Kaohsiung Mayor Han Kuo-yu (韓國瑜) has almost completely captured the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). Regardless of how many years it has groomed someone, after Han arrived on the scene, party members have been forced to step aside, one after the other.
The inherent problem posed by the Han phenomenon might shake the party to its core, and has in fact become the greatest threat to the KMT’s continued development and even its existence.
There is no shortage of KMT members who recognize the inherent problems with the phenomenon, but hardly anyone dares speak out about the damage he is causing the party.
Leaving other power factors aside, Han might still have a chance to win next year’s presidential election, as well as reshuffle the party.
To a certain extent, the replacement of the KMT’s first presidential candidate in 2015, then-deputy legislative speaker Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱), prevented the reshuffle from taking off earlier, but the impetus for change is becoming stronger and reformist voices are vicariously staging a comeback through Han. It seems that the existing order is about to break down.
What does this mean? By way of analogy, a few months ago, another presidential bid by former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) was discussed, and his fan club clustered around to support him.
Han’s supporters have rallied to shut Ma up and prevent him from blocking Han’s route to power. Given this, can party members still reasonably claim that a revolution is not under way?
For example, Han’s seven-day trip to Hong Kong, Macau and southern China last month pulled apart all of the party’s existing frameworks by engaging in lengthy and intimate discussions with Chinese Communist Party officials.
Under Ma, the public viewed the KMT as a party whose ultimate goal was unification with China, but Han seems to represent a new position — “on-the-spot unification” — and any other policy is “boring.”
This has never been a mainstream position throughout the party’s 70-year history. If the party as a whole were to embrace Han, it would be a great shift in policy. It would have a huge effect on not only centrist voters, but also KMT supporters.
During last year’s local elections, one of Han’s slogans was “politics zero, economy 100.” Many people thought he meant that he would not talk politics, but after being elected, he has talked about nothing but politics. The result, of course, has been zero, and this is having a crucial negative impact.
Economically speaking, it is often possible to play a win-win game, but politically, especially when it comes to cross-strait relations, the so-called “one China” game has been zero-sum ever since 1949 — if I live, you die.
In the game set up by China, if someone wants to attract business and capital, there is by definition only one way to do so: kowtowing to Beijing.
This is also the reason why Han pledges allegiance to the so-called “1992 consensus” wherever he goes and even joked in Macau that he was so popular he could run for chief executive of the territory. This all adds up to “one country, two systems,” with no space for the Republic of China (ROC).
However, he did not come back with a memorandum of understanding, but a letter of intent, to be implemented a year at a time, depending on the situation. There were no signs of any orders or delivery dates.
The key point is that this is not a win-win exchange; it all depends on whether the Chinese masters give their nod.
Han is a graduate of the ROC Military Academy special program, so he was trained to fight the communist bandits — of course he understands political zero-sum games. Having come up with “zero” in this particular one, surely he is acting the fool.
Members of the political elite who have been promoted through the KMT’s system surely understand that Han is putting on a show, but they still do nothing, even after they saw him meet with the director of China’s liaison office and hear him talk about being elected chief executive.
In the eyes of his fans, Han can do no wrong. The KMT has truly been swept away by the Han craze — can it really continue to call itself a nationalist party?
Tzou Jiing-wen is editor-in-chief of the Liberty Times (sister newspaper of the Taipei Times).
Translated by Edward Jones and Perry Svensson
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