The Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Monday expressed its gratitude to the US House of Representatives for passing the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, which details the US’ commitments to its allies in the Indo-Pacific region. It also includes a section regarding US commitments to Taiwan.
On the same day, the Ministry of National Defense confirmed that Chinese fighter jets and warships have once again been sighted near Taiwan, following a brief period during which such intimidation had ceased.
It was also reported that Japan intends to boost spending on advanced stealth fighters and long-range missiles to support the US, which is facing an increasingly emboldened Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the Western Pacific.
The act is a welcome restatement of the US’ commitment to its key regional allies. It is also a recognition of the importance not only of military might, but also of the perception, in the eyes of increasingly jittery allies, that military strength can be relied upon to offer promised protection against China’s ambitions.
It can be regarded as a recalibration of a regional policy that has fallen into disarray over the past decade or so, and a much needed attempt to recapture a narrative of strength and reliability in the region.
The act concentrates not on Asia, but on the much wider Indo-Pacific region. This is a reimagining of former US president Barack Obama’s poorly implemented “pivot to Asia.”
One of the US’ challenges in Asia is that China — through aggressive land reclamations in the South China Sea, unreasonable territorial and maritime claims, and continued intimidation of its neighbors — has salami-sliced its way to greater power, not only in actual terms, but also in its command of the narrative of regional dominance.
The PLA still pales in comparison to the might of the US military, but China has a significant advantage: It seeks, for the time being at least, regional — not global — dominance. Global dominance requires the US to project power many thousands of kilometers away, backed up by military force. This entails presence, supply lines, maintenance of those supply lines and a network of allies. That is a much more difficult proposition than what Beijing has in mind.
The US had hoped that China could be convinced to cooperate with the international community through the lure of increased economic prosperity. This has not happened. Obama’s passive China policy allowed Beijing to increase its dominance in the South China Sea.
Speaking at the Hudson Institute, US Admiral Philip Davidson said: “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the US.”
First the South China Sea, next the Western Pacific.
Japan bolstering its defensive capability to support US forces in the region is a recognition of the emerging dynamic. Essentially, China wants the US out of the way; it sees itself as resuming its rightful return to hegemonic power in the region.
If China achieves unification with Taiwan, the game would change radically in China’s favor. Regional influence would become significantly more difficult for the US to maintain.
The protection of Taiwan, and the rebuttal of the myth that it is a part of China, is the most direct and effective way for the US to reassure its regional allies of its commitment to their protection and national security in the face of the challenge presented by an increasingly dominant China.
Words of reassurance are important, but rhetoric backed up by deeds would be a far more effective way of assuaging the fears of concerned allies.
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