Academia Sinica President Lee Yuan-tseh (李遠哲) recently made an appeal to people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, stressing that only through cooperation can a new political milieu be created.
Actually, the "one China" issue has found Taiwan mired in a morass of difficulties from which it longs to extricate itself. It has been overlooked, however, that in order to make progress in cross-strait relations, Taiwan needs to construct a logical theoretical framework for positioning and direction. Such a move would allow Taiwan to remove itself from its present predicament.
In terms of positioning, the substance of "one China," namely "China as a whole cannot be permanently divided," should be restored to its original meaning.
Moreover, neither side should use its national title to lay claim to the whole. China as a whole is not merely the Republic of China (ROC), nor is it only the People's Republic of China (PRC). Thus, in discussions regarding cross-strait positioning, we must construct the concept of the "three entities"(三個主體), namely the ROC, the PRC, and "China as a whole"(整個中國).
The "three entities" concept is theoretically grounded in the notion that sovereignty belongs to the people; "China as a whole" is shared by Chinese people on both sides of the Strait, and cannot be monopolized by any one party.
In strict legal terminology, cross-strait relations could be posited as "two Chinese states under China as a whole" or "two equal political entities with attributes of statehood under China as a whole." If one wishes to steer clear of shared misunderstandings and suppressed animosities, and moreover satisfy both sides' emotional and cognitive needs, using the formulation of "two equal political entities under China as a whole" would perhaps be even more appropriate to the task.
For "China as a whole," relations between the ROC and PRC are "internal." They would have what could be commonly described as a "brother-to-brother" or "special" relationship.
This kind of formulation doesn't violate the positioning used by Taiwan in the Guidelines for National Unification (國統綱領).
In addition, it doesn't run counter to China's long-held views. That is to say, the positioning of "two equal political entities under China as a whole" would basically incorporate the formulations found in the Guidelines for National Unification and "one China, two systems."
Vis-a-vis an agreement signed by both sides, "China as a whole" can legally exist as one of the "three entities." The mutual promise not to split up "China as a whole" is a necessary legal step. But at the same time that legal pledges are being made, both parties should also accept the other's existence, agreeing to coexist in international organizations. After agreeing not to remain permanently divided, the two sides, coexisting in international bodies, would not create any legal conclusions that the two have completely separated from one another.
Both sides of the Strait should work to realize "China as a whole," ensuring that it's more than just an empty concept existing only in law. For example, in international organizations, apart from each side having its own representatives, teams representing "China as a whole" or the "cross-strait community" should be jointly organized to act as observers.
Further, in accordance with gradually deepening cooperation across the Strait, the authority of this "third entity" needs to be increased. Thus, the three entities can coexist in international organizations.
After China and Taiwan have determined their respective positioning, the second important step is deciding the direction.
China and Taiwan should be able to adopt the integrational method used by the EU. Under this kind of "individual entities sharing another entity," and "union in division, division in union" model, the needs of each side are taken into account, and a target for interaction is agreed upon. "Integration" can make up for flaws in "one China, two systems" in that it can gradually build a "common identity" across the Strait, while not forcing the Taiwanese people to alter their national identity.
This will be useful in fostering peaceful coexistence and development among future generations. "Integration" can also make up for shortcomings of the "cooperation and mutual benefit" provided for in the Guidelines for National Unification. It creates a mechanism that can be shared by both sides of the Strait. Through participation in the mechanism, Taiwan will have the right to share in the development of "China as a whole."
Moreover, Taiwan won't need to worry about whether or not it will gradually be "peacefully digested" in the process. A thing or two can be learned from the way Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg have used the European Economic Council's mechanisms to develop their influence outside of their respective individual borders.
"Positioning" and "direction" are steps forward which Taiwan and China cannot nor should not avoid. Both sides should take positions centered around the interests of all Chinese. Creating an environment that is mutually acceptable to people on either side of the Strait -- one that will allow Chinese and Taiwanese to develop alongside one another in peace -- is our shared responsibility.
Chang Ya-chung is the director of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at Nanhua University. Translated by Scudder Smith.
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