Order comes from certainty; wars come from the misjudgements of each side. The US’ ambiguity in its diplomatic policy with Beijing is not the best strategy. The “status quo” is less stable now than it has been at any time in history. The US’ ambiguous strategy allows Beijing too many illusions, which it expects to grab after paying a high enough price, or becoming more powerful.
When Beijing finds itself further and further away from the goal of annexing Taiwan, and the cost of the arms race cannot be recouped, it will naturally become increasingly realistic for Beijing to take a risk before the window of opportunity closes.
The differences in the cognitive structures of Washington and Beijing cannot be bridged, so the US in any case cannot expect Beijing’s goodwill. Even if Taiwan fell into Beijing’s hands like Hong Kong, Beijing would continue to suspect that Washington would use its value influence to split China.
The only diplomatic achievement the US can expect is to eliminate the illusions of Beijing. The policy of “one China, with separate interpretations” encourages Beijing’s illusions. Beijing’s highly targeted arms race is the result of this ambiguous strategy.
Beijing’s need to obtain Mongolia is no less than its need to obtain Taiwan in terms of ideology, political reality, historical evolution and the military. The same bad diplomatic result did not appear on the Siberian border, because the legal status of Mongolia is very clear.
If US president-elect Donald Trump’s government resolves to restore Taiwan’s normal statehood in the UN, Beijing has less ability and opportunity to oppose this new order than it did with Russia for Mongolia.
In fact, this ambiguous strategy is an excuse for appeasement, which unjustly injures the value and interests of Taiwan in the short term and pushes China toward a despairing long march. Ultimately, the cost of maintaining order in the Asia-Pacific region is increased by an ambiguous strategy.
This ambiguous space makes Beijing unable to abandon the hope of eventually annexing Taiwan. At the same time, Beijing understands it cannot really annex Taiwan without disrupting US hegemony. So Beijing plans to accumulate military and economic power to establish a parallel system against the US’ Asia-Pacific order. Such an attempt would eventually drain China’s resources and and destroy its opportunities of integrating into the world, leading to the destruction of China and turmoil in Asia.
The further on the wrong path one goes, the higher the price one pays. A bold decision from the US could release both Taiwan and China from this predicament.
China is fully aware that it has no legitimate reason to oppose the equal status of China and Taiwan. It accepted the equal status of North Korea and South Korea. Beijing is Machiavellian with regards to politics. As a loser in the Cold War, Beijing regards the treatment of the Cold War’s winners and the world’s master as a windfall. More importantly, it knows better than anyone else that it has no ability to resist the US. For the tyrant, this reason is more convincing than any other reason.
Moscow’s power is far less than Washington’s, but it has more respect in Beijing, because Russia uses real political reasons and reduces misjudgements. On the contrary, US President Barack Obama did not use his great strength, forgetting Beijing despises weak horses, just like former al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden did.
Obama was insulted in Hangzhou, because he is not good at using language Beijing can understand. If Trump avoids the same mistake, the foundations of long-term peace in the Asia-Pacific region are a fait accompli.
William Liu is a doctoral student at Wuhan university.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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