Three decades after its expulsion from the UN, Taiwan has begun a mini debate on who lost the UN.
In a report to a high-level gathering of Presidential Office officials, Dr. Chen Lung-chu (陳隆志), national policy adviser to the president and former professor of Yale University, argued that the late president Chiang Kai-shek (蔣中正) and his stubbornness was to blame.
ILLUSTRATION: MOUNTAIN PEOPLE
Understandably, John Chang (章孝嚴), a KMT legislator and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, disagreed. He asserted that the changing world situation made it unfeasible for the ROC to preserve its seat in the UN, despite of efforts made by the ROC government.
Chang urged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to release classified files to set the record straight.
Without the decision-making and diplomatic files from the ROC, it may be difficult to make a comprehensive and fair judgment on who or what was responsible for the defeat in the UN.
However, declassified top-secret US files showed that while changing world politics was one of the key factors, then-president Chiang's inflexible policy based on domestic considerations was a major factor.
According to Chiang's thinking, what he was fighting for was not a seat for the ROC in the UN. He was competing with PRC for the legitimacy of representing "the whole of China."
Most likely, he would rather have lost the ROC's UN seat than co-exist with the PRC in the world body because "to keep the earthen tile intact" would have shaken the ROC's legitimacy for ruling Taiwan.
The most important declassified document that showed Chiang's direct involvement in the UN representation issue in 1971 was a "Summary Record of A Conversation Between President Chiang Kai-shek and Mr. Robert Murphy" collected in the Nixon Files.
Murphy had been under-secretary of state in the 1960s and was considered an old friend of Chiang. He was sent by President Richard Nixon on a mission to Taiwan to persuade Chiang to adopt a new approach in order to retain the ROC's seat in the UN
Conversation with Chiang
He had a lengthy conversation with Chiang on April 23, 1971. The only other officials present were Chow Shu-kai (
According to the top-secret record of the conversation, Murphy told Chiang that as a result of careful study in 1971, it was believed that if the old formula were used, "we would encounter defeat in the UN this year or, at the latest, next year."
In replying to Chiang's inquiry about what sort of new approach the US had in mind, Murphy pointed to the idea of "replacing the Important Question Resolution (IQR) with a Dual Representation (DR) formula."
Murphy suggested that the new resolution might be prefaced by a statement in favor of the principle of universality and then go on to propose a dual representation for China without mentioning which of the two contending parties is the sole representative of China.
He warned that this approach must be made as "a sincere effort to solve the Chinese representation question and not merely a gimmick."
Chiang's response to Murphy's presentation was a question regarding what would happen to the ROC's seat at the Security Council. Murphy assured him that the new approach would avoid this point so as to enable the ROC to retain its seat at the Security Council.
The new American approach was to replace the IQR, focusing on preserving ROC's seat. But Chiang was more interested in the exclusion of the PRC as he said that "the IQR should remain the principle instrument to bar the admission of the Chinese communists."
But Murphy pressed hard; he cited Nixon's position that "should the ROC insist upon using the old formula in the UN this fall, he would be prepared to go along." But Nixon was very anxious to know Chiang's views and to get his advice.
Inseparability
Chiang began to pronounce his demands. He wanted the IQR be reintroduced and the new approach to preserve both the ROC's membership in the UN General Assembly and its seat at the Security Council "because the two really are inseparable." If they are treated as separate matters -- which would give the Security Council seat to Beijing -- "the ROC would find it impossible to remain in the world body."
Why did Chiang want so badly to keep ROC's seat at the Security Council? Obviously it was because that touched on who was the legitimate government of China. The UN Charter designated China as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. By implication, whoever keeps the seat at the Security Council is the legitimate government of China.
That was why Chiang was unusually candid in talking to Murphy, saying "yielding the ROC's seat at the Security Council to the Peiping regime would undermine the legal foundation of the ROC's very existence. Such a humiliating situation would be against our national honor and tradition and would be, therefore, totally unacceptable."
In the conversation, Chiang summed up his views as follows:
First, "From the stand point of the ROC, we hope the IQR can still be resorted to this year."
Second, if the US should see difficulties ahead, the ROC would do nothing to stop it from suggesting a new formula provided that this new formula would not cause any serious damage to the ROC.
Third, "Any new formula which endorses the UN General Assembly's acceptance of the Peiping regime is damaging enough to the ROC, even if Peiping does not come in."
Fourth, the new formula must by all means protect the ROC's seat at the Security Council in order to preserve the ROC's basic position and the integrity of the charter.
Fifth, "Should any other country try to amend the new resolution by including the ROC's seat at the Security Council, the US must do its utmost to thwart such an attempt."
At one point Chiang even urged the US not to be co-sponsor of the new formula, but moments later he backed off and said he would leave it to the US government to weigh all the pros and cons.
Chiang's mentality was fully revealed in the following blunt exchanges with Murphy: "President Chiang re-emphasized the inseparability of the ROC's seats both in the General Assembly and at the Security Council. Should the ROC's seat at the Security Council be taken away, then the ROC would have no choice but to act according to the Chinese proverb, `rather be a jade broken than an earthen tile intact.'"
Murphy jokingly commented that if the ROC, under the old formula, should encounter defeat, then the jade would really be broken.
"President Chiang said that he is fully aware of the consequence, but our legal stand and moral tradition would not allow us to coexist with the rebel regime in the UN."
If Chiang were alive and involved in this mini-debate, he would blame the US for the ROC's expulsion from the UN. He put it that way when he asked Murphy to convey to Nixon a message that said, in part, that "if the US does not put a stop to its concession to the Peiping regime, eventually Peiping might get into not only the UN General Assembly but also the Security Council. Should the ROC one day leave the UN, the world would know that she has been forced out not by the communists, but by the US."
Chang has a point that the changing world situation played a key role in the expulsion of the ROC from the UN. Merely four days after the Chiang-Murphy consultation, on April 27, the White House received a message from Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai (周恩來) inviting Nixon to send a high-level representative to visit Beijing. That led to then secretary of state Henry Kissinger's secret mission to China in July and a subsequent visit in late October which dealt a fatal blow to ROC's efforts to retain its membership in the UN.
But Chiang's five points and his deep concern about the legal foundation of the ROC's existence had constrained the ROC's efforts to lobby for the Dual Representation Resolution in the months leading to the final fiasco.
Passive efforts
From declassified US diplomatic files we can see those efforts were passive, confused, inconsistent and even hesitant. Chiang's concern about the legitimacy of his KMT government was a dominant factor in the struggle to retain a seat in the UN.
Some of the key developments revealed from those declassified files may help us understand better the process and make a fair judgment.
On July 10, Kissinger told Chinese Premier Zhou that the US would be willing to agree that the admission of PRC into the UN can be a majority vote, not an Important Question. The US would say the expulsion of other countries now in the UN should be by a two-thirds vote.
"In this manner, you would be able to take the Security Council's seat allocated to China, and as soon as you can get the two-thirds vote for expulsion, you would be the only representative of China in the UN. Indeed, you would get the China seat now," Kissinger said.
On July 30, Secretary of State William Rogers informed James Shen, ROC Ambassador to the US and Liu Chieh (劉鍇), ROC Ambassador to the UN, that he would announce the US decision on the Dual Representation Resolution on Aug. 2. The new approach would provide representation both for the ROC government and the government in Beijing and "at least to acquiesce in the majority view that government in Beijing should hold a permanent seat on the Security Council."
US Ambassador Walter McConaughy also informed Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai on July 31 about the US decision. Chow responded that, "ROC would have to publicly oppose the Dual Representation Resolution. But it would not campaign against it or give an impression of all-out opposition."
On Aug. 2, Ambassador McConaughy reported to the State Department that Chow called him to say that Premier C. K. Yan (嚴家淦) and Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) were very unhappy with the draft statement by Rogers that stated that the ROC "has a population of 14 million and is larger than 92 members of the UN," because that seemed to rebut the ROC's statement claiming to represent 700 million Chinese people.
On Aug. 2, right after Rogers announced the US decision, the ROC made a statement that urged "the peace-loving and justice-loving member states to defeat the Albanian Resolution which seeks to replace the ROC by the rebel Chinese Communist regime."
The ROC statement avoided mentioning Dual Representation or the seat at the Security Council.
On Aug. 21, the American Embassy in Taipei reported to Washington quoting Fredrick Chien (
According to the diplomatic cable, Chien said that the ROC government "would have less objection" to a subsequent amendment to the Dual Representation Resolution to include the seat at the Security Council.
On Aug. 26, US Ambassador George Bush and ROC Ambassador Liu Chieh met in New York. They agreed that renewed efforts to obtain co-sponsors were required.
On Aug. 28, Che Yin-shou, director-general of International Organization Affairs, told American diplomats that MOFA had sent instructions on the Dual Representation Resolution on Aug. 21. The instructions contained three main points.
First, ROC ambassadors were to urge host governments to vote for simple Dual Representation and explain that the ROC, for obvious reasons, cannot support the Dual Representation Resolution in the UN General Assembly, but the host government should disregard this position. Ambassadors were also to sound out host governments' positions on the disposition of the Security Council seat without indicating opposition to host governments' positions, including those favoring the Security Council seat for Beijing through complex or amended Dual Representation Resolution.
On Aug. 31, Chow Shu-kai, in conversation with Ambassador McConaughy, repeated the ROC's "strong hope" that the initial Dual Representation Resolution avoid inclusion of the Security Council seat.
Mixed messages
On Sept. 3, Rogers instructed McConaughy to convey an 11-page message to Chow, complaining that a simple Dual Representation Resolution cannot even assemble a minimally acceptable list of co-sponsors for the representation resolution.
On Sept. 11, Rogers reported to Nixon that Chow had handed McConaughy a formal written response which reiterated the traditional position of the ROC: to admit the Chinese Communists to the UN would violate the charter. The moment such a resolution was tabled, his government would have to issue a public statement objecting to it in the strongest terms.The ROC would continue to object, moreover, as required.
But Rogers reported that Chow was more flexible and pragmatic in oral statements and indicated that the ROC did want Dual Representation to succeed.
On Sept. 15, Huang Shao-ku (黃少谷), secretary-general of the National Security Council, told an American diplomat that he wanted to make sure that the US realized the ROC would have to make a statement opposing US co-sponsorship of the complex Dual Representation. Huang explained that the ROC statement was necessary since the government had already been attacked in the Central Policy Committee.
On Sept. 16, Chow and his delegation met with Rogers. Rogers said that the US was convinced that the only chance for success lay in a complex Dual Representation scenario.
"The US wants to win, but without the energetic behind-the-scenes support of the ROC, our joint effort cannot be successful," Rogers said.
Chow responded that "the maximum the ROC could do was not to campaign against complex Dual Representation. If asked by a friendly government, the ROC ambassador has the latitude to inform their host government that the ROC hopes the Dual Representation will pass."
"If an ROC ambassador in the field had any doubts, and wished to seek new or clearer instruction, I would be available for this in New York," Chow said. He added that "something cannot be easily put down in black and white."
On Sept. 23, the State Department sent a priority telegram to all embassies, informing them that the ROC's public statement on Sept. 23 on the US Dual Representation was "designed primarily for domestic consumption on Taiwan and does not indicate the ROC will act in any way to oppose the passage of Dual Representation giving the PRC the Security Council seat."
The State Department said that Chow had previously informed the US that such a public statement would have to be issued, but the ROC would continue to work behind the scenes for the Dual Representation Resolution as its only effective way of preserving its representation in the UN.
"The secretary was informed by Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai on Sept. 16 that US embassies could assure host governments friendly to the ROC that the ROC did hope Dual Representation would pass," the State Department telegram said.
Confusion
All these developments indicated that the situation was confused and the ROC's efforts were a passive campaign for the passage of the Dual Representation Resolution. The ROC seemed obsessed with its legitimacy and MOFA was constrained by the position taken by Chiang during the conversation with Murphy.
Kissinger's visit to Beijing in late October added to the confusion. It sealed the fate of the ROC's membership in the UN. As Chiang had predicted, if the ROC lost its Security Council seat to the PRC, the legal foundation for the ROC's existence would be damaged. The new question was how to deal with the damage.
Vice Foreign Minister H. K. Yang (楊西崑) suggested a declaration of independence and the renaming of the ROC as "The Chinese Republic of Taiwan." He advised the formation of a government consisting two-thirds Taiwanese and one-third mainlanders.
But President Chiang had a different idea. He did not want to give up his privilege to rule in Taiwan. But he had to make a little concession. He appointed his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, as premier and put a few more Taiwanese in the Cabinet. That was a long process described by American diplomats as the "Taiwanization of the Republic of China," which served as a tool to rebuild the legal foundation for the ROC to govern Taiwan.
But that solution has not yet resolved the problems that Taiwan faced in international community.
James Wang
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