The premise of Syaru Shirley Lin’s (林夏如) book, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, is that given Taiwan’s complex political, social and economic landscape and its equally complex relationship with China, most existing academic work is not comprehensive enough to fully examine Taiwan’s “inconsistent and irrational” economic policies toward China. These policies have seen four major course reversals in the past 20 years, beginning from Lee Teng-hui’s (李登輝) restrictive “no haste, be patient” policy following the 1995 missile crisis, to Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) rapid liberalization program that led to the Sunflower movement of 2014.
“Although theoretical literature might lead one to forecast that Taiwan’s growing economic independence on China would cause Taiwan to liberalize its economic policies steadily over time, this has not been the case,” Lin writes.
In her introduction to the book, Lin admits that even she initially believed that “economic logic alone would explain the alternation between economic liberalization and restriction.” But soon, she realized that Taiwanese national identity, which had been rapidly consolidating since the country’s democratization, was a major underlying factor that she had overlooked.
This identity, which began as a contested one where people would identify as either Chinese or Taiwanese, pro-independence or pro-unification, has rapidly changed over the years.
Lin argues that today, most people hold a general Taiwanese identity regardless of ethnicity and political views as a general consciousness driven by shared democratic values and a “way of life” — one that China does not share, and thus people strive to protect it although they may support different approaches when it comes to cross-strait relations.
It is surprising to read that some scholars simply dismiss this national identity as an artificial construct created by opportunistic politicians to make people act irrationally when it comes to China issues. It does indeed seem irrational at first, as Lin points out that today, one can be Taiwanese, oppose unification yet support cross-strait economic liberalization. But this book provides a solid explanation to this contradiction, and explains how this shift in identity cannot be ignored when looking at developments in Taiwan’s foreign economic policy.
Naturally, when national identity is brought into the fray, Lin has to include other factors, such as political history and public opinion. The result of this shift from a singular, economic point of view to a comprehensive and eclectic analysis is an extremely thorough and systematically organized book that provides a methodical review and analysis of the four “episodes” or changes in direction regarding economic policies in Taiwan’s recent history.
In each period, Lin details the changes in the four major “clusters” that make up the spectrum of what people believe the government should do: extensive restriction, moderate restriction, moderate liberalization, and extensive liberalization.
Each of the episodes are organized in the exact same way: changes in national identity, national economy and politics, cross-strait relations, Beijing’s policy, Washington’s policy, the major national debate or conference of that period, public reaction, changes in the four clusters and finally a case study to illustrate the analysis. And even these sub-chapters are thorough, as they are broken down into further categories and include all segments of society, leaving few stones unturned.
This thoroughness continues until the conclusion, where Lin lays out the implications for Taiwan’s domestic politics and future cross-strait relations. She explores a number of potential scenarios that include the challenges both Taiwan’s and China’s political leaders face, what went wrong and what actions they could possibly take.
In the vein of giving advice to both Taiwan and China, there is no hint of political bias detected in the book, as all parties receive attention. Lin is Taiwanese but has a varied background — she spent her childhood in Taiwan, worked in the financial industry focusing on direct investment in Asia, and now teaches political science in both the US and Hong Kong.
Despite the book’s sheer amount of information, systematic organization and academic nature, it is actually an enjoyable read for the layperson, with only a little jargon in the part where Lin explains her methodology. While the writing is not particularly lively or dramatic — it is, after all, an academic text — the arguments are compelling with a unique perspective that keeps the reader hooked.
Furthermore, the prose is clear and easy to understand despite tackling such a complicated topic in a complicated way. And the strict organization actually helps with the navigation — you know what’s coming, and it’s interesting enough that you look forward to it. At face value, it is indeed a fascinating history lesson not only on the recent developments in national identity and cross-strait economic relationship, but how intertwined they are.
If there were any criticism in the writing, it might be the massive number of acronyms used — the non-expert may easily forget what a certain acronym stood for (this reviewer did) and perhaps spelling it out the first time it appears in each chapter would have helped.
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