Speaking at the inauguration of Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam (林鄭月娥) on Saturday, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) said: “Any attempt to endanger China’s sovereignty and security, challenge the power of the central government ... is an act that crosses the red line.”
Xi has drawn the Chinese government’s “bottom line,” making it clear that any attempt to challenge the central government is unacceptable. With such a bottom line, not only does it rule out Hong Kong independence, but also any political action that might be considered a threat to Beijing’s authority.
Even before Xi’s address, there were already signs that Beijing was planning such a move.
Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC) Chairman Zhang Dejiang (張德江), the nation’s No. 3 official who oversees Hong Kong and Macau affairs, said at a May 27 conference marking the 20th anniversary of the implementation of the Basic Law: “Hong Kong’s political structure is neither separation of powers nor led by the legislature or judiciary. It is an executive-led one, with the chief executive as the core.”
His comment drew criticism from democracy advocates, who pointed out that, according to the Basic Law, Hong Kong has judicial independence.
Zhang later reiterated his point by describing the relationship between Beijing and Hong Kong as one between the central government and a regional government, which derives its power only through delegation from the former.
He added that in no circumstances would attempts to resist the authority of the central government be tolerated.
Despite the 2014 Occupy Central movement and repeated calls for political reform, Beijing’s attitude toward Hong Kong has become increasingly conservative.
On Sep. 12, 2015, Hong Kong Liaison Office Director Zhang Xiaoming (張曉明) said that the chief executive oversees the territory’s legislative, judicial and executive branches.
As suggested by Beijing’s attitude since 2014 and remarks by Zhang Xiaoming and Zhang Dejiang, the central government is planning to elevate the chief executive to a special status that is higher than the legislative and judicial branches. By emphasizing that the chief executive derives their power only through delegation from the central government, Beijing is aiming to exert fuller control over the territory.
What Beijing is really concerned with is not what Hong Kong is now, but rather what it will become in 2047 — when Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping’s (鄧小平) pledge of “one country, two systems” will have expired.
As Tian Feilong, executive director of the One Country Two Systems Legal Studies Centre at Beihang University, said in his book Is the Executive-led System Outdated? Reflection on the Hong Kong Constitutional Model: “2047 will be more than a time to decide whether to terminate the Basic Law and ‘one country, two systems’: It will mark the beginning of a new political era, where the executive-led/chief executive model will become more fully developed. In fact, all the disputes that have arisen from Beijing’s decisions regarding Hong Kong were meant to prepare the territory for that next phase.”
In short, Beijing will not abandon the “executive-led” model for Hong Kong, because it plans to further expand that system in the next several decades.
Under British rule, Hong Kong did not experience authoritarianism in the typical sense. Although Hong Kongers could only vote in very few circumstances, they enjoyed freedom of speech, freedom of press and academic freedom to a certain extent.
In contrast, since 1997, Beijing has taken a series of measures to ensure that the election of the territory’s chief executive and legislative council only takes place in a controlled way.
For example, Beijing had shelved the proposal to allow the election of the territory’s chief executive and legislative council through universal suffrage in 2007 and 2008. In addition, the “831 Decision” made by the NPC’s Standing Committee on Aug. 31, 2014, set down clear limits for last year’s legislative council election and this year’s chief executive election.
From Beijing’s plan to introduce the mandatory Moral and National Education Curriculum in Hong Kong’s schools after its handover to last year’s Causeway Bay Books incident and attempts to intervene in Hong Kong’s education system, it is clear that Beijing is paving the way for an authoritarian shift in the territory.
Before Taiwan became a democracy, it also went through an authoritarian period.
However, the biggest difference between Taiwan and Hong Kong is whether the latter could become a democracy depends entirely on Beijing.
John Lim is an associate research fellow at Academia Sinica’s Institute of Modern History.
Translated by Tu Yu-an
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