Last week’s Han Kuang live-fire drills simulated a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attempt to land on Penghu and a PLA assault on a Taichung airbase. These drills are important to maintain the most effective military response in case of an invasion by China.
Although the US has committed to defend Taiwan by the Three Joint Communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the “six assurances,” the nation still needs to be ready to defend itself, certainly in the initial stages of an attack.
According to a 2015 RAND Corp report entitled The US-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017, China’s ability to project its military power and have favorable engagements with the US is rapidly improving, especially closer to home, with an invasion of Taiwan for example.
However, it is also important to consider the costs of an invasion and its aftermath, which might give Beijing considerable pause.
First, landings would be costly for an invading force in terms of life and equipment, much more so than for Taiwan, especially with US assistance factored in.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would need to know that an invasion would succeed. Defeat would jeopardize the CCP’s legitimacy and give the US good cause to maintain a much stronger — and long term — military presence in the region, making a repeat attempt much more difficult.
Second, even if Beijing were to succeed, it would unlikely be met with open arms by Taiwanese. It would be different from when Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) forces arrived in 1949.
Taiwanese have an increasingly strong sense of national identity and have had a long time to think about China taking over. They do not want that.
They also have a sophisticated sense of the ins and outs of the historical argument of who has rightful sovereignty over Taiwan. China would not win that argument.
Third, there would be considerable infrastructure damage and destruction to government buildings, utilities, bridges, roads, railway lines and other transportation links. This would require massive reconstruction, which would not endear Taiwanese to the aggressors, to say nothing of the costs.
Fourth, there would be significant loss of life, which would stir up enmity.
Beijing could expect several decades of mollifying and pacifying Taiwanese, and dealing with insurgencies across the nation.
The PLA would have to commit tens of thousands of people to keeping Taiwan under control for decades.
There is also the reaction of the international community to consider. China is trying to present itself as a global power, with all of the responsibilities that entails.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) appears to want to establish China as a champion of international free trade and the environment in the potential power vacuum left by US President Donald Trump’s administration.
Instigating an invasion and drawn-out pacification of a people known for their progressive, peace-loving ways and democratic achievement might not be the best way to do that. It could lead to international isolation and condemnation that would retard any efforts China has made to set itself up as a reliable international partner.
Nations such as the Philippines, Vietnam and Japan, which have competing territorial claims in the South China and East China seas, would also have to adjust their approach to China and its military.
The economic disruption would have serious domestic consequences for the CCP’s legitimacy, as Chinese, who are becoming accustomed to prosperity and stability, might turn against the leadership.
In the US’ National Security Strategy (NSS) report released last month, US President Donald Trump offered his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The “Trump Corollary,” presented on page 15, is a distinctly aggressive rebranding of the more than 200-year-old foreign policy position. Beyond reasserting the sovereignty of the western hemisphere against foreign intervention, the document centers on energy and strategic assets, and attempts to redraw the map of the geopolitical landscape more broadly. It is clear that Trump no longer sees the western hemisphere as a peaceful backyard, but rather as the frontier of a new Cold War. In particular,
When it became clear that the world was entering a new era with a radical change in the US’ global stance in US President Donald Trump’s second term, many in Taiwan were concerned about what this meant for the nation’s defense against China. Instability and disruption are dangerous. Chaos introduces unknowns. There was a sense that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) might have a point with its tendency not to trust the US. The world order is certainly changing, but concerns about the implications for Taiwan of this disruption left many blind to how the same forces might also weaken
As the new year dawns, Taiwan faces a range of external uncertainties that could impact the safety and prosperity of its people and reverberate in its politics. Here are a few key questions that could spill over into Taiwan in the year ahead. WILL THE AI BUBBLE POP? The global AI boom supported Taiwan’s significant economic expansion in 2025. Taiwan’s economy grew over 7 percent and set records for exports, imports, and trade surplus. There is a brewing debate among investors about whether the AI boom will carry forward into 2026. Skeptics warn that AI-led global equity markets are overvalued and overleveraged
As the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) races toward its 2027 modernization goals, most analysts fixate on ship counts, missile ranges and artificial intelligence. Those metrics matter — but they obscure a deeper vulnerability. The true future of the PLA, and by extension Taiwan’s security, might hinge less on hardware than on whether the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can preserve ideological loyalty inside its own armed forces. Iran’s 1979 revolution demonstrated how even a technologically advanced military can collapse when the social environment surrounding it shifts. That lesson has renewed relevance as fresh unrest shakes Iran today — and it should