During President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) tour of Taiwan’s Caribbean diplomatic allies this month, she stopped over in the US, meeting with several US politicians as well as UN representatives. Tsai achieved a big diplomatic breakthrough, successfully persuading Washington to loosen the framework of the US’ “one China” policy.
For more than three decades, successive US governments have agreed to respect the “one China” policy and its three main tenets: an acknowledgment that there is only “one China,” the need for cross-strait dialogue and an agreement to reach a peaceful resolution.
The second of the Three Joint Communiques, which, when signed in 1979, formally established diplomatic relations between the US and China, stated that Washington “acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.”
The third communique, signed in 1982, stated that the US “reiterates that it has no intention of ... pursuing a policy of two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan.” The result of the three communiques was to restrict Taiwan’s diplomatic activities.
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and China, successive US governments have maintained close, unofficial ties with Taiwan in accordance with the terms of its Taiwan Relations Act.
The quasi-government-to-government relationship has maintained peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, while the US’ mere “acknowledgment” of China’s position in the three communiques fell short of “recognizing” that Taiwan is part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The shades of gray created by the wording gave the US wiggle room to develop policies within the confines of the communiques and the act, and to defend Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty and promote cross-strait dialogue and the peaceful resolution of disagreements.
Washington was initially hopeful that by opening up to the world and becoming prosperous, China would eventually become a democracy. For this reason, the US pursued a “one China” Taiwan Strait strategy and a policy of engagement with Beijing. To have constructive relations with the PRC, the relationship between Taiwan, China and the US was weighted heavy toward China.
After US President Donald Trump took office, he looked at the aggressive military expansion under Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) leadership, Beijing’s flouting of international trade rules, its use of “sharp power” to infiltrate the globe with its ideology and its interference in the affairs of foreign governments. Trump decided to take on Beijing. His administration has enacted the Taiwan Travel Act and the National Defense Authorization Act in addition to other Taiwan-friendly measures.
The goal is twofold:
First, to remove the restrictive nature of the “one China” policy, which prevented Taiwanese presidents, premiers and high-level officials from visiting the US.
Second, to bring Taiwan into the fold of Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy family of democratic nations and use its democracy to shine a spotlight on China’s autocratic regime.
Within the US-led strategic framework to fight China’s autocracy with democracy, the US has used the Taiwan Travel Act to relax the “one China” policy and chart a path that will allow Taiwan reciprocal status with other sovereign nations and to harness its strategic ability to guide China toward democratization.
This has enabled Tsai to make a symbolic visit to Taiwan’s liaison office in New York in addition to the diplomatic breakthrough of attending a dinner with the UN ambassadors from 17 friendly nations to enlist their support for Taiwan’s readmission into the world body.
Add to this Tsai’s speech at Columbia University in which she extolled the virtues of Taiwan’s democratic values. These show that Taiwan is a sturdy buttress in the US’ strategy of using democracy against autocracy.
This is the significance of Tsai’s breakthrough and it serves as an important yardstick in Taiwan’s journey toward democratic and diplomatic parity with other democratic nations.
Michael Lin is a retired diplomat who served in the US.
Translated by Edward Jones
Could Asia be on the verge of a new wave of nuclear proliferation? A look back at the early history of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which recently celebrated its 75th anniversary, illuminates some reasons for concern in the Indo-Pacific today. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin recently described NATO as “the most powerful and successful alliance in history,” but the organization’s early years were not without challenges. At its inception, the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty marked a sea change in American strategic thinking. The United States had been intent on withdrawing from Europe in the years following
My wife and I spent the week in the interior of Taiwan where Shuyuan spent her childhood. In that town there is a street that functions as an open farmer’s market. Walk along that street, as Shuyuan did yesterday, and it is next to impossible to come home empty-handed. Some mangoes that looked vaguely like others we had seen around here ended up on our table. Shuyuan told how she had bought them from a little old farmer woman from the countryside who said the mangoes were from a very old tree she had on her property. The big surprise
The issue of China’s overcapacity has drawn greater global attention recently, with US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen urging Beijing to address its excess production in key industries during her visit to China last week. Meanwhile in Brussels, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen last week said that Europe must have a tough talk with China on its perceived overcapacity and unfair trade practices. The remarks by Yellen and Von der Leyen come as China’s economy is undergoing a painful transition. Beijing is trying to steer the world’s second-largest economy out of a COVID-19 slump, the property crisis and
As former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) wrapped up his visit to the People’s Republic of China, he received his share of attention. Certainly, the trip must be seen within the full context of Ma’s life, that is, his eight-year presidency, the Sunflower movement and his failed Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement, as well as his eight years as Taipei mayor with its posturing, accusations of money laundering, and ups and downs. Through all that, basic questions stand out: “What drives Ma? What is his end game?” Having observed and commented on Ma for decades, it is all ironically reminiscent of former US president Harry