Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) returned to work after his defeat in the presidential election to face the music in the city he abandoned for three months to concentrate on his campaign. He now has to contend with a recall motion that has a real chance of progressing to the third stage, which could be put to a vote as early as May or June.
An ETToday opinion poll found that 63.4 percent of Kaohsiung residents approve of the recall motion and 42.2 percent regret voting for Han in the 2018 mayoral election.
The poll results reflect an obvious partisan bias: 90 percent of respondents who are Democratic Progressive Party supporters favor Han’s recall, although 30 percent of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) supporters do, too.
In the Jan. 11 election, Han only won three of the 38 administrative districts in Kaohsiung, which had a nationwide high turnout of 77.44 percent. He received less than 35 percent of votes, compared with more than 62 percent for President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文). He has clearly lost the trust he persuaded Kaohsiung voters to place in him in 2018, and in a possible recall vote, his fate would be in the hands of those same voters.
These figures are devastating for Han, because the threshold for a recall, should the proposal reach the third stage, is hardly unattainable: a simple majority, as long as 25 percent of eligible voters participate.
One possible objection to holding a recall vote at this point is that it is unfair to condemn the administration of a maverick newbie so early in his first term.
However, Han did himself no favors right from the start, with frequent absences after running an energetic campaign built around him rolling up his sleeves and getting to work for the city’s residents, abandoned in short order by the naive hubris of believing that only he could save the nation.
He could vie for the KMT chairmanship, despite the outright rejection he received the last time he tried.
He has said that he has no interest in standing, but he said the same for the KMT presidential primary last year.
Some have said he could unite the pro-unification, localization and metropolitan elite elements within the KMT. That might be an overly charitable assessment of the situation.
The party elite countenanced him because of his unexpected victory in Kaohsiung, but his drubbing this month will have dented their enthusiasm.
If he decides to stand, he would obviously have to resign as mayor with immediate effect.
However, Han has failed to show himself to be a competent administrator, a clearheaded reader of political signs, an astute politician or a reliably electable candidate. The KMT would be insane to elect him as its chairman.
In the next few months, he might be tempted to have his team dig up dirt on his predecessor, Presidential Office Secretary-General Chen Chu (陳菊), to show that he is not such a bad option. However, this would be politically risky: Chen was popular in Kaohsiung when she was in office, and any attempt to muddy her name now would — quite correctly — be seen simply as a political tactic and might not go down well with an already incensed electorate.
He could wait to see if the polls are kinder to him closer to the recall vote and pre-emptively resign if it looks like he will lose.
Han’s best option is to press on, despite the obstacles. He has a few months’ lead before a potential recall vote occurs. He needs to buckle down and prove himself to the Kaohsiung electorate, even though at this point, his odds do not look too good.
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