Doubtless, it is not comforting for Taiwanese to know that China has irredentist claims on all its borders and over all the waters that wash onto its shores. It is worth remembering that the People’s Republic of China insists on its “sacred duty” to recover and reunify what it perceives as “lost” territories. Thus, any nation sharing any sort of border with China must be alert against encroachment, especially given Beijing’s unwillingness to compromise on such issues.
Besides Taiwan, China claims Zangnan, or “South Tibet” — its name for the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh. In 2006, the Chinese ambassador to India declared the “whole state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory... we are claiming all of that. That is our position.”
Indeed, it claims about 80 percent of the South China Sea, including the the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands, 南沙群島) and the Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands, 西沙群島), which are on a broad plateau up to 1,600km from China’s eastern coastline.
In a challenge to its most powerful neighbor, Japan, Beijing claims the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台) — known in Japan as the Senkakus and in English as the Pinnacle Islands. These consist of eight small, uninhabited volcanic islets in the East China Sea 120 nautical miles (222.24km) from Taiwan and 200 nautical miles from Okinawa. Taiwan also claims the formations.
Beijing’s insistence on sovereignty over the South and East China Seas incited disputing parties to seek protection under treaties that China has signed to resolve jurisdictional conflicts. To this end, an international arbitration panel in The Hague, Netherlands, declared that China’s claims to resource jurisdiction in the South China Sea have no basis in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Driven by an obsessive desire to fulfill a singular sense of geographical destiny, Beijing ignored the panel’s findings that its historic rights arguments were legally unsound.
Meanwhile, on its border with India, China has moved to take a mile while appearing to give back an inch on its claim to all of Arunachal Pradesh. This has been backed up by probing moves into the northeastern state of Sikkim while improving infrastructure near disputed areas that have military as well as commercial uses
For its part, New Delhi deployed two additional army divisions and two air force squadrons to positions near its border with China. Despite its own actions, Beijing denounced India’s recent troop movements and insisted there would be no “compromises in its border disputes with India.” In this instance, refusing to compromise suggests that China is more inclined to rely on military power than diplomacy.
Concerning its maritime claims, since China is not an archipelago nation, it has no legal basis to extend its continental shelf to claim natural resources in stretches of open water. As it is, Beijing’s assertions overlap the continental shelves of the Philippines and Vietnam. By claiming sovereignty over the Spratlys, it can claim a 200 nautical mile economic zone, and it will do so regardless of recognized limits of other littoral countries.
Another ruse to consolidate claims over its border with the Korean Peninsula involves an egregious distortion of the past. Books and articles have been published in China under the rubric the “Northeastern Project” that depicts much of Korea’s ancient history as having begun in China. This attempt to rewrite history met with official objections from Seoul, and Korean learned societies demanded Beijing put the kingdom of Goguryo in proper historical perspective.
This geographic overlapping of two Korean kingdoms with northeastern China is taken to imply that they are part of China’s ancient history. It is likely that the tactic is part of a well-orchestrated and purposeful attempt to increase its political influence in Northeast Asia. It also reflects concern over large numbers of ethnic Koreans living in the northeastern Chinese provinces of Laoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang that were granted considerable autonomy during the early 1950s.
On the face of it, fudging a historical moment might seem small potatoes. However, basing territorial claims on history has enormous strategic political and diplomatic importance.
If it creates fake history to extend its borders, Beijing can then rigorously apply its doctrine of “absolute sovereign rights” that is a central tenet of its foreign policy. Under this dogma, it rejects outside criticism about events or policies within its declared borders and refuses to compromise on this point regardless of the consequences.
As it is, Beijing insists that other countries exercise the highest standards of historical probity. For example, Chinese media and diplomatic channels have been used to criticize the content of Japanese history textbooks. Beijing is blatantly hypocritical in insisting that others engage in correct renderings of past deeds and misdeeds. Significantly, Beijing rejects interpretations of the Law of the Sea treaty that contradict its aims yet applies the logic of the treaty to support its own territorial claims.
However, hypocrisy, duplicity and deception are recognized skills and among the most valuable tools of international diplomacy. Ignoring Chinese intent and ability to wield these dark arts to promote the interests of the Middle Kingdom comes with great peril.
To extend its reach in maritime Asia, China developed a “string of pearls” consisting of naval bases, commercial ports and listening posts. These include port facilities in Bangladesh, radar and refueling stations in Myanmar, a deepwater port in Gwadar, Pakistan, and access to the port of Hambontota in Sri Lanka. More recently, it has gone further afield by constructing a naval facility in Djibouti, within a few kilometers of the US’ largest military base in Africa.
Given these steps, it remains to be seen whether China’s insistence on being engaged in a “peaceful rise” will be contradicted by its future actions. While Beijing invites ridicule for making weak or baseless territorial claims, the rest of the world should note it is deadly serious about defending them.
Christopher Lingle is a researcher at the Centre for Civil Society in New Delhi, India, and a visiting professor of economics at Universidad Francisco Marroquin in Guatemala.
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