At the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation earlier this month in Beijing, China apparently felt the need to dispel growing criticism that its lending for the Belt and Road Initiative and other projects is a form of “debt-trap diplomacy,” from which the trapped nations might never be able to repay their debts and would hence lose their valuable assets to China.
This criticism has been reinforced with the view that most projects undertaken with Chinese loans do not help the recipient countries much in terms of increased employment, as they involve the use of Chinese labor and associated activities.
Indeed, as some media reports say, Chinese engaged in such projects live in their own communal world, without much contact with local people.
During a gala opening of the forum, they were received by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) (reminiscent of the old imperial court, as Xi is now the country’s indefinite president), who announced new loans of US$60 billion.
“In addition, for Africa’s least-developed countries, heavily indebted and poor countries, landlocked developing countries and small island developing countries that have diplomatic relations with China [and not with Taiwan], the debt they have incurred in the form of interest-free Chinese loans due to mature by the end of 2018 will be exempted,” Xi said.
However, this will apparently not apply to new loans.
A good number of these countries have subsistence economies and are likely to become beholden to China forever; especially as these projects, built with Chinese money and labor, do not have substantive local employment benefits.
China is obviously aware that it has an image problem; hence, Xi’s image-making exercise at the forum to suggest that China and the attending nations are on the same page regarding Beijing’s beneficial developmental role.
To emphasize this, Xinhua reported that South African President Cyril Ramaphosa said: “[This forum] refutes the view that a new colonialism is taking hold in Africa, as our detractors would have us believe.”
The refutation implicitly acknowledges that China’s expansive role in Africa and elsewhere is being regarded as a form of new colonialism.
It is not just in Africa and other developing nations, but also in some developed counties, that Beijing’s quest to buy sensitive industrial and technological assets is raising eyebrows.
Take for instance the case of Germany, where its government decided to block the potential purchase of machine tool manufacturer Leifeld Metal Spinning by a Chinese investor, citing national security concerns.
According to Bloomberg, Germany has joined the US and Canada in taking a tougher line on Chinese acquisitions of their important assets.
The government of German Chancellor Angela Merkel has reportedly been at the forefront of moves to bring in EU-wide screening of foreign investments after being the target of Chinese acquisitions.
There is concern that China is seeking access to sensitive technologies to advance its global reach, as well as acquire key infrastructure, such as ports and electricity.
In Australia, there is great concern about China’s attempts to acquire or invest in sensitive assets in all areas, such as new mobile phone technology, mining, agriculture, infrastructure and so on.
Canberra is placing restrictions on security grounds for fear of losing control of important infrastructure systems.
Sydney Morning Herald international editor Peter Hartcher reported that even in 2013, before Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, China was in an expansive mood.
Hartcher reported that in a meeting with then-Australian treasurer Joe Hockey, then-Chinese minister of finance Lou Jiwei (樓繼偉) asked his Australian counterpart: “Why won’t you let me buy Rio Tinto?” referring to the giant Anglo-Australian mining conglomerate.
He then tried another angle, saying: “All I want is to buy 15 percent of the top 200 listed [Australian] companies.”
Lou reportedly persisted, asking for authority to buy multibillion-dollar shareholdings in Australia’s major banks, prompting Hockey to suggest that they move the conversation to a “more meaningful topic.”
Indeed, there is a sense that, apart from its historical greatness, such entitlement comes by virtue of China’s size, as spelled out in 2010 by then-Chinese minister of foreign affairs Yang Jiechi (楊潔篪) in a conversation with his Singaporean counterpart.
“China is a big country and other countries are small countries and that is just a fact,” Yang reportedly said.
However, that might not be acceptable to other countries that are protective of their national sovereignty.
Sushil Seth is a commentator based in Australia.
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath