Pig farmers and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators on Tuesday last week protested at the legislature in Taipei against the import of US pork containing the leanness-enhancing feed additive ractopamine. KMT legislators carried a large polystyrene model of a pig into the legislature, chanting slogans and holding up placards reading: “[If] US pork is imported, [then] Lin Chuan steps down” and “US pork is laced with drugs, Taiwan does not want it.” We can only speculate as to whether this is to be the last clash in the legislature over this issue.
Both the KMT, during its time in power, and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government officials have said that the import of US pork containing ractopamine is the price the nation must pay in order to be admitted into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Unless Taiwan gives up on the TPP, the government can expect further protests from pig farmers.
There are three ways to eliminate a backlash from pig farmers. Their rejection of US pork is mainly based on concerns that the import of cheaper, leanness-enhanced products would have a negative impact on Taiwanese pork on the domestic market. Import duties are an important fiscal mechanism to protect domestic markets, and in a meeting in September last year between the Council of Agriculture and livestock farmers, pig farmers expressed concerns that if Taiwan joins the TPP, the current 12.5 percent import duty on pork would be removed.
If the government could guarantee that future import tariffs would not be completely removed, and if it made an effort to maintain those tariffs at a level close to today’s, pig farmers’ protests would likely subside.
The question is if Taiwan would be allowed to keep such tariffs under the TPP. Judging from Japan’s experience, it would be possible.
Prior to talks about entry into the TPP, Japan defined pork as a sensitive agricultural product and it succeeded in maintaining an import tariff of more than 10 percent on cheaper pork products.
During TPP negotiations, if the government can designate pork as one of the most protected products in Taiwan, then there is a possibility that it would be able to set the pork import tariff at about 10 percent, or at least maintain it at that level for a period of 10 years or more.
Furthermore, there seems to be a big difference between the Japanese and the Taiwanese governments in their approach to the impact on the agricultural industry of the TPP.
The Japanese government talked about subsidies before it talked about deregulation, while Taiwan’s government only talks about deregulation, without mentioning subsidies, so of course there is a big difference in how Japanese and Taiwanese pig farmers have reacted.
When Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s government came to power in 2012, it increased the agricultural budget by more than 5 percent before deciding to enter talks on Japan’s entry into the TPP. Previous Japanese governments had been reducing the agricultural budget every year for the previous 12 years. Abe reassured Japanese farmers that his government would care for them before he entered into TPP talks.
How will the Taiwanese government go about this?
After Taiwan joins the TPP, a multilateral free-trade framework, competitive Taiwanese industrial and agricultural products will be able to enter the US and Japan, two major markets, tariff-free, although by the same token, competitive agricultural products from the US would also be able to enter Taiwan tariff-free.
Assessing who in the Taiwanese market would be a winner and who would be a loser after entering into the TPP is the government’s job, and it should therefore also propose subsidies for those pig farmers that would suffer from the nation’s TPP membership.
For example, it could subsidize new technical pig farming equipment, thus increasing productivity, while at the same time improving the environment.
Apart from this, Taiwanese pig farmers have enjoyed profitable periods in the past thanks to exports to Japan. However, following an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in Taiwan in 1997, Japan discontinued importing Taiwanese pork, which created problems for Taiwanese pig farmers.
However, given proper controls, Taiwan proper could be designated as an area free of foot-and-mouth disease following a vaccination program.
Japan is already allowing imports from areas in some Brazilian states that have been designated as free of foot-and-mouth disease, although Japan only allowed imports from these states after they had filed applications for six or seven years.
If Taiwan proper could be designated as epidemic free in the coming two years, perhaps the current good diplomatic relations between the two nations would persuade Japan to reduce the application period to just one or two years.
If that were the case, it would be a real possibility that Taiwanese pork could once again be exported to Japan in three or four years’ time. If there was hope that this could happen, pig farmers would busy themselves making plans for the lucrative Japanese market and would no longer be so worried about US pork imports.
If the government continues to focus talks about the TPP on the import of US pork, then it is only playing the game on the terms laid down by the KMT.
If it instead focused on farmers and public opinion, and shifted the focus of the debate toward import duties, subsidies and the Japanese market, it would be setting the rules for the game.
Guo Yung-hsing is a professor in National Taichung University of Science and Technology’s Department of International Trade.
Translated by Perry Svensson
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath