Before former vice president Lien Chan (連戰) met with then- Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) in late April 2005, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rushed to pass an “Anti-Secession” Law, which says that there is only “one China” and that Taiwan and China belong to that “one China.”
At the time, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) did not echo the rhetoric that Taiwan and China belong to “one China,” but continued to use the so-called “1992 consensus” and the idea of “one China, with different interpretations.”
Ten years later, the KMT has officially adopted the view that Taiwan and China belong to “one China” as the basis of its stance. There is reason to believe that KMT Chairman Eric Chu’s (朱立倫) remark about Taiwan and China belonging to “one China” was not a coincidence, but the result of CCP pressure.
Although the government denies that this is its current stance, pressure from Beijing means that it is likely to be the guideline for the next president and government should the KMT win next year’s presidential election.
On the other hand, even if Chu denies the goal of eventual unification, it is recognized both domestically and internationally that the concept of Taiwan and China belonging to “one China” would expedite unification faster than “one China with different interpretations.”
There is no doubt that this is a way for the KMT to place heavy political pressure on the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) on Beijing’s behalf.
The KMT is probably not going to win next year’s presidential election anyway, so as far as Beijing is concerned the smartest thing to do is to use the incumbent puppet to put pressure on the ones still unwilling to be puppets.
After Lien and Hu met 10 years ago, they issued a joint statement listing five points of agreement aimed at China’s effective annexation of Taiwan.
With the exception of the agreement to terminate hostility and reach a peaceful agreement, significant progress has been made on the other four agreements.
The agreement to hasten cross-strait talks has progressed from unofficial cross-strait exchanges to official negotiations between China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (國台辦) and Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council and the agreement to promote full-scale cross-strait economic exchanges and forge a cross-strait economic cooperation mechanism was achieved by the establishment of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which fosters tighter cross-strait relations than the WTO.
As for the agreement to facilitate negotiations on Taiwan’s participation in international activities, that has been realized by the Taiwanese government’s initiative to debase Taiwan to a district when it applied to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the agreement to establish a periodic party-to-party communication platform was further confirmed by the meeting between Chu and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平).
For the time being, it is infeasible to sign a peace agreement based on the planned foundation of “one country, two districts,” which would bring about the formal annexation of Taiwan by China.
This is especially regrettable for the KMT and in particular for President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), who nurtures a wishful idea that the 21 agreements signed with the CCP without the consent of the legislature can be equated with a peace agreement.
That said, it does not necessarily mean that Ma will not do everything he can to cooperate with the CCP’s formal annexation of Taiwan and sign a peace agreement in the last year of his presidency.
The CCP enacted its counter-Taiwanese-independence idea into the “Anti-Secession” Law, displaying its ambition to annex Taiwan and its intention to use military threats to coerce Taiwanese into obedience.
The most noted article, Article 8, stipulates that, “the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” should any of the following three circumstances arise: “In the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted.”
The first situation was designed on the assumption that former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) might declare independence on the basis of “one country on each side” (一邊一國) after he won his second term as president.
The second situation was aimed at preventing a declaration of independence resulting from events such as the 228 Hand-in-Hand Rally in 2004, the biggest rally in Taiwan’s history, in which about 2 million people participated.
However, the purpose of the demonstration was merely to protest against the Chinese deployment of missiles aimed at Taiwan, and to support the anti-missile referendum, not to declare independence.
However, Taiwanese could in fact use such an event to demonstrate their collective wish for independence and start the process of nation formation, which was what the CCP tried to prevent.
The KMT thought that if Taiwan accepted the idea that both Taiwan and China are part of “one China,” which China put forward 10 years ago, China’s demands would be met, but that was a serious mistake.
China is about to take the next step to force Taiwan to obey. Xi has made it clear that without the “1992 consensus,” there can be no peace in the Taiwan Strait.
For Xi, there is no such thing as “one China with different interpretations” in the “1992 consensus”; there is only the “one China” principle.
That a meeting between Ma and Xi has been infeasible shows that China now expects little of the KMT.
The CCP’s next step is likely to be to make the DPP, which is likely to win next year’s presidential election, obligated to launch peace talks with China.
This is the most crucial reason for the introduction of Taiwan-related clauses in China’s new National Security Law.
According to Article 11 of that law, safeguarding national sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity are the responsibilities of “all Chinese,” including those in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau.
Some critics might say that this regulation is targeted at last year’s Umbrella movement in Hong Kong and that it is nonsensical for China to include any clause related to Taiwan, which is outside its jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, however reluctant Taiwanese are to accept this law, they must realize that this is Beijing’s attempt to treat Taiwan as its territory for which it can create legislation and make plans.
This is a crucial sign that China is trying to force Taiwanese to obey.
Article 32 of the National Security Law even stipulates that the Chinese president can declare a state of emergency, declare war and order mobilization.
The Hand-in-Hand Rally in 2004 was initiated because Taiwanese were aware of China’s missile threat.
With missiles still in place, the KMT has now teamed up with the CCP, causing Taiwan to become increasingly dependent on China.
The CCP is likely to capitalize on the KMT’s weakness to seduce and coerce the Taiwanese public and government.
Taiwanese must stop Ma’s administration from continuing to import new Chinese elements, such as allowing individual Chinese to purchase houses and drive up housing prices and stocks, and prevent him using the service trade agreement and free economic pilot zones to allow an invasion of Chinese people and capital into Taiwan, and effectively force the Ma administration to minimize the ramifications of imported Chinese elements, such as independent visits.
Otherwise, it will be hard to slow down the speed of China’s annexation of Taiwan, and difficult to stop the CCP from formally annexing Taiwan.
Leung Man-to is a political science professor at National Cheng Kung University.
Translated by Ethan Zhan
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