President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has been in power for eight years. His political performance on domestic issues and the economy is dire. This is reflected in his rock-bottom approval ratings. In the final month of his last term, he has finally discovered a cause he hopes will restore his reputation: nationalism. His little South China Sea shenanigans are stirring up international tensions and, finally, some of the more hawkish supporters of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) are gradually warming to him again, moving his approval ratings from single-digit figures back into double digits.
Amid heightened tensions in the South China Sea, Ma visited Itu Aba Island (Taiping Island, 太平島) to erect plaques reaffirming the Republic of China’s (ROC) claim to the island. He took a media delegation along for the ride, too. That the island has an airport, after all, means that it is more than the reef the Philippines claims it to be.
By going to Itu Aba Island and reminding everyone of the ROC’s claim, Ma is repeating what his predecessor, former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), did eight years ago, something he criticized Chen for doing at the time.
“A caretaker president should be ensuring social stability and national security, and preparing for the handover of power. That is the greatest contribution he can make to the system of constitutional government,” Ma said at the time.
Perhaps he should learn from his own words.
Ma made a similar visit to Pengjia Islet (彭佳嶼). Nobody questions the ROC’s territorial claim over Pengjia. However, the situation with the Okinotori atoll is a little more complex. The Japan Coast Guard seized a Taiwanese fishing boat there on Monday last week, leading the Presidential Office to protest in the strongest terms, saying the atoll is a reef, not an island. It sent two patrol boats to the area for a month, a move aimed at pleasing the KMT faithful.
When Ma was strutting his stuff on Kinmen to celebrate the 23rd anniversary of the historic talks between then-Straits Exchange Foundation chairman Koo Chen-fu (辜振甫) and then-Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits chairman Wang Daohan (汪道涵), the Chinese response was less than enthusiastic. This demonstrated the illusory nature of the so-called “1992 consensus” and improving cross-strait relations the KMT loves to tout. It was from this point on, too, that the KMT started to appear weakened, and Beijing has increasingly seen the KMT as yesterday’s news, looking more to the incoming Democratic Progressive Party government, and concentrating on how to intimidate and pressure president-elect Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) into accepting the “one China” principle.
The Kenya incident, in which Beijing pressured the African nation into sending Taiwanese suspects to China for prosecution, shows that Beijing does not respect the Cross-Strait Joint Crime-Fighting and Judicial Mutual Assistance Agreement (海峽兩岸共同打擊犯罪及司法互助協議). Beijing did not contact Taipei over jurisdiction in the case, as is required by the agreement: It merely brushed aside Taipei’s protests. A similar thing has since happened with Malaysia.
Protecting the nation’s territorial rights and its citizens’ interests are the unshirkable duty of a president. However, this should be for the entirety of a president’s term, not just in the waning moments of their time in office. Moreover, in dealing with the governments of other countries, a president should be accommodating, but not to the point of subservience.
Ma’s administration has taken a different approach with Beijing over Kenya and Japan over Okinotori. It has adopted a conciliatory tone with Beijing, sending a task force to China to discuss the matter. In contrast, it has continued to escalate the accusatory language against Japan and to back it up with armed assertiveness. The approaches are night and day. It is no wonder Beijing has given us scant regard, and Tokyo has accused us of escalating tensions. It is enough to make one think Ma is more interested in the theatrics than in resolving problems.
The Executive Yuan recently revised a page of its Web site on ethnic groups in Taiwan, replacing the term “Han” (漢族) with “the rest of the population.” The page, which was updated on March 24, describes the composition of Taiwan’s registered households as indigenous (2.5 percent), foreign origin (1.2 percent) and the rest of the population (96.2 percent). The change was picked up by a social media user and amplified by local media, sparking heated discussion over the weekend. The pan-blue and pro-China camp called it a politically motivated desinicization attempt to obscure the Han Chinese ethnicity of most Taiwanese.
On Wednesday last week, the Rossiyskaya Gazeta published an article by Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) asserting the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territorial claim over Taiwan effective 1945, predicated upon instruments such as the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation. The article further contended that this de jure and de facto status was subsequently reaffirmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly issued a statement categorically repudiating these assertions. In addition to the reasons put forward by the ministry, I believe that China’s assertions are open to questions in international
The Legislative Yuan passed an amendment on Friday last week to add four national holidays and make Workers’ Day a national holiday for all sectors — a move referred to as “four plus one.” The Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), who used their combined legislative majority to push the bill through its third reading, claim the holidays were chosen based on their inherent significance and social relevance. However, in passing the amendment, they have stuck to the traditional mindset of taking a holiday just for the sake of it, failing to make good use of
As strategic tensions escalate across the vast Indo-Pacific region, Taiwan has emerged as more than a potential flashpoint. It is the fulcrum upon which the credibility of the evolving American-led strategy of integrated deterrence now rests. How the US and regional powers like Japan respond to Taiwan’s defense, and how credible the deterrent against Chinese aggression proves to be, will profoundly shape the Indo-Pacific security architecture for years to come. A successful defense of Taiwan through strengthened deterrence in the Indo-Pacific would enhance the credibility of the US-led alliance system and underpin America’s global preeminence, while a failure of integrated deterrence would
RSS