As with all authoritarian regimes, the way in which core decisions are made in Chinese politics is non-transparent.
When former Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) came to power, Western media asked: “Who is Hu?” However, it was only toward the end of his presidential term that anyone caught a glimpse of who he really was.
When Hu was preparing to hand over power to his successor, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping (習近平), a power struggle erupted within the CCP. It was only at this point that onlookers realized that, for the past decade, Hu had struggled to maintain control.
What does this mean for how we try to understand Xi and his grip on power?
Since he came to power, Xi has demonstrated a completely different political style to Hu. Even though both men cut their teeth as CCP Central Committee members, Xi’s succession was quite dramatic, played out as it was against the backdrop of the detention of disgraced former politburo member Bo Xilai (薄熙來).
Therefore, to a certain degree, Xi’s succession was the most controversial within the party. This has perhaps influenced his subsequent style of leadership. Taking office within this context, Xi had to show himself to be a stronger leader than was previously necessary to give himself the kind of political space he needed.
Perhaps this is why Xi deemed it necessary to immediately embark on his drive against corruption, and why, in the name of this drive, he had senior officials, such as former Chinese domestic security head Zhou Yongkang (周永康) and former Central Military Commission (CMC) vice chairman Xu Caihou (徐才厚), arrested. Former CMC vice chairman Guo Boxiong (郭伯雄) and former United Front Work Department head Ling Jihua (令計畫) have also been detained.
Xi has also reintroduced revolutionary-era methods such as the “Mass Line” initiative — a Maoist term for the need to align the CCP with the people. Many Chinese have been reminded of the purge of bureaucracy during the “Three-Anti” and “Five-Anti” campaigns instigated by former Chinese leader Mao Zedong (毛澤東), and there are apparently many within the halls of the Chinese communists’ bureaucracy fearfully anticipating a knock on the door.
In the wake of the announcement of the seven “taboo” subjects banned from discussion in public debate, and Xi’s evident suppression of civil society, people are also being reminded of Mao’s anger at intellectuals following his ostensible welcoming of criticism during the Hundred Flowers Campaign that would eventually lead to the anti-rightist campaign.
Recently, foreign media have also started commenting on how Xi has embarked upon something of a personality cult, and how within a 30-minute news broadcast, 20 minutes are usually devoted to matters involving Xi himself.
Xi is also aware of how the media can be used to craft his public persona. His first attempt — a story about a taxi ride through Beijing — failed, but he got the formula right when he lined up for steamed dumplings in a restaurant in the city. Local reporters were all over this, as were international media.
The announcement of the East China Sea air defense identification zone, the island-building in the South China Sea, the Central Asian “One Belt, One Road” trade initiative and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) over the past year, are all part and parcel of a grand plan. This has not only made neighboring nations restless, it has united them in their flight to the US’ side.
Xi’s leadership style focuses on gaining the advantage; seeking a moral high ground to bolster his image; applying pressure on his opponent and then sitting them down to talk; waving the “anti-West” flag; and reinstating the CCP’s exclusive control over everything. He has amassed 10 titles within the party, and established the Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms and the National Security Commission.
Wherever has the idea of “collective leadership” among the upper echelons of the CCP gone? It has not been seen since the days of Mao. Are people to believe it possible that Xi could scale the status heights that Mao once obtained? Does this mean that he could, given the stable and absolute power he has, and the rarefied status that he holds, instigate an unprecedented degree of internal reforms, or achieve foreign relations successes nobody before him has been able to?
Several terms and concepts have been used in post-revolution China studies to explain how power within the CCP is divided between different bureaucracies, how it is balanced between the higher echelons and CCP Central Committee members and how the distribution of power is handled in a way that will keep the various factions happy.
Phrases such as “fragmented authoritarianism,” “reciprocal accountability” and “systematic succession” help achieve this.
However, Xi’s behavior seems to have confounded people’s understanding of how China operates. Could it be that Xi is reinventing how things are done in China?
In fact, despite Xi’s rather rash leadership style, most of what people already know about China has not changed. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang (李克強), like his predecessor Wen Jiabao (溫家寶), has already been frustrated by the bureaucracy on several occasions. Xi’s Mao-esque ways and his struggle for consolidation of power have made little headway in rushing the ponderous bureaucracy in Beijing, and it remains as difficult as ever to get directives implemented.
People often hear of the intransigence and soft resistance of the bureaucracy in Beijing. By all accounts, even after the incarceration of 70-year-old former journalist Gao Yu (高瑜) for “leaking state secrets,” the directive banning the seven “taboo” subjects from being publicly discussed has yet to be fully implemented.
In the international arena, the “One Belt, One Road” initiative and the AIIB were supposed to lay the foundations for a new international order with China at its center, but the clumsy, rash actions of the Chinese government in the South China Sea have neutralized any goodwill that these might have inspired.
It was reported that during Xi’s recent trip to India, just as he was due to attend a banquet with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Chinese People’s Liberation Army troops crossed into Indian territory. Was all of this about Xi intentionally planning to send conflicting signals? Or is this show of strength an attempt to conceal the sense of insecurity he feels about his own power? And is this feeling an accurate reflection of the real situation?
Unfortunately, the people who follow Chinese politics are unlikely to know the answers to these questions for perhaps another 10 years. However, it is still possible to surmise much from what happened in Chinese politics a decade ago, and what is being seen now.
Hsu Szu-chien is an associate research fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica.
Translated by Paul Cooper
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