A public opinion poll commissioned and released recently by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) showed it leading in public recognition among all political parties in the nation. This must be music to the party’s ears. However, before it starts celebrating, it should view the poll with caution, especially when viewed side by side with another survey on Taiwanese identity.
The KMT poll showed that its approval rating stood at 29.9 percent, followed by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) at 26.3 percent, the New Power Party at 10.1 percent and the People First Party at 3.1 percent.
While the uptick in support for the KMT might seem uncanny in light of a government investigation into the party’s “ill-gotten” assets, the DPP government’s swift action, coupled with the KMT’s outcry of procedural injustice and ambiguous claims of reducing its assets to “zero,” could have painted the KMT in its supporters’ eyes as the victim of a political vendetta.
The KMT’s position as the opposition party might have also helped consolidate support among people who might have been reluctant to back it when it was the dominant party and had a poor record.
The DPP’s declining support could be explained in the same vein. Young people who have voted for the party in anticipation of progressive reforms think it has yet to take firm action (notwithstanding the fact that reforms take time), while pro-independence supporters think the administration of President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has been hesitant or unwilling to advance the independence agenda.
For the said reasons, the KMT cannot afford to be complacent. What is more, it should be concerned about an even more “disturbing” trend that could undermine support for the party.
A recent poll conducted by the Chinese-language Commonwealth Magazine showed that not only has the number of people who identify themselves as Taiwanese been on the increase since the 1990s, those who consider themselves to be “pan-blues” and identify themselves exclusively as Taiwanese have also been on the rise.
The results showed that for the first time since the magazine started taking the poll the ratio of pro-KMT respondents who identified themselves as Taiwanese (40.5 percent) surpassed that of their peers who considered themselves to be both Chinese and Taiwanese (38.1 percent).
The results are not that surprising, as different polls have shown that the younger the generation, the clearer their national identification is.
The KMT is not insulated from this generational change and the political direction its current leader is leading the party has displayed a yawning gap with its young supporters.
A rift between the KMT caucus and headquarters has recently surfaced, with KMT Chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) becoming increasingly outspoken about her outlook for the party and the nation. For the party, she hopes that its offer of a peace agreement with Beijing would appeal to the Taiwanese public; and for Taiwan, it would either be a peaceful unification with China or unification by force, if necessary.
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath