Putting the US first is what US presidents do. Post-war US presidents have consistently interpreted this as cultivating, and claiming stewardship of, an international order of peace and stability that creates conditions amenable to the furtherance of US interests. There is concern that US President Donald Trump has a narrower, less nuanced, more direct understanding of what putting the US first means, but it is impossible to tell.
On Friday, Trump gave his inaugural address.
“From this moment on, it’s going to be America first,” he said, making international trade and foreign relations integral to his theme.
This “decree,” he said, is to be heard “in every city, in every foreign capital and in every hall of power.”
Governments worldwide have been put on notice and were surely listening — many in anxious anticipation — over concerns that Trump’s business instincts would leave former allies abandoned or — as with Taiwan — as dealmaking fodder.
At a dinner celebrating 80 years of diplomacy at Twin Oaks in Washington on Wednesday last week, Taiwan’s Representative to the US Stanley Kao (高碩泰) said that the relationship between the two nations had “never been better in recent memory,” albeit with a “quiet and low-key” engagement. The Taiwanese government would like the momentum to remain intact, although the relationship “should be based on its merit and not used … as some kind of bargaining chip,” he said.
Former premier Yu Shyi-kun (游錫堃) — in Washington at the head of a Taiwanese delegation for the inauguration — asked Washington-based Heritage Foundation founder Edwin Feulner whether he thought Trump might sell Taiwan out.
Feulner said that the US’ Taiwan Relations Act would prevent him from doing so and that even if he wanted to, he would have to get past US Congress first.
The idea that the US could abandon Taiwan if it were in the US’ interest was mooted in 2011 by Charles Glaser of the Elliott School’s Institute for Security and Conflict Studies. The idea received short shrift in Congress and yet Trump’s address also signaled his willingness to distance himself from the policies of both parties.
However, there is reason for optimism. White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus is known to be well-disposed toward Taiwan.
Trump also said in his address that: “We will seek friendship and goodwill with the nations of the world,” and “reinforce old alliances.”
Kao said Taiwan intends to ensure that Taiwan-US relations remain sustainable and predictable. Unfortunately, it takes two to tango. Nobody is sure what Trump’s foreign policy goals are, or how well thought out his ideas might be.
How important is it for the US to protect Taiwan from China, whether it be for the sake of democracy in Asia, a valuable trading partner, the maintenance of the first island chain or of the US’ soft power influence in Asia?
Trump’s opening salvo on abandoning the “one China” policy is not the only threat he is throwing Beijing’s way — he has also made much of a possible 45 percent tariff on Chinese goods that could well trigger a trade war that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) would be keen to avoid. There are no winners in war, only casualties, and Xi would also have to contend with increased economic problems that such a conflict would cause. The distraction this would create might even benefit Taiwan.
Nevertheless, concerns have been voiced over whether Trump’s approach to foreign affairs and security might actually benefit China, which is being more assertive in Asia, and even challenge the US-led international order maintained by his predecessors. Will Trump decide to cash in the Taiwan “bargaining chip”? The government will have to make him understand why it would not be in the US’ best interests to do so.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
The narrative surrounding Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s attendance at last week’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit — where he held hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin and chatted amiably with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — was widely framed as a signal of Modi distancing himself from the US and edging closer to regional autocrats. It was depicted as Modi reacting to the levying of high US tariffs, burying the hatchet over border disputes with China, and heralding less engagement with the Quadrilateral Security dialogue (Quad) composed of the US, India, Japan and Australia. With Modi in China for the
The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has postponed its chairperson candidate registration for two weeks, and so far, nine people have announced their intention to run for chairperson, the most on record, with more expected to announce their campaign in the final days. On the evening of Aug. 23, shortly after seven KMT lawmakers survived recall votes, KMT Chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫) announced he would step down and urged Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) to step in and lead the party back to power. Lu immediately ruled herself out the following day, leaving the subject in question. In the days that followed, several
The Jamestown Foundation last week published an article exposing Beijing’s oil rigs and other potential dual-use platforms in waters near Pratas Island (Dongsha Island, 東沙島). China’s activities there resembled what they did in the East China Sea, inside the exclusive economic zones of Japan and South Korea, as well as with other South China Sea claimants. However, the most surprising element of the report was that the authors’ government contacts and Jamestown’s own evinced little awareness of China’s activities. That Beijing’s testing of Taiwanese (and its allies) situational awareness seemingly went unnoticed strongly suggests the need for more intelligence. Taiwan’s naval
RSS