Beijing was not happy about Premier William Lai (賴清德) reiterating his support for Taiwanese independence at the legislature on Friday last week. The state-run Global Times published an editorial lambasting Lai for his “presumptuous” words. It also suggested the Chinese government consider initiating a new avenue of attack against Taiwanese independence advocates.
Taiwanese commentators have criticized what they feel is the excessive nature of this suggested approach, and of its implications for free speech and sovereignty. However, what is also interesting is the editorial’s frank description of the context of Beijing’s “united front” strategy.
The editorial calls for Beijing to issue an international arrest warrant for Lai, as part of the next step in “united front” warfare consisting of “precision strikes” against individual pro-independence Taiwanese politicians. Lai would then be prosecuted under China’s criminal code and its “Anti-Secession” Law.
Since the “Anti-Secession” Law is pertinent to the context and assumptions of the “united front” tactics informing the editorial’s premise, certain details are worth pointing out.
First, it is based on the principle that Taiwan is not a sovereign country and belongs to China. Article 4 says that accomplishing unification is “the sacred duty of all Chinese people, the Taiwan compatriots included.” If you want presumption, look no further than that.
Second, it states that peaceful means to achieve this are preferred.
Third, it explicitly states the way this is to be achieved. Article 6 lists measures to promote cross-strait relations, including encouraging and facilitating personnel exchanges, economic exchanges and cooperation, as well as exchanges in education, science, technology, culture, health and sports, and cooperation in combating crimes.
While these sound harmless, indeed desirable, their presence in the law, constituting one-fifth of the entire text, suggests that they are intended to lay the groundwork for eventual unification, rather than being desirable ends in themselves.
Which makes perfect sense when you read the rest of the editorial.
It says that, following the development of closer cross-strait ties and “the mainland’s” continuously expanding influence on “the island,” China’s encircling of Taiwan is almost complete.
It then talks of how China’s sanctions against pro-independence Taiwanese entertainers and artists have clearly borne fruit, evidenced by how their ability to perform in Taiwan has been curtailed.
The time is ripe to tighten the grip and exert similar sanctions — “precision strikes” — against specific pro-independence Taiwanese politicians, the editorial says.
“Following the increasing “mainlandization” of economic and social life within Taiwan, we can surely now find or pro-actively initiate ways to sanction” these politicians and “to create an entirely new battlefront,” it says.
Lai will be the first, and he will serve as an example to cow not only other pro-independence politicians, but any Taiwanese with independence leanings who desire in any way to develop their business or career in the Chinese market, the newspaper said.
Previously, the two-pronged approach of a state to exert influence in the world has been the combination of soft (cultural, social and economic) and hard (military) power. Add to this now a third category, that of sharp power: The attempt to penetrate the political and information environments in certain countries.
Beijing is effectively presenting traditionally soft power approaches as a desirable alternative to hard power interventions, but intentionally exploiting the environment cultivated by this soft power to encircle, strangle, penetrate and strike.
The Global Times editorial is a prefect summary of how it has gone about this.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval
RSS