had a pleasant meeting with Qiu Xiaoqi (邱小琪), Special Envoy of President Xi Jinping (習近平),” Venezuela’s soon-to-be ex-president tweeted on Telegram, “and we reaffirmed our commitment to the strategic relationship that is progressing and strengthening in various areas for building a multipolar world of development and peace.” Judging by how minutely the Central Intelligence Agency was monitoring Maduro’s every move on Friday, President Trump himself was certainly aware of Maduro’s felicitations to his Chinese guest. Just
As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) races toward its 2027 modernization goals, most analysts fixate on ship counts, missile ranges and artificial intelligence. Those metrics matter — but they obscure a deeper vulnerability. The true future of the PLA, and by extension Taiwan’s security, might hinge less on hardware than on whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can preserve ideological loyalty inside its own armed forces. Iran’s 1979 revolution demonstrated how even a technologically advanced military can collapse when the social environment surrounding it shifts. That lesson has renewed relevance as fresh unrest shakes Iran today — and it should
On today’s page, Masahiro Matsumura, a professor of international politics and national security at St Andrew’s University in Osaka, questions the viability and advisability of the government’s proposed “T-Dome” missile defense system. Matsumura writes that Taiwan’s military budget would be better allocated elsewhere, and cautions against the temptation to allow politics to trump strategic sense. What he does not do is question whether Taiwan needs to increase its defense capabilities. “Given the accelerating pace of Beijing’s military buildup and political coercion ... [Taiwan] cannot afford inaction,” he writes. A rational, robust debate over the specifics, not the scale or the necessity,
RSS