US President Barack Obama’s trip to China continues to be the subject of hot debate in Western media. Many observers in the US and Europe feel that he allowed his hosts to set the agenda and tone for the visit, and that he insufficiently emphasized the core interests and principles of the US, such as human rights and democracy.
The Obama team seems to have been too eager to “create a positive atmosphere” to encourage China to go along on a number of undeniably important issues, such as global warming, environmental protection, North Korea and Iran.
In doing so, it allowed the Chinese leaders to outmaneuver the Americans. This occurred not only in terms of information control surrounding public events — such as the “town hall meeting” with a programmed audience of Communist League Youth members in Shanghai — but also in terms of substantial issues relating to both Tibet, East Turkestan and Taiwan.
For Taiwan, the biggest setback of the visit was the mention in the US-China Joint Statement of “sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) said during the joint press conference that the Chinese side appreciated the statements by Obama that “the US side … respects China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity when it comes to the Taiwan question and other matters.”
Not unexpectedly, government-controlled Chinese media, such as Xinhua news agency and the China Daily, immediately reported that Obama recognizes China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity on Taiwan and other issues.
If that is what Beijing believes was said, the Obama administration may want to clarify that this is in direct contradiction of US policy, which holds that Taiwan’s status must be determined peacefully and with the assent/consent of Taiwanese. That is the essence of what was laid down in 1979 in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and in 1982 in the Six Assurances.
The problem is that there is significant tension between the TRA and the Three Communiques, the main one being that the TRA represents the US side of the deal as prescribed by Congress, while the Three Communiques represent what China wanted.
To this we may add that some 30 years have passed since the TRA and the Three Communiques were activated, and that in the meantime Taiwan has become a free and democratic country.
Taiwanese were certainly not involved in drafting the Three Communiques, but, interestingly, there was some “Taiwanese” influence in the drafting of the TRA. Prominent senators and congressmen involved in the decision-making in Congress in 1979, such as senators Edward Kennedy, Claiborne Pell, and representatives Stephen Solarz and Jim Leach, did consult with Taiwanese-American leaders.
In light of the changing situation in Asia, how the US deals with a small, democratic Taiwan on the one side and an increasingly assertive — and important — giant on the other will require careful planning.
It would be a grave mistake, however, if we allowed Taiwan’s existence as a free and democratic country to be held hostage or to be whittled away by the rulers in Beijing.
Taiwanese have worked hard to achieve their democracy. It is essential that the US make crystal clear that Taiwan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity should not be infringed upon in any way, so that the people of Taiwan can make a free decision on their future.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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