Earlier this month, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) delivered a major speech on Taiwan. It was originally intended to mark the 40th anniversary of then-Chinese National People’s Congress Standing Committee chairman Ye Jianying’s (葉劍英) 1979 “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” and praise the peaceful evolution of the cross-strait relationship.
However, Xi went drastically off-piste, delivering a harshly toned missive that was the most strongly worded speech on Taiwan policy of any Chinese leader since the beginning of the country’s economic reforms.
Xi’s speech has stirred up a political tsunami among the main political parties in Taiwan, with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and independent politicians — and even politicians in the US — likely to adjust their policies to respond to the changed state of affairs across the Taiwan Strait.
In the speech, touted by Beijing as “guiding principles for a new era of China-Taiwan policy,” Xi introduced “five conditions,” which included a restating of the so-called “1992 consensus,” but with an additional proviso inserted into its meaning that the two sides “will work jointly to seek national unification.”
Xi also advocated joint discussions by representatives from each side of the Taiwan Strait to arrive at a Taiwanese version of Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework for Hong Kong.
However, Xi’s New Year message has already been rejected by the DPP and the KMT. From President Tsai Ing-wen’s (蔡英文) perspective, Xi’s five conditions are manna from heaven.
First, Tsai was facing renewed pressure from Beijing to clarify her stance on the “1992 consensus” following the KMT’s victories in the local elections on Nov. 24 last year, which allowed the party to install 15 mayors and county commissioners who support the “1992 consensus.”
The Tsai administration was in a bind, but Xi’s five conditions have thrown the government a lifeline.
Second, Xi’s request that representatives from each of the political parties on both sides of the Taiwan Strait engage in political negotiations to develop a Taiwanese version of Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” model was a naked attempt at “united front” tactics by Xi that in one fell swoop undid four decades of hard work by China to slowly butter up Taiwan.
Third, Xi’s modification of the “1992 consensus” to mean that the two sides will work together toward unification has reinforced the DPP’s argument that acceptance of China’s “1992 consensus” would result in the elimination of the Republic of China.
Fourth, despite Xi’s demand that Taiwan negotiate a “one country, two systems” model with China, there is no market for this among Taiwanese, who have looked on at the abject failure of the system’s trial in Hong Kong. The majority of Taiwanese vehemently reject such a model.
Fifth, after the DPP’s poor performance in the local elections, some middle-generation DPP legislators have raised doubts about Tsai’s leadership and argued that she should not run for a second term, believing that if she does, it would stifle the prospects of the party’s younger generation.
Some members of the elder generation of the party’s pro-independence wing also wrote an open letter calling on Tsai to give up power, making it more difficult for Tsai to get re-elected. Xi’s five conditions could not have arrived at a more opportune moment.
From the perspective of the KMT, Xi’s five conditions sent the party’s leadership into a state of shock and astonishment.
First, the Chinese Communist Party and the KMT had originally reached an agreement on the “1992 consensus.” This was blown out of the water by Xi unilaterally injecting the requirement for “national unification” into its definition.
Following a period of careful reflection, the KMT simply reiterated its “1992 consensus,” that each side has its own interpretation of what “China” means. The party clearly has one eye on next year’s elections and seeks to shore up its long-standing position while also avoiding accusations that it is in Beijing’s pocket.
Second, the KMT is well aware of the trajectory of Taiwanese mainstream public opinion and that Taiwanese would never accept the “one country, two systems” model.
Now that Xi is demanding that the two sides jointly discuss a “one country, two systems” model, the KMT has therefore had no choice but to publicly reject that solution.
Third, the KMT’s China policy has traditionally been the party’s strength. While the party has not yet been usurped by the DPP in this area, after Xi’s “five conditions,” the KMT can no longer claim China policy as its domain.
Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), who has advocated that “the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family,” previously believed that he would only need to decide whether to accept the “1992 consensus” if he decided to run for president.
However, the changed meaning might cause Ko to reassess his challenge to the throne.
Xi’s five conditions were intended as a warning to Washington — which Xi sees as a “foreign force” — against interfering in Taiwan’s elections and opposing China’s unification designs. The question Xi should be asking himself is: Does US President Donald Trump look like someone who is easily intimidated?
Edward Chen is a chair professor at Chinese Culture University’s Department of Political Science.
Translated by Edward Jones
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