The presidential and legislative elections are this Saturday and many people think that the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government is about to be booted out. Even those who are skeptical of other parties, or who simply have not heard much from them in terms of cogent policies, think that the “Ma-chine” must go.
Despite polls that support this opinion, people must remember that the nation has been here before. In 2012, most pundits said that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) would win the presidential race. It did not. A vital ingredient of the turnaround in 2012 was the exogenous pressure from both China and the US, exerted late in the race, when citizens were almost ready to vote.
The two great superpowers, disagreeing on just about every other issue across their political spectrum, came out in support of the KMT, pointing to the DPP as having dubious veracity and an insecure grip.
The main focus of this strong bias was relations across the Taiwan Strait — the KMT was seen as improving them, the DPP as potentially destroying them. It is not insightful now to see that this issue was enough to persuade a significant portion of even new young voters and environmentalists into supporting the KMT.
So, now for some common sense. There are clearly two significant differences this time around.
First, the innovative and unique student movements — led by the Sunflower movement in 2014 — which have floored parliamentary politics time and again since 2012, and have also served to educate the wider electorate (even their mothers and fathers) in the need to scope out the whole agenda of all parties. Such movements also helped give rise to a proliferation of alternative parties now competing in the simultaneous elections for the parliament.
Second, the China issue has altered dramatically since 2012. Not only has the KMT been seen to have moved too close to Beijing, especially in economic and commercial policies, but the issue has declined in relative importance. It is feasible that Taiwan might have a presidential election that is, for the first time, decided on the basis of a wide range of issues beyond China and corruption — or the links between the two.
In combination, these two processes offer great opportunities for the political opposition. In particular, DPP presidential candidate Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) stands firmly behind the notion of “maintaining the ‘status quo,’” which a majority of citizens appear to support, as well as being critical of the commercial cuddle with China that the KMT is identified with.
So the DPP can forward itself as both distinctive yet mild, and the US’ stance seems to be more on the side of Tsai, especially since her US visit.
The reasons that people might wish to modify these common sense elements are complex, but boil down to two points.
First, things do go wrong in politics. Especially in the days before an election. Leaders and their parties can mishandle strategies, even when their underlying policies seem sound or are popular.
Second, elections are followed by parliamentary and presidential politics for another four years and within that period — probably within weeks or months this year — people can be pretty sure that, if the DPP is in power, issues such as cross-strait relations and the voice of China are likely to be hauled to the forefront of political discussion.
On the first of these issues, people might ask whether the DPP has successfully shown that its social and economic policies are clearly superior to those of the KMT. I happen to believe that they are, but this is not my point. For instance, when KMT presidential candidate Eric Chu (朱立倫) raised what were mostly external straits issues — in disguise — with Tsai during the second and final televised presidential debate, she did not take the opportunity to clarify how these were tied to domestic economic policies, nor did she effectively use that rare chance to clarify the DPP’s social policies and force the debate into substance and away from rhetoric.
She got caught up on the issue of the seeming increased distance between the KMT and Taiwanese, failing to promote the advantages of the DPP’s domestic policies. New voters can be lost in such media moments and those who want dynamic change must hope that the DPP this week airs its own policy intentions far more clearly, while exposing the weaknesses of the KMT’s social and environmental policies.
As to the longer-term, but vital, second issue, if the DPP wins the presidential election, and especially if it also manipulates alliances with smaller parties to give it effective parliamentary control, then the China issue is likely to take center stage. With the KMT effectively out, and the DPP and smaller parties brimming with victory, the chances of a challenge to the “status quo” formula would become more likely.
A dangerous trigger for this would be clear statements by China against the new regime in Taiwan. Another — which would be longer in the making — would be any downturn in Taiwanese employment or economic growth that could be attributed to a weakening of the Chinese commercial relationship as a result of DPP policies or actions. Either or both of these might have devastating impacts on the public rhetoric in Taiwan concerning all things Chinese.
To be anti-Chinese in Taiwan is populist and expected. For many people, the sentiment sits side-by-side with full awareness of the ethnic, familial and cultural identities shared by the two systems.
However, if that translated during the course of this year into a more overtly anti-Chinese political trajectory, possibly associated with an economic downturn, then this could well be interpreted as a move away from the balance of the “status quo.” A more liberal regime would, in any case, always be in danger of illustrating the inherent contradictions of the “status quo” formula.
Among other elements, student movements have broadened the political agenda in this newly democratic nation and the electorate’s search for clearer policy formulations on important issues is consequently much stronger than in 2012.
From the condition of the nation’s media to the safety of nuclear power or the possibility of new commercial policies, the nation is ripe for political change. It is up to the opposition to keep its eyes on the ball and to cohere around the important issues, addressing an increasingly experienced electorate through clear policy statements that are small on personal abuse, but big on issues of substance.
Ian Inkster is a professorial research associate at the Center of Taiwan Studies, SOAS, University of London and editor of the international journal History of Technology.
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