During his official visit to Japan from May 9 to May 12, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (李克強) received a very high-profile welcome from Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The two sides signed 10 cooperation agreements, signaling that relations between China and Japan have recovered to the level they were at before 2012, when the two countries clashed over the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台).
The “China factor” has always been an important variable that influences Taiwan’s relations with Japan, so will the full recovery that has taken place in China-Japan relations impede the normal development of ties between Taiwan and Japan?
Among academics who specialize in Japan, there is a widespread idea that “when relations across the Taiwan Strait are good, Taiwan-Japan relations will also be good.” The basic thinking behind this is that when cross-strait relations are cordial, China will turn a blind eye to moves that Taiwan makes to strengthen its relations with the US and Japan.
To prove the point, those who support this idea would point to the 28 agreements that Taiwan signed with Japan during former president Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) eight years in office.
While this idea does have some merit, another factor is that China’s rise is creating an ever-greater imbalance of power between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. This is a strategic worry for the US and Japan, and gives them a motive to bolster their relations with Taiwan.
China is displeased with President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) for her refusal to recognize the so-called “1992 consensus,” so it keeps stepping up its pressure on Taiwan militarily, diplomatically and even with respect to people-to-people exchanges.
In view of this tension, the US has taken a series of steps to reinforce its relations with Taiwan, including passing the 2018 US National Defense Authorization Bill and the Taiwan Travel Act, and agreeing to provide Taiwan with the technical assistance it needs to build its own submarines.
Admittedly, the factors that influence Taiwan-Japan and Taiwan-US relations are not exactly the same. Japan has no law comparable to the US’ Taiwan Relations Act.
It has been 46 years since Japan broke off diplomatic relations with the Republic of China in favor of the People’s Republic of China, and since that time, Japan has been extremely cautious about how it handles its relations with Taiwan, not daring to go beyond the bounds of its pledge to Beijing to only maintain people-to-people relations with Taipei.
This has made it difficult for Japan to expand its political relations with Taiwan, especially regarding the sensitive matter of regional security.
However, Japan is uneasy about China’s rise and worried about the growing power imbalance across the Taiwan Strait. Abe has proved to be the most Taiwan-friendly of Japanese prime ministers and since he took office, there has been a marked atmospheric change in Japan’s efforts to boost its relations with Taiwan.
Even during the presidency of Ma, who never enjoyed Japan’s full confidence, Japan still made great efforts to bolster its relations with Taiwan, rather than see the Ma administration lean heavily toward China.
After Tsai took charge of the Presidential Office, Taiwan-Japan relations entered a mini-golden age not seen for several decades, with Tokyo holding great expectations of her administration.
Although Taiwan has not made any progress in dropping its restrictions on food imports from Japan, that did not stop Tokyo from renaming the Interchange Association to the more explicit title of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association and sending Japanese Vice Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications Jiro Akama on an official visit to Taiwan in March last year.
However, since late last year, when relations between China and Japan started to show clear signs of improvement, there have been no signs of any further moves to enhance Japan’s political relations with Taiwan.
Abe hopes to visit Beijing this year and he would like Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) to use the occasion of the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Osaka in June next year to make a state visit to Japan.
Clearly, the “China factor” in Taiwan-Japan relations is not entirely the same as the “cross-strait relations factor,” and it is even harder to say that say that “when China-Japan relations are good, Taiwan-Japan relations will not be good.”
Although it would be unrealistic to expect formal relations between Taiwan and Japan at a time when China-Japan relations have fully recovered, there is still plenty of room for low-key promotion of practical relations between the two sides.
There is room for improvement even in the “sensitive” area of regional security. Although Taiwan and Japan have no formal diplomatic relations, their location in the East China Sea means that they still need to interact to “prevent unforeseen incidents.”
The Institute for National Defense and Security Research was established on May 1 under the auspices of the Ministry of National Defense, presenting the possibility of an institutionalized Taiwanese-Japanese regional security dialog mechanism with the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies and other bodies.
When Japan seeks to develop its relations with Taiwan, it must consider relations with China. However, as long as everyone fully understands the multifaceted nature of the “China factor” and grasps the extent of its influence on Taiwan-Japan relations at each stage, there should be no need to worry about unexpected changes.
A suitable strategy for promoting relations between Taiwan and Japan could then be designed for each stage, so that they could continue to develop at a steady pace.
John Lim is an associate research fellow in Academia Sinica’s Institute of Modern History.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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