Few are surprised that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) rejected Taiwan’s application to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a founding member. Whereas Premier Mao Chi-kuo (毛治國) declined to confirm legislators’ speculation that the PRC’s outright rejection was related to the issue of Taiwan’s sovereignty, Mainland Affairs Council Minister Andrew Hsia (夏立言) was candid and forthcoming.
According to Hsia’s reply to the Legislative Yuan, Beijing stipulated that founding AIIB members must be sovereign states, and it does not consider Taiwan a sovereign state.
Beijing has for a long time sought to deny and undermine Taiwan’ sovereign status in the international community. Its rejection of Taiwan’s application to join the AIIB as a founding member also directly contradicts and belies President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) claim that Beijing and Taipei agree to the “1992 consensus” idea of one China with different interpretations.
Ma’s rush to apply to the AIIB has met with a chorus of criticism from the Legislative Yuan and the public.
The failures of the Ma government to consult with the Legislative Yuan and to conduct an inter-departmental impact assessment echo its actions before signing the cross-strait service trade agreement in June 2013.
The attempts by Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) members to railroad the pact caused public outrage and protests that led to the occupation of the Legislative Yuan’s main chamber by demonstrators for 23 days beginning in March last year.
Thus, members of the Black Island National Youth Front, a group that was proactive in organizing the protests last year, gathered outside the presidential office on March 31 this year to protest against the government’s application to the AIIB.
Under the present unfavorable circumstances, what is the rationale behind Ma’s government still hoping to join the bank as an ordinary member? For strategic, political and economic reasons, Taiwan should give up.
Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is pursuing his “China Dream” and striving to make China the world’s “champion nation.” In so doing, China has been challenging the US’ supremacy in the Asia-Pacific region, and the Pax Americana.
The AIIB is an economic and financial organization created and controlled by China to compete against the World Bank, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), all directed by the US and its allies. It would be very unwise for Taiwan to side with China against the US — a dependable and valuable partner.
It is imperative that Taiwan’s decisionmakers revisit the history of the wrong and harm that the PRC has inflicted on Taiwan in international organizations. For example, the PRC not only secured admission to the Paris-based International Police Organization (Interpol) in 1984, but also imposed several conditions for its entry.
These conditions included changing the membership name of the Republic of China (ROC) to “Taiwan, China;” barring the ROC delegation from flying the national flag; and relegating the ROC delegation to a role as part of China’s national delegation, without the right to vote in Interpol.
Taiwan was grossly humiliated and ceased attending meetings, but has not formally withdrawn from Interpol.
The PRC adopted the same tactics at the ADB in 1985, but did not get as far. Unlike Interpol, where one member state can cast only one vote, ADB decisionmaking happens via weighted voting, and most members — including Japan and the US, which have most shares — wanted Taiwan to stay. As part of its strategy to isolate Taiwan in international arenas, Beijing initially sought Taiwan’s expulsion from the ADB, but when that failed, it switched tactics — changing the membership name of the ROC to “Taiwan, China” to humiliate the KMT and induce Taipei to withdraw voluntarily.
The ploy almost worked. Some hardliners in the KMT leadership under then-president Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) wanted to walk out of the ADB. They contended that for Taiwan to remain in the ADB under the name imposed by Beijing would make Taiwan look like a province of the PRC and undermine the raison d’etre of the KMT rule in Taiwan.
Then-minister of foreign affairs Chu Fu-sung (朱撫松) said on several occasions that the ROC would not “accept any arrangement which contradicts the ADB charter or affects this nation’s status, interest, or name.”
Alarmed, the administration of then-US president Ronald Reagan dispatched former US national security adviser William Clark to Taipei in November 1985 to dissuade the KMT government from making such a drastic move.
At the behest of the US, then-Singaporean prime minister Lee Kuan Yew (李光耀), a close friend of Chiang, also visited Taipei soon thereafter to help persuade Chiang to adopt a flexible approach. To soften the blow to the KMT government, the ADB also decided a new membership name for the ROC: “Taipei, China.”
After considerable internal debate, the KMT government settled on a highly controversial “three noes” compromise: It would not accept the name change, would not withdraw from the ADB and would not attend ADB meetings.
The KMT government boycotted annual ADB meetings in 1986 and 1987.
After Chiang passed away in January 1988, his successor, former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), opted for a pragmatic approach and sent Taiwan’s delegation back to the 1988 annual meeting, but with a conspicuous “under protest” sign to show its displeasure at the name imposed by the ADB.
This brief history illustrates what Beijing has done to undermine Taiwan in the international community, and why Taiwan must learn to distinguish between friend and foe.
It is also important to point out that since 1966, Taiwan has been a responsible member of the ADB and has made generous contributions to its development fund. Regrettably, Taiwan has not benefited from its association with the bank, as Taiwan’s construction companies and other enterprises have not been competitive enough to win bids for ADB projects. It stands to reason that Taiwan will never do well in the AIIB, and that Beijing has no reason to support Taiwan’s cause.
In short, joining the AIIB is the wrong issue for Taiwan. To help revive Taiwan’s struggling economy, the nation’s top priority is to participate in the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free-trade agreement.
Although Ma’s government on several occasions said that it wants to join, just providing lip service is not enough. To qualify for membership, Taiwan must do its homework. The government must undertake inter-departmental impact assessments and consult with the Legislative Yuan and private enterprises, while the Legislative Yuan must conform with TPP expectations on tariffs, imports and exports, and market access, to say the least. Is Ma’s government ready to embark on these tasks?
Parris Chang is professor emeritus of political science at Penn State University and president of the Taiwan Institute for Political, Economic and Strategic Studies.
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