Former Hong Kong chief executive Donald Tsang (曾蔭權) was found guilty of bribery and misconduct in public office last week. On several occasions, he was reported to have exploited the privileges of his position for personal gain. He is the first — and hopefully the last — Hong Kong chief executive to be convicted in a criminal court.
Since 1997, the post-colonial arrangement of “one country, two systems” has degenerated into that of “one Hong Kong, two realities.” Privileged members of elites have become inviolable and immune from any legal processes, whereas ordinary people are subject to much scrutiny.
Numerous incidents of misconduct, corruption and abuse of public authority have normalized the dominant power structure in an autocratic system, thereby advancing the interests of the powerful at the expense of a disfranchised majority.
This case not only reveals the erosive effects of nepotism and cronyism in the post-colonial era, but also adds to the long list of scandals that have undermined Hong Kongers’ confidence in the legitimacy and integrity of the territory’s system of governance.
Yet, the surprising outcome of Tsang’s trial proved otherwise. The territory’s judicial independence is probably the only core institution that has not been eroded. Hong Kong’s judges, who are versed in common law traditions, continue to uphold the principles of fair play and substantial justice.
While Hong Kongers are contemplating the ramifications of their disgraced former leader’s conviction, the electoral race to become the territory’s next chief executive has begun. Several candidates are competing for the position, with former chief secretary for administration Carrie Lam (林鄭月娥) and former secretary of finance John Tsang (曾俊華) emerging as frontrunners.
How Tsang’s trial will affect the development of the election remains to be seen, but whoever wins next month’s poll will have to confront three structural problems in local politics.
First, the chief executive race is more like a selection process among pro-Beijing community representatives, business tycoons and urban professionals than a democratic election. Adhering to a longstanding policy of denying Hong Kong full democracy, China preempted electoral reform and its handpicked political agents have no legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
The 1,200-member Chief Executive Election Committee is scheduled to meet and decide on the next political leader. The pro-democracy camp occupy about 300 seats in this body, but pro-Beijing groups and some prominent business leaders have a dominant presence. Given this imbalance, it is hard for people to initiate a genuine debate about direct democracy in the electoral competition.
Worse still, there are restrictions on who can be nominated to sit on the committee. Pledging allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party is a precondition for becoming the territory’s chief executive. None of the candidates is willing to acknowledge and support the rise of localism as a means to defend Hong Kong’s core values.
Second, many Hong Kongers are struggling to come to grips with the gradual disappearance of the “one country, two systems” constitutional framework.
During the 1980s, Beijing wanted to ease people’s concerns about the territory’s future under communism. It introduced the Basic Law, which guaranteed that socialism would not be implemented and the existing capitalist system and way of life would remain unchanged for 50 years.
However, witnessing Beijing’s constant intervention in local affairs, Hong Kongers are deeply concerned over the 2047 deadline, when the territory is mandated to be part of the People’s Republic of China.
Third, the neoliberal discourse of laissez-faire prosperity has lost its appeal for Hong Kongers, who see no hope in a futureless society. Tycoons and middle-class professionals still profit from cross-border trade with China and they choose to ignore corruption and nepotism in all levels of Chinese bureaucracy.
The ruling elite have often employed the logic of economic transaction to engage with people. Their legitimacy depends on the satisfactory outcome of public policies, but their arrogance and insensitivity has reinforced many discriminatory measures against poor people.
In the light of Chinese economic slowdown, the Hong Kong government has been incapable of resolving the rising grievances and improving the territory’s wellbeing.
Perhaps chief executive candidates should pay attention to Donald Tsang’s downfall. His trial touches on the complicated relationship between rule of law and the exercise of power. The next chief executive has to manage a government devoid of legitimacy, so it is important to seek a consensus on issues of democracy and cross-border relations with China.
Otherwise, the new leadership will find it hard to restore Hong Kong’s fragile institutions and win the hearts and minds of Hong Kongers.
Joseph Tse-hei Lee is professor of history at Pace University in New York.
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