Thu, Mar 03, 2005 page8

• Will the Chen-Soong pact pay off?

  • By Hsu Yung-ming 徐永明
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  If we want to talk about the most important consensus of the Chen-Soong meeting, we might as well settle for it being a willingness, midway in the process of constitutional amendment, to reinterpret President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) doctrine of "four noes" in such a way that the formulation of the status quo as stated in the Constitution becomes the common ground on which consensus can be built.

  Its effects on Taiwan's political environment will be significant, and will diversify the future development of political parties here.

  Prior to the summit, politicians from all the parties wondered what kind of cooperation agreement could be reached by these two implacable rivals who had faced each other in two presidential elections, especially now that no single party had a clear majority in the legislature.

  The key factor was pointed out by Chen; namely that he would never face People First Party (PFP) Chairman James Soong (宋楚瑜) in another presidential election, so there were no electoral concerns and a number of issues that had become entangled in electoral rhetoric could now be dealt with in a more straightforward manner, especially now that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was seeking the cooperation of the PFP.

  The main theme of the summit, aside from the calligraphic scroll with the words "sincerity" that Chen presented to Soong, was the DPP's willingness to give way on a number of issues, reducing the pressure on the PFP from pan-blue supporters and to prepare to meet the challenge of the "anti-secession" law to be released by Beijing early this month.

  Since his re-election, Chen has been following a path of conciliatory government. To win the support of the PFP in the legislature, Chen has no choice but to compromise on constitutional amendment through a referendum, changing his platform to one of internal government reform that does not impinge on sovereignty or national title issues. And, in any case, if Taiwan is to win the support of the US and Japan in this era of the anti-secession law, it is necessary to reiterate the idea of "four noes," and though it was said to Soong, it was intended to be heard by the US, Japan and China.

  In making such an announcement, Chen is establishing the use of soft tactics to deal with blatant force across the Taiwan Strait.

  So there is indeed a necessity to develop a peace mechanism and set of enforceable regulations for cross-strait relations. Apart from the generally accepted view that this will give Soong a platform to operate across the Strait, the most important aspect of this move is that Taiwan will use "peace" to oppose the anti-secession law, especially as it has already demonstrated that it has a referendum law that allows the president to call a defensive referendum, and has made use of this despite intense US pressure not to.

  With the juggernaut of the anti-secession law directed straight at Taiwan, it is essential that this country have a soft policy to hand, especially under the new structure of US-Japanese security cooperation in the region. Concern for security often comes from the risk of conflict, and the new security guarantee is like a bird cage to protect the growth of Taiwan consciousness, and this new effort to strive for peace could see the creation of another path for cross-strait relations.

  If the main goal of cross-strait relations is peace, then the gulf within domestic opinion will be narrowed.

  Premier Frank Hsieh's (謝長廷) domestic policies, including no hike in National Health Insurance premiums, the minimum tax system and taxing soldiers and teachers, are all policies that combine elements from the pan-green and pan-blue platforms, incorporating aspects of the Lien-Soong presidential bid, and basically constitutes a middle way on domestic policy.

  The premise for this is that the current status quo be incorporated into the Constitution, and the peaceful resolution of the cross-strait issue becomes common ground. If this were the case, many of the lines leading to ethnic conflict would be removed.

  What comes next is simply the question of response and adjustment to this situation within both the pan-green and pan-blue camps. For many pro-independence supporters, the 10-point consensus from the Chen-Soong meeting justified their initial fears, for there is the retreat from "one country on each side of the Strait" to the "four noes" and the suggestion of "a constitutional `one China.'"

  The fact that emotions have been running high should come as no surprise. This is especially clear in the popularity of the individual politicians. Chen's popularity is not likely to increase as a result of a reconciliation, and will probably fall due to doubts from all sides. Soong will face the same danger. Falling between two chairs is the conventional danger of a middle-road policy, and the only difference is that now Chen and Soong are tied together.

  Whether there will be a challenge from within the pan-green camp might become apparent as early as May and the National Assembly elections. Although this is an extraordinary session of that body convened to deal with the issue of constitutional amendment, the vote along party lines will give an indication of changes to the political map.

  It will be interesting to see if the DPP and PFP can retain their relative strength. The greatest challenge to Chen's reconciliation approach will be to see if the new pan-green camp will be able to revive the call for constitutional reform through referendum.

  As for the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), it will first have to tear its attention from the struggle for the party chairmanship and take note of the Chen-Soong middle road.

  Looked at in detail, the 10-point consensus contains many KMT policy positions, and as the Chen-Soong partnership omits KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰), the KMT really have very little room to maneuver, and it really does not have many cards in its hand to bargain over the arms procurement deal, party assets or the party pulling out of its media interests.

  The new middle road has also helped establish a defensive triangle between the US, Japan and Taiwan. For cross-strait relations, the ball is now back in Beijing's court. A divergence is likely to appear in the pan-greens' platform, and the KMT is in danger of being marginalized. We must wait and see if the party will be able to respond to this danger after a transition of power to the next generation.

  Hsu Yung-ming is an assistant research fellow at the Sun Yat-sen Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy at the Academia Sinica.

  Translated by Ian Bartholomew
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