In 1992, only 17.6 percent of Taiwanese considered themselves “Taiwanese,” but in last year’s survey by National Chengchi University (NCCU), less than 4 percent of Taiwanese considered themselves exclusively “Chinese.”
Taiwanese identity has waxed and waned over the past few centuries, influenced by various internal and external forces.
Humans have lived on the island of Taiwan for at least 10,000 years and civilization here might go as far back as 30,000 years, long before any nation-state existed. Taiwanese Aborigines are the descendants of Austronesian people who landed on Taiwan, probably from Southeast Asia and/or the Southeast Asian landmass — today’s Southern China — more than 5,000 years ago.
They lived in more or less isolated tribes and developed different languages from the same root. Although there was a supratribal alliance in the central west plains called the Kingdom of Middag in the 17th century, it controlled only about 27 towns at its peak.
Taiwan was roughly divided into Middag, Dutch (in the south, southwest and southeast) and Spanish (in the north) areas in that period. Still, a large part of central mountainous Taiwan and the narrow east coast plains were isolated tribal areas. Each population group had its own identity.
Since the early 17th century, Taiwan’s inhabitants have come under various economic, political and cultural influences, most of which were forced upon them by various colonizing newcomers, each of which left their footprint.
With increased migration from China during the 18th and the 19th centuries, Han people began to dominate the Taiwanese population.
Taiwan, like China, was a colony of the Qing Empire from the late 17th century. Although the Qing established Taiwan Prefecture and later designated Taiwan as a province, they never took control of the whole island.
During the 200 years or so of Qing rule, Han people and culture began to overtake the tribal areas in the western plains, and plains Aboriginal tribes disappeared and merged into Han society.
It is said that there were only Tangshan (唐山) grandfathers, but no Tangshan grandmothers (Tangshan meant the “China proper” areas of the Qing Empire), because the Han immigrants were mostly men, who then married Aboriginal women. At the time, Aborigines had their own identity, while Han immigrants continued to identify with the Han in the southern Qing.
In 1895, the Qing ceded Taiwan to Japan after being defeated in the First Sino-Japanese War. The Japanese ruled Taiwan with an apartheid system that tended to enhance and perpetuate Han Taiwanese identity as being Chinese, but Japan also began massive infrastructure construction, established unified health and education systems and implemented the rule of law.
All these not only connected different Taiwanese groups in different areas, but also changed the culture of Taiwanese society, which continued to develop along a very different path from that of “compatriots” in China.
However, because of the isolation from China, people in Taiwan were not aware of these gradual, but cumulative changes leading to significant differences and they continued to identify themselves as Han Chinese. I call this period the “incubation period” of Taiwanese identity.
The shock came when Japan surrendered Taiwan to the representative of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石), who brought in his Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) military and bureaucrats.
Although uncertain, Taiwanese first welcomed them, but were shocked to see the Nationalist soldiers wearing straw slippers, carrying umbrellas, pots and pans, and acting like bullies with guns.
The Nationalist Chinese bureaucrats were arrogant and corrupt. They behaved very differently from the polite and orderly society in Taiwan, and they even looked somewhat different from Taiwanese. The 228 Massacre in 1947 confirmed the initial impression, followed by the imposition of martial law.
Taiwanese realized that they were very different from Chinese. This was the first awakening of Taiwanese identity.
Chiang’s Nationalist Chinese were also alarmed that Taiwanese were so different from them and even had an appreciably unique identity. The Nationalists looked at this unique identity as the result of Taiwanese being “imperialized” by Japan. They began a wholesale conversion of Taiwanese into Chinese.
Patriotic education and propaganda were everywhere. Speaking ill of the KMT government resulted in long prison sentences. Thus a perfect environment for the development of a Stockholm syndrome was put in place.
These methods of what could be called cultural genocide were very successful, and the postwar baby boomer generation became Sinicized and had a Chinese identity with nationalist characteristics. Taiwanese identity waned.
Then, in the 1980s, stimulated by the overseas independence movements, democratization began in earnest in Taiwan.
Millennials and “generation Z” were born into a free society. With the free flow of information, members of these younger generations were “naturally independent” or “genetically independent.”
The NCCU poll showed that 55.3 percent of respondents deemed themselves exclusively Taiwanese. More than one-third of respondents, or 37.3 percent, said they were both Taiwanese and Chinese, and less than 4 percent identified themselves as Chinese only. Ninety-four percent said that living in a democratic country is “important” or “very important.”
This is the second reawakening of Taiwanese identity. Not only did a majority identify themselves as Taiwanese, it appears that Taiwanese have incorporated the values of democracy and freedom into their newest identity constructs.
Identity can be a fragile thing, depending on changes in the political and economic environments. Risk aversion also plays a significant role. A recent small, but significant drop in Taiwanese identification might be due to a sluggish domestic economy, better job opportunities in China and increased military threats from China. However, the desire to defend democracy and freedom remains strong.
Sebo Koh is a former chairman of the World United Formosans for Independence, USA.
Donald Trump’s return to the White House has offered Taiwan a paradoxical mix of reassurance and risk. Trump’s visceral hostility toward China could reinforce deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Yet his disdain for alliances and penchant for transactional bargaining threaten to erode what Taiwan needs most: a reliable US commitment. Taiwan’s security depends less on US power than on US reliability, but Trump is undermining the latter. Deterrence without credibility is a hollow shield. Trump’s China policy in his second term has oscillated wildly between confrontation and conciliation. One day, he threatens Beijing with “massive” tariffs and calls China America’s “greatest geopolitical
Ahead of US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) meeting today on the sidelines of the APEC summit in South Korea, an op-ed published in Time magazine last week maliciously called President William Lai (賴清德) a “reckless leader,” stirring skepticism in Taiwan about the US and fueling unease over the Trump-Xi talks. In line with his frequent criticism of the democratically elected ruling Democratic Progressive Party — which has stood up to China’s hostile military maneuvers and rejected Beijing’s “one country, two systems” framework — Lyle Goldstein, Asia engagement director at the US think tank Defense Priorities, called
A large majority of Taiwanese favor strengthening national defense and oppose unification with China, according to the results of a survey by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC). In the poll, 81.8 percent of respondents disagreed with Beijing’s claim that “there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China,” MAC Deputy Minister Liang Wen-chieh (梁文傑) told a news conference on Thursday last week, adding that about 75 percent supported the creation of a “T-Dome” air defense system. President William Lai (賴清德) referred to such a system in his Double Ten National Day address, saying it would integrate air defenses into a
The central bank has launched a redesign of the New Taiwan dollar banknotes, prompting questions from Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators — “Are we not promoting digital payments? Why spend NT$5 billion on a redesign?” Many assume that cash will disappear in the digital age, but they forget that it represents the ultimate trust in the system. Banknotes do not become obsolete, they do not crash, they cannot be frozen and they leave no record of transactions. They remain the cleanest means of exchange in a free society. In a fully digitized world, every purchase, donation and action leaves behind data.