Last year a research student surnamed Lin, who studies Taiwanese politics at Beijing University, came to visit me. Lin asked me: "You are in fact relying on military protection by the US in your advocacy of Taiwan independence. Aren't you afraid that Taiwan will become an American colony?"
I replied that "if you are worried that Taiwan will become an American colony, then you shouldn't keep threatening Tai-wan with military force, thus forcing us to look to the US for protection. Why don't you try to make Taiwan look to China? If China were to recognize Taiwan's independence and sovereignty, and turn the two countries into the best of allies, with all mutual economic benefits, cultural exchanges and military alliances, the US would be scared to death."
Lin's visit continued for more than two hours and there was argument as well as agreement.
Lin understood my explanation of China's traditional historical awareness quite well. I basically said that Beijing's constant talk of Taiwan as part of its territory and seeing the "unification" of Taiwan as a sacred historic mission is a matter of China's traditional historical awareness making itself felt. Looking back at China's 3,000-year history, there have basically been two situations -- either there has been one large unified country, or there have been several states existing simultaneously.
The first situation prevailed for more than 1,700 years, and the latter for almost 1,300 years. This gives a proportion of 58 percent against 42 percent, not a great difference. During the periods when there were several states, the people did not necessarily lead difficult lives. During the Five Dynasties and Ten States period, the Min state in Fujian Province, for example, was quite successful in developing sea trade. Life in the Shu state in Sichuan Province wasn't too bad, either, until it was conquered by the Song state and rural rebellions ensued.
But past Chinese traditional concepts saw empires with centralized power as the norm, even though these empires didn't care even if the people's lives were completely destroyed. The existence of several simultaneous states was seen as abnormal, even though the people's lives were stable and prosperous. As a result, some emperors saw the destruction of small states and the quest to unify "the world" as a sacred historic mission.
Historians see the unified state as the historical standard to praise. In other words, "all lands under the heavens belong to the em-peror," and "as there are not two suns in the sky, there are not two emperors to rule the people." In the event that "all lands under the heavens" really couldn't be "unified," each king would strive to prove lineage to claim that he was in direct descent of earlier em-perors and that all the other kings were traitors and usurpers. Line-age is another aspect of unifica-tion. This is strictly a product of despotic dynasties and lies a world apart from today's democracies.
This unification view and lineage concept have served to suppress unique creativity in many areas, and it has also led to much warfare and the end of happiness and stability for innumerable people. Lucian Pye said that China throughout history has wasted too much manpower, material and financial strength on its quest for unification, and that this is one reason why it has been weak for so long and is unable to rise again.
China only understands how to "unify," not how to "unite." The former suppresses many unique individualities by creating one big body, while the latter allows many unique individualities to maintain their uniqueness before joining them together. China's constant wish to "unify" Taiwan and destroy its independence is a matter of unification, rather than uniting, and this is bad for both parties. If the two sides were united, they would be able to exist and prosper together.
Before leaving, Lin said that as a proponent of Taiwan independence, I was very different from what he had imagined. I told him that, regardless of whether he believed what I said, he would have to remember to add some criticism when using my words in his thesis to avoid creating trouble for himself. This made him smile.
A year later, the people of Taiwan are keeping China at a respectful distance after being hit by the SARS epidemic and alarmed by Hong Kong's Article 23 uproar. China pays no attention to winning the minds of the Taiwan-ese. Instead it adopts a heavy-handed unification approach, applying pressure to Taiwan across the board. Judging from its actions, from blocking Taiwan's participation in the World Health Organization and the World Women's Forum to the recent request that every nation should disallow "Taiwan" in favor of "China" when listing birthplaces on the passports for their foreign-born citizens, China is still unable to distance itself from this traditional historical awareness.
The question of whether China and Taiwan will be able to exist and prosper side by side depends on this very concept. On this issue, however, China is stuck in a pre-modern historical awareness. Will an independent Taiwan have to sacrifice its own democracy and freedom to abide by such stale historical awareness?
All those blue groups leading a life of Taiwanese independence while opposing real Taiwanese independence should find a way of helping their mother country change its way of thinking instead of echoing Beijing's "one China" cliches.
Lee Shiao-feng is a professor at Shih Hsin University.
Translated by Perry Svensson
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