The inauguration of Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) on Friday as Taiwan’s president represents both continued success for the Island’s democracy and potential new dangers for its 23.5 million citizens. Domestic economic challenges and escalating international threats to the Republic of China’s (ROC) security could immediately test Tsai’s reputation for caution. So it is likely her first year in office will determine the success or failure of her presidency.
Peacefully transferring power from the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) — the third change of parties since Taiwan’s democratization — contrasts sharply with China’s one-party rule. This achievement is a powerful source of legitimacy, demonstrating the ROC’s ability to perform the normal functions of government, a critical element for constituting a “state” under customary international law.
Taiwan could justifiably declare itself an independent state, as the DPP’s charter advocates, but Tsai prefers to continue Taiwan’s ambiguous “status quo” internationally and in cross-strait relations.
For now, ambiguity might provide Tsai the best path to pursue economic growth, her top domestic priority, but maintaining the “status quo” is not in her power alone. While she might make every effort to avoid being perceived as a “troublemaker” to Beijing and Washington, other players are likely to make that difficult.
The close timing of political transitions in Taiwan and the US means that her first year will be particularly risky. Tsai’s presidency begins in the middle of an unusual US presidential election.
Republicans are about to nominate Donald Trump, whose closest parallel might be Wendell Willkie, a businessman who became the Republican presidential nominee in 1940. Trump is utterly removed from conventional politics and reflects enormous voter discontent with Washington and seemingly everyone in it. In contrast, Democrats seem poised to select former US secretary of state Hillary Rodham Clinton, the ultimate establishment insider. Assuming Clinton is not indicted before November, another unprecedented wild card, new polls show the race might be surprisingly close.
How Beijing perceives the US’ political drama is uncertain, but an adversary’s internal confusion always brings opportunities. With US President Barack Obama’s tenure ending, Chinese leaders will not miss one last chance to take advantage of his passive approach to foreign affairs.
While international attention focuses on China’s assertive activities in the South China Sea, Beijing could also seek gains in the East China Sea. It declared an “air defense identification zone” in 2013, continued an active dispute with Japan over the Senkaku — or Diaoyutai (釣魚台) — Islands and has certainly not forgotten that “breakaway province” across the Taiwan Strait.
Beijing’s approach to territorial disputes in the South China Sea has not been merely creating “facts on the ground” but creating the ground itself. It populates its artificial islands with air and naval forces to make its claims concrete and menacing. Washington declares that the disputes should be resolved through peaceful negotiations. That sounds laudable but is merely academic chatter in a theater dominated by active military power.
Half-hearted US “freedom of navigation” operations, undertaken when the Pentagon’s insistence prevails over White House indifference, have not slowed China’s operations to convert territorial claims into hegemony over the South China Sea. The odds that Obama will take significant action to oppose Beijing are diminishing more rapidly as his time left in office dwindles.
Between Taiwan’s and the US presidential inauguration, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has eight months to execute his plans in the East and South China seas with scant prospect of a robust US response. Even if Obama tries to rally action in the region, he might be under stress in Eastern Europe or the Middle East. All of the US’ adversaries will see the same potential vulnerability. China might try to avoid actual military conflict, but it has every incentive to see how far it can go.
Beijing also understands that Washington’s lack of attention will extend for some months after a new president takes office, be it Trump or Clinton. The next administration will face innumerable domestic issues that divert attention from foreign crises. China might believe that testing a new administration is advantageous, even if it has no immediate payoff.
Beijing no doubt recalls the Hainan Island incident in April 2001, when a Chinese fighter jet collided with a US EP-3 surveillance plane in international airspace. The new administration under then-US president George W. Bush focused on resolving the immediate controversy without fully considering the broader costs of acquiescing too quickly.
The Chinese military might be tempted to create a new crisis to test the resolve of the new president.
Tsai and her DPP colleagues would be well advised to work closely with US allies to navigate the coming year. Taiwan’s new government should also reflect on what it really wants over the long term. Caution might be a virtue but it is not a strategy.
John Bolton, a former US ambassador to the UN, is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. This article was first printed in the Asia Wall Street Journal.
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