On May 20, former vice president Wu Den-yih (吳敦義) won the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chairmanship election with a landslide victory, which had something to do with his great efforts building local connections over the past few decades.
It is not too difficult to predict that the KMT under Wu, who attaches importance to local party affairs and networking, might perform better in local government elections at the end of next year.
However, whether Wu will lead the KMT to a successful comeback and regain power is another story.
He lacks common ground with the younger generation and this is not only because he is 69 years old this year, or because of the ingrained image of him as a liar, but because the party lost momentum after the 2014 Sunflower movement due to a national discourse that it is incapable of touching the younger generation, who have come to view Taiwan is an independent nation.
The KMT’s traditional national discourse is tied to the Chinese national discourse that it inherited from Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and his son Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) when the KMT relocated from China to Taiwan in 1949.
This discourse has extended to recent party leaders, such as former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), New Taipei City Mayor Eric Chu (朱立倫) and KMT Chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱).
However, it is obvious that this Republic of China (ROC) discourse, which is connected to China in two ways, does not appeal to the younger generation.
First, the KMT’s links to China go back to the Xinhai Revolution and the establishment of the ROC, the Chinese United League and the Revive China Society during the late Qing Dynasty.
This period involves the Northern Expedition, a war with Japan and the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion, which is connected to the beliefs and emotions that loyal party members find it most difficult to abandon.
Many of the Sunflower generation think that this view of national history is irrelevant and deals with the history of a foreign nation.
Second, the KMT links Taiwan to a future “unified China.”
As a result of changes to national identity that followed Taiwan-centered political and social trends that began in the 1990s, the party almost stopped mentioning cross-strait unification during Ma’s and Chu’s terms as chairmen.
However, although the KMT charter has been revised 20 times since it was adopted in 1924, the party still insists that its goal of a “strong, prosperous and unified nation” remains unchanged.
No KMT party leader has dared to exclude cross-strait unification as an option for Taiwan’s future.
The charter states that the party is to realize a unified nation according to the Three Principles of the People.
However, the two sides of the Taiwan Strait have now been separately governed for almost 70 years.
Although China’s economic and national strength have grown consistently, this “rising China” continues to reject democracy, clearly and definitely.
The possibility of realizing unification is next to zero in the eyes of younger Taiwanese.
Every party leader since former vice president Lien Chan (連戰) has failed to lay down a road map for realizing a unified nation under the three principles, and they have not dared discuss the existence of the ROC with Chinese leaders.
This makes it difficult not to ask old and new KMT leaders, party officials and members: Should the realization of unification remain in the party’s charter?
If so, how is this goal going to be achieved?
Meanwhile, the cruel reality is that following the Sunflower movement, the younger generation are more likely to favor independence and they are saying no to the KMT’s national discourse.
Whether or how the KMT deals with its long-standing discourse and effectively attracts young people will be crucial to whether it can regain momentum.
Would Wu dare open this discourse to debate after becoming the chairman in August?
If he does, would it attract young people?
This is not only a challenge to his intelligence and ability, it is also critical to whether the party can revitalize itself and make a comeback.
John Lim is an associate research fellow at Academia Sinica’s Institute of Modern History.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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