Pessimism, anxiety and frustration best capture the mood of Hong Kongers on the 20th anniversary of the return of the territory’s sovereignty to China.
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) first official visit to Hong Kong failed to boost public confidence in the sustainability of the “one country, two systems” framework. A heavy police presence, road closures and media censorship made people wary of the corrosive effects of Chinese authoritarian governance.
The pressure for “mainlandization” has been in tandem with the rise of democratic localism in Hong Kong’s politics.
Since the territory witnessed massive protests in late 2014 calling for direct elections of its chief executive, the escalating conflict with Beijing has led to the rapid mainlandization of local socioeconomic, political and legal structures.
Hong Kongers are worried about the incremental erosion of good governance, free speech and the rule of law as promised under the Basic Law.
As the territory is quickly absorbed into the Chinese political union, the long-standing universal values and norms that have set both places apart are disappearing.
Meanwhile, the transformation of the Hong Kong identity has occurred naturally over the past two decades, where an alternative local identity is replacing or supplementing a Han Chinese national identity.
This prolonged process started from the territory’s reversion from British to Chinese rule, and several institutional and societal factors contributed to the evolution of this postcolonial identity.
First, civic institutions are incredibly important. Hong Kong was subjected to more than 150 years of British educational, political and socioeconomic policies, all of which made it different from China.
The relatively free and liberal environment, especially the freedom of speech and press, has enabled Hong Kongers to weaken their adherence to various Chinese political regimes and cultivate a local sense of belonging throughout the late 20th century.
Second, the disappointment with mainland values, norms and ruling practices that arose from increasing cross-border interactions might have diluted the pre-existing Chinese cultural identity among the postcolonial generation.
Third, perceived hostility from China tends to alienate many Hong Kongers. Beijing’s latest demand for the chief executive, lawmakers and local educators to express their absolute obedience to the Communist state only worsens the situation.
Finally, demographic changes have led to a gradual decrease in the overall proportion of mainland-born residents and an increase in locally born Hong Kongers. As a result, ambitious political actors have to embrace, promote and internalize new localist sentiments to win popular support for their electoral campaigns and policy agendas.
All these elements are going to polarize the debate about the constitutional future of the territory.
As many Hong Kongers and pro-Beijing supporters perceive their own identity as an exclusive category, they might find it hard to compromise and tolerate the other side’s shortcomings.
In this crisis situation, effective leaders should know how to connect vision — ie, the art of knowing what to do and why in any given circumstance — with action — the art of knowing how to accomplish things.
The challenge for Xi and Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam (林鄭月娥) is how to transcend the binary identity politics and turn Hong Kong into a special political zone, experimenting with direct democracy for the territory and for China.
Joseph Tse-Hei Lee is professor of history at Pace University in New York City.
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