Those of us applauding the result of the French presidential election should perhaps do so tentatively or with only one hand. Enthusiasm for the defeat of the far-right candidate in France disguises the greater fact of the rightward shift of the political center at a global level within our major democratic systems. France should not make leftward liberals too sanguine.
The French race was won by a candidate without any track record, left or liberal, and no experience of elected office, by a party so recent and small it barely exists, and in the absence of any really serious attempt amongst the established parties and interests to forge workable coalitions between the liberals and the left.
The latter failure meant that the race was merely won by the least harmful candidate, himself a product of elite French institutions and a particularly entitled, yet unelected minister under French President Francois Hollande, seemingly without any detailed platform of policies on the economy, on social change, on industries and regions, nothing beyond an enthusiasm for the existing, unreformed “European project.”
Yet it is not difficult to see the EU as a fundamentally conservative troika — a very large platform for the further application of the neoliberal market faiths of the German government, the European Central Bank and the IMF.
Many commentators have perceived the tendency of a shift to the right within established parliamentary frameworks. The liberal left, which long struggled to ameliorate the worst excesses of market competition and which put its faith in public interventions to safeguard jobs, incomes, civil life and public amenities, has long fought against the neoliberal activists of a more aggressive capitalism, one that lives by the dictum that the profit system is indeed one that is highly unprofitable to most people.
The real difference now is that we are inheriting the aftermath of the global recession of 2008, where financial collapse resulted in a fightback of established interests that operated through a rightward shift of the entire political discourse and its leading institutions, including the political parties that held the trust of voters.
So, where it had taken considerable time and effort, and a good deal of ingenuity, for a leader such as former British prime minister Tony Blair to move the Labour Party toward the center and right, a few months have seen a complete turnaround within the center, with a larger proportion of its core turning further to the right.
In most of Europe the democratic left is fragmented and anxious.
The question is not so much the one now being discussed by most of the media: Will the rightward shift continue toward greater extremes in the major systems within the next few years?
Again, the second question of whether it will spread to other established democracies in and beyond Europe and the US is also of interest.
More interesting is the effect of the shift on smaller democratizing nations and, in particular, the possible impact on the most exemplary and successful of Asian democratic transitions, Taiwan.
In nations of democratic transition, the forces behind right-wing populism might not be so marked as in the older democracies — heightened mistrust of new elites has not yet become an overwhelming attitude; feelings of disempowerment are less where a political system is escaping from an earlier authoritarian regime; fear of economic globalization and immigration is less where there is a higher rate of economic growth; and worries over growing inequality are neutralized by relief at the escape from poverty.
Is Taiwan more or less vulnerable to the rightward shift than the larger established democratic nations?
There are some telling Taiwanese strengths, elements that cannot be artificially grafted on to any system and are similarly difficult to remove or inhibit.
The history of effective social movements is a huge saving grace. Even before the Sunflower movement, and certainly accelerating since then, it had become clear that Taiwanese democracy can incorporate alongside its party-dominated focus a great deal of dissent and direct action. The speedy use of social media by youthful dissenting groups cannot in itself prevent the rise of the extremists within the established parties, but it can certainly inhibit, ridicule and expose them.
In normal times a theorist might argue that a political system subject to such change by special, non-elected interests operating outside the established parliamentary procedures cannot be a full democracy. So be it, but these are no longer normal times.
Established centers of power in the US, Britain and France have shown themselves weak or confused in the face of right-wing extremism. A more fluid balance of forces — including many smaller parties fighting for a voice and representation — might well now be a strength to smaller, nascent democracies.
Taiwan also has a history of right-wing authoritarianism to act as a pointer in which direction not to move. This is no mere theory, but central to the long-lived experience of almost all Taiwanese.
No teaching or texts can deny the brutality and limits of imagination imposed by martial law. Most Taiwanese need only bear that in mind as they witness any rise of potential demagogues. Whatever they claim, believe the opposite. Whatever they advise, do the opposite.
Cross-strait relations and the intentions of China might also be said to measure the limits of Taiwan’s democratic evolution — the claim being that Taiwan has traded in a one-party system for a one-issue system. There is a deal of truth in this, but it might act more as something of a protectorate space for democracy.
Within Taiwan the overhanging constraint imposed by the cross-strait issue serves as a severe limit to any extreme right-wing movements, which would have to convince Taiwanese that they could gain advantage from any party set on a course of direct collision with China.
So, as a result of global tendencies, we have a complex irony now operating in Taiwan’s favor. Three elements that together have been seen as limitations to mature democracy — social movements, a history of authoritarianism and the cross-strait threat — might now be seen as serving the survival and progress of democracy.
It is up to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as the governing party to bear in mind such advantages, for they are real, but they are not set in concrete, providing a safe democratic structure for ever. Democracy is more a process than a structure, particularly so as it emerges from authoritarianism.
A DPP that uses the global turmoil only to gain short-term positional advantages will be one that falls short of the need to establish a clear alternative to right-wing populism.
Global shifts and the rhetoric of US presidents or the threats of Chinese presidents, all of which might be expected to become more volatile in the short term, are not within the realm of Taiwanese influence.
Far better to focus on good, strong policies at home, improvements in healthcare and the environment, especially for an aging population, and pay more attention to regional and structural problems that are creating new areas of unemployment, inequality and low aspiration, all of which reforms would be indirect contributions to welfare and cultural identity.
A truly active liberal state might withstand the major pressures stemming from the rightward global shift.
Ian Inkster is professorial research associate at the Centre of Taiwan Studies, SOAS, University of London, senior fellow in the Taiwan Studies Programme, China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, and editor of the journal History of Technology.
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