During last year’s presidential primary, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) first nominated then-deputy legislative speaker Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) as its presidential candidate, but later replaced her with then-KMT chairman Eric Chu (朱立倫). The incident revealed a serious discrepancy between KMT members, who voted in the primary and the national electorate, showing that the party membership was far from representing public opinion.
As Hung is vying for KMT leadership, these problems continue to percolate. The “Hung Hsiu-chu phenomenon” caused by her campaigns for the party’s presidential candidacy and chairpersonship has significant hidden political implications, and is also closely related to the KMT’s image. It would also have an impact on the nation’s political direction regarding the relationship between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
What does the “Hung Hsiu-chu phenomenon” entail? Here is a brief description of its five traits.
The first is concern among deep-blue supporters over the direction of Taiwanese politics.
Following the KMT’s rout in 2014’s nine-in-one elections, deep-blue supporters were worried by the pan-green camp’s landslide victory and they hoped to turn the tide in January’s presidential and legislative elections. This has resulted in indignant anger and a feeling of being outcast and abandoned fighters, fighting the good fight inside the party.
The second trait is the interpretation among deep-blue supporters of the reasons behind the KMT’s electoral defeat. There is a consensus that the party’s defeat was because of its inability to set a political agenda, low public support for the government and the public’s rejection of the government’s cross-strait policy.
However, while the KMT’s pro-Taiwan faction feels that this is the result of a major disconnect from mainstream public opinion, the deep-blue faction feels that it is the result of President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration moving closer to the pan-green camp and turning their back on the KMT’s true direction, as well as their inability to clearly present the party’s views, rather than thinking that the defeat was the result of its mistaken pursuit of unification with China.
Their view is that as long as the party’s views are clear and strong, they would be able to take on the pan-green camp head-on and regain pan-blue supporters in a protracted fight.
Third, pan-blue supporters are offering a solution for how the party could leave its troubles behind.
Based on the idea that they would be able to turn chaos into order with a head-on clash, a small clique around Hung and a group of deep-blue academics followed up on the selection of Hung as the party’s presidential candidate by proposing the controversial “one China, same interpretation” formula.
In doing so, they were not only looking toward the election, but also at how they would be able to clarify the KMT’s views during the election campaign.
The fourth trait is the huge influence deep-blue supporters have on the primary election process within the party.
The traditional definition of “deep-blue supporters” encompasses people who support the KMT’s candidates for political office; and military personnel, civil servants and public school teachers are often used as the group’s symbols.
However, in addition to the number of deep-blue supporters having dropped following the dwindling numbers of veterans and veterans’ family members, and second-generation Chinese leaning toward a Taiwan-centered position, the Ma administration also initiated a series of policies that ate into the benefits of military personnel, civil servants and public school teachers, which caused them to turn their backs on the party.
In addition, the scandal caused by KMT vice presidential candidate Jennifer Wang’s (王如玄) speculation in military housing also helped push deep-blue supporters toward the New Party and the People First Party (PFP).
Come election time, many deep-blue members of the KMT voted for the New Party and the PFP.
Still, it is estimated that 220,000 of the party’s 320,000 members belong to the deep-blue camp, which means that even though Hung was nominated as the party’s presidential candidate, she was not seen as representing the party and her policy proposals were vehemently rejected by many party members, leading to her replacement.
Fifth, there are discrepancies between how deep-blue supporters and pan-blue supporters understand the party’s future.
In February 1993, a conflict within the KMT led to the military faction and some Chinese elites among party legislators under the leadership of then-premier Hau Pei-tsun (郝柏村) and then-Veterans Affairs Commission chairman Hsu Li-nung (許歷農) leave the party due to their dissatisfaction with then-president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝). The group that split from the KMT later founded the New Party.
The next split came before the 2000 presidential election when the pan-blue camp split and former Taiwan provincial governor James Soong (宋楚瑜) formed the PFP after losing the presidential election. The result was that those who stayed with the party were probably more inclined toward a Taiwan-centric position.
After its founding, the New Party still had to make legislator Chen Kwei-miew (陳癸淼) the first convener of the National Election Campaign Development Committee and the PFP also had to stress that it was a pro-local party open to members of all provincial backgrounds.
This is why Hung’s policy platform, which is adopting the political demands of deep-blue members and is seen as catering only to the party’s deep-blue supporters, is creating a gap between the party’s deep-blue membership and its Taiwan-centered supporters.
At the moment, the KMT is losing large numbers of Taiwan-centered supporters in central and southern Taiwan. Reviving the KMT’s fortunes depends on finding someone that can find ways of bringing deep-blue and Taiwan-centered supporters together.
Still, the party chairperson by-election is turning into a sequel to the “Hung Hsiu-chu phenomenon” that appeared during the party’s nomination of a presidential candidate.
If the divide deepens, the result of the by-election would not only fail to end intra-party division, but could also lead to a third split.
Justin Chen is the vice president of the Cross-Strait Policy Association.
Translated by Ethan Zhan and Perry Svensson
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