In the first year of his presidency, US President Donald Trump has shaken up the traditional direction of US foreign policy through several initiatives, with his focus on protecting and promoting the interests of Americans under his grand “America First” strategy.
Trump pulled the US out of the Trans-Pacific Partnership; refused to “certify” the Iran nuclear deal framework to the US Congress; took a tough stand on North Korea’s nuclear program and immigration issues; questioned the “one China” policy and strongly denounced Chinese expansion in the South China Sea; reopened discussions on the future of the North America Free Trade Agreement; withdrew the US from the Paris climate agreement and recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.
Trump’s decisions have kept the US’ allies and enemies clueless about the future course of his policies toward these countries.
True, during the initial months of the Trump administration, there was also confusion and uncertainty about the US’ approach toward South Asia.
Soon after being elected president, Trump’s strong stand on the H-1B visa and immigration, his appreciation for Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his accusation that India was seeking billions of dollars from advanced countries in exchange for its support for the Paris agreement sparked serious concern in the Indian foreign policy establishment about India-US ties under the new US administration.
However, before the relationship between New Delhi and Washington could become fragile, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the US at Trump’s invitation and the two leaders established a strong personal chemistry.
Trump expressed his commitment to expanding and deepening the strategic partnership. It was in this context that US Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis visited India and said: “India and the United States share a strong and vibrant strategic partnership.”
These high-profile political engagements, in turn, sent strong signals about deepening ties between India and the US, with Mattis agreeing to re-energize the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative as a mechanism to promote technology sharing. This, in turn, will greatly help the Indian military modernization program.
The two sides have also focused on strengthening cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and respecting freedom of navigation, overflight and commerce throughout the region, which is a matter of great relief for India as the statements are obliquely aimed at China’s assertive posturing in the South China Sea.
With an attempt at countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a joint statement, supporting regional economic connectivity, has sought respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, the rule of law and the environment. The US’ role has been very crucial in India becoming the 43rd member of the Australia Group last month.
The Trump administration has approved the sale of unarmed surveillance drones to India. Getting 22 Guardian MQ-9B uncrewed aircraft will enhance India’s maritime surveillance capability. The revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among the US, India, Japan and Australia last year also shows an expansion in bilateral engagement between New Delhi and Washington.
With regard to Pakistan, the Trump administration made it clear that Islamabad has to confront terrorism in all its forms. Realizing that Pakistan is reluctant to cooperate in counterterrorism operations, the US decided to halt disbursement of US$255 million to Islamabad.
In announcing his South Asia Policy in August last year, Trump became perhaps the first US top leader to openly say that “Pakistan often gives safe haven to agents of chaos, violence and terror.”
In his first tweet of the year, Trump said: “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than US$33 billion in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools.”
Consequently, the US Department of State announced it would freeze most military aid — about US$1.3 billion — to Pakistan.
On promoting peace, security, stability and development in Afghanistan, Trump’s South Asia Policy said the US would deploy more troops in Afghanistan without fixing a timeline for the return of US forces.
“From now on, victory will have a clear definition: attacking our enemies, obliterating ISIS, crushing al-Qaeda, preventing the Taliban from taking over Afghanistan and stopping mass terrorist attacks against America before they emerge,” Trump said.
The South Asia Policy authorizes US commanders in the region to take action against extremists both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is equally important that the new US administration no longer considers Pakistan its non-NATO ally.
Certainly, given former US president George W Bush’s lukewarm approach to India on the Afghanistan issue and the flip-flopping in former US president Barak Obama’s approach to the issue, Trump’s new strategy is a welcome development for India, because the move is not only a candid acceptance of India as a regional and global power, but will also help India increase its strategic depth in Afghanistan.
While the Trump administration clearly indicated its preferences in South Asia during a visit to Pakistan on Friday, US Acting Secretary of State for South Asia Alice Wells’ statement that the US is open to an all-inclusive dialogue process to ensure durable peace in Afghanistan is a marked shift in Trump’s South Asia Policy.
Only time will tell whether the dialogue process is really implemented or whether it has just been used as a tool to pressure Pakistan to act against extremist organizations operating on its soil.
Over the next three years, it will be interesting to see how Trump addresses, among other issues, India’s concerns about the H-1B visa issue, what concrete steps the US takes to expand engagement with India in high-tech fields and to what extent Trump succeeds in changing Pakistan’s actions on counterterrorism at a time when China is openly backing Islamabad.
Sumit Kumar is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs visiting fellow at National Chengchi University in Taipei and a research fellow at the Chennai Center for China Studies in Chennai, India.
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