For a nation that has to battle on almost a daily basis to maintain a presence on the international stage, Taiwan has been popping up a lot in the international media over the past year, often for the wrong reason.
It is not because of the coverage of the theatrical fisticuffs in the Legislative Yuan, or the bigotry of those fighting efforts to legalize same-sex marriage, or even the chill in cross-strait relations since President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) took office.
It is because of the increasing number of Taiwanese being arrested abroad on suspicion of telecom fraud or other criminal activities and the resulting battles over where they end up on trial — the countries they were arrested in, Taiwan or China.
In the past two weeks alone, Indonesia deported 18 Taiwanese and 125 Chinese suspected of telecom fraud to China to face prosecution; Cambodia sent 10 Taiwanese to China over similar charges; and 18 Taiwanese arrested in Bangkok for telecom fraud were repatriated to Taipei.
Going back further, Spain in February sent more than 200 Taiwanese to China, despite Taipei’s protests, while in June last year, Cambodia sent 21 Taiwanese to China, just weeks after Kenya deported 23 Taiwanese to Beijing on April 5 — all for alleged telecom fraud, although in the Kenyan case the 23 had been cleared of those charges in a local court.
Then there were the two Taiwanese men who died after being shot by Indonesian police during drug raids, one on July 27 in Jakarta and the other on July 13 in Banten Province, while five other Taiwanese were arrested in the two raids. Those five, if convicted of smuggling amphetamines, are likely to join seven other Taiwanese sentenced to death in Indonesia on the same charge in the past year alone.
On a positive note, in some of these cases, be they fraud or drug-related, the suspects were arrested or raids were conducted because of intelligence provided by the Criminal Investigation Bureau. That apparently was a key factor in winning the repatriation of the 18 arrested in Bangkok.
However, the battle over where suspects should be deported to has not been just about diplomatic ties or which nation provided police assistance. Beijing used to be able to argue that it had the right to prosecute Taiwanese telecom fraud suspects whose victims were Chinese, because such suspects would likely not end up in court if sent back to Taiwan.
That situation changed after the Legislative Yuan on Nov. 15 last year passed an amendment to Article 5 of the Criminal Code to add “aggravated fraud” to the list of offenses that could be prosecuted in Taiwan even if they were committed “outside the territories of the Republic of China.”
Yet a lot of time and money are still being spent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Mainland Affairs Council and the Straits Exchange Foundation on handling the fallout from these cases — terms of consular assistance, battling for repatriation or trying to get China to abide by the Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement (海峽兩岸共同打擊犯罪及司法互助協議).
It is time and money that could be put to better use elsewhere. Would it not be better to focus on getting the message out in Taiwan that if you are involved in illegal dealings abroad you risk arrest and the likelihood of tough prison sentences — or in the case of drug offenses in Southeast Asia or China, the death penalty? That if you are involved in telecom scams targeting Chinese citizens, you could find yourself in a Chinese courtroom?
Instead of arguing over who has the right to try a suspect, perhaps people should be willing to recognize the basic limitations inherent in such situations.
Yes, there is the cross-strait factor, but the main issue is that Taiwan — just like any other nation — cannot do much more than provide consular advice to its citizens arrested abroad, and more should not be expected.
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