Chinese State Counselor Yang Jiechi (楊潔篪) visited Washington earlier this month and met with US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson for bilateral talks. The two discussed issues including North Korea and bilateral trade, and announced that China and the US are to hold a Diplomatic and Security Dialogue in the second half of this year.
On the surface it appeared to be a routine dialogue, but there was more to the meeting than meets the eye.
During the past year or so, Yang has made a number of trips to the US and was responsible for handling important affairs between the two nations. Whether dealing with US President Donald Trump’s provocations over China’s so-called “one China” policy, organizing the first summit between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) or last year’s inaugural US-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue, Yang has discharged his duties with aplomb.
However, Yang’s latest diplomatic mission was particularly tricky since the talks touched on the essence of the US-China relationship, the US-Chinese strategic relationship, the US-Chinese stance on nuclear weaponry, trade issues and the thorny problem of Taiwan.
During a visit to Beijing in March last year, Tillerson appeared to endorse some of China’s so-called “14 principles” — Chinese diplomatic speak imbued with hidden meanings.
Tillerson referred to the US-China relationship as “built on non-confrontation, no conflict, mutual respect and always searching for win-win solutions.”
This was interpreted by Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi (王毅) as an endorsement of Xi’s “new model of major power relations,” and Tillerson was subsequently attacked by US media and think tanks as having inadvertently handed Beijing a diplomatic coup.
At the time, Tillerson referred to the adoption of the “one China” policy and the Three Communiques, which he said have allowed for long-term stability between China and the US and would assist in providing the framework for the next 50 years of China-US relations.
Few could have predicted what followed: There is now no trace left of the trumpeted US-China 50-year framework. The Trump administration has instead announced a succession of reports: the National Security Strategy report, National Defense Strategic Outline and the Nuclear Posture Review, which not only define China and Russia as “rivals” and “strategic competitors,” but also classify the two nations as “revisionist powers” seeking to challenge the global order and global values.
If the US is using phrases such as “rival,” “strategic competitor” and “revisionist power” to describe China, how does it define its relationship with China now and moving into the future?
During a news briefing on Feb. 8, US Department of State spokeswoman Heather Nauert said: “We’re not seeking an adversarial relationship with the Government of China. We are simply identifying actions that China has taken that undermine a rules-based order.”
There will clearly be a difference of opinion between the two nations, which would be reflected in bilateral exchanges on areas including trade, security, the Internet, human rights, democracy and freedom of the press, and these exchanges can be expected to be extremely frank and direct.
Some understanding of Yang’s thoughts following his meeting with his US counterpart can be gleaned from a statement by Chinese Ambassador to the US Cui Tiankai (崔天凱).
The basic position of the US-China relationship is one of mutual respect and beneficial cooperation, Cui said, adding: “We don’t think there is a zero-sum game between China and the US.”
Cui went on to say that China does not seek hegemony, has never been afraid of external forces and absolutely would not abandon its legitimate rights. This statement shows that there is potential for the conflict between the two nations to turn red hot.
The “Taiwan problem” is undoubtedly an issue that Beijing wishes to discuss, but that the US is unwilling to engage in.
China’s Xinhua news agency claimed that when Yang clarified China’s position on Taiwan during the talks and asked the US to deal with the issue seriously and conscientiously, Tillerson said the US continues to uphold the “one China” policy.
However, Tillerson’s reply does not adequately reflect the growing number of Taiwan-friendly bills passing through the US Congress.
Edward Chen is a chair professor in the Chinese Culture University’s political science department.
Translated by Edward Jones
China’s supreme objective in a war across the Taiwan Strait is to incorporate Taiwan as a province of the People’s Republic. It follows, therefore, that international recognition of Taiwan’s de jure independence is a consummation that China’s leaders devoutly wish to avoid. By the same token, an American strategy to deny China that objective would complicate Beijing’s calculus and deter large-scale hostilities. For decades, China has cautioned “independence means war.” The opposite is also true: “war means independence.” A comprehensive strategy of denial would guarantee an outcome of de jure independence for Taiwan in the event of Chinese invasion or
A recent Taipei Times editorial (“A targeted bilingual policy,” March 12, page 8) questioned how the Ministry of Education can justify spending NT$151 million (US$4.74 million) when the spotlighted achievements are English speech competitions and campus tours. It is a fair question, but it focuses on the wrong issue. The problem is not last year’s outcomes failing to meet the bilingual education vision; the issue is that the ministry has abandoned the program that originally justified such a large expenditure. In the early years of Bilingual 2030, the ministry’s K-12 Administration promoted the Bilingual Instruction in Select Domains Program (部分領域課程雙語教學實施計畫).
Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) earlier this month said it is necessary for her to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) and it would be a “huge boost” to the party’s local election results in November, but many KMT members have expressed different opinions, indicating a struggle between different groups in the party. Since Cheng was elected as party chairwoman in October last year, she has repeatedly expressed support for increased exchanges with China, saying that it would bring peace and prosperity to Taiwan, and that a meeting with Xi in Beijing takes priority over meeting
Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs spokesman for maritime affairs Rogelio Villanueva on Monday said that Manila’s claims in the South China Sea are backed by international law. Villanueva was responding to a social media post by the Chinese embassy alleging that a former Philippine ambassador in 1990 had written a letter to a German radio operator stating that the Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island, 黃岩島) did not fall within Manila’s territory. “Sovereignty is not merely claimed, it is exercised,” Villanueva said. The Philippines won a landmark case at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016 that found China’s sweeping claim of sovereignty in
RSS