Faced with the possibility of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) returning to power next year, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) threatened that should the DPP not conduct cross-strait relations on the basis of the so-called “1992 consensus,” cross-strait ties would become volatile and unstable.
The “1992 consensus” is a tacit understanding between the Chinese government and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) that both sides of the Taiwan Strait acknowledge there is “one China,” with both sides having their own interpretation of what “China” means.
The fact that China is now playing the “1992 consensus” card eight months ahead of the presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan next year shows that it is very anxious about the possibility of a DPP president. However, the “1992 consensus” card will be much less effective in the coming elections than it was in 2012, so China should be pragmatic in its dialogue with the DPP.
From China’s point of view, the “1992 consensus” is associated with harmonious development and a cross-strait peace dividend. Taiwanese and the DPP also want peaceful cross-strait development. However, if China threatens the DPP, it is likely to damage its own credibility.
Besides, if the DPP takes over the reins of government without accepting the “1992 consensus,” Xi is likely to come under heavy pressure. He risks reinforcing the impression that China is just manipulating the fears of Taiwanese and playing a game of chicken with the DPP — a game that could lead to both sides getting hurt
The current position in the DPP is embodied in its 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future. The DPP does not accept the “1992 consensus,” but it will not adopt radical policies that might upset the stability of cross-strait relations.
If the DPP takes control of the government without accepting the “1992 consensus,” China might break off negotiations between the Straits Exchange Foundation and China’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits. It might also take foreign policy measures to suppress Taiwan; maybe even make military threats. However, even if the two sides find it impossible to continue their dialogue and negotiations, it would only mean returning to a confrontational stalemate; it would almost certainly not lead to war.
The “1992 consensus” card was effective in the run-up to the 2012 presidential election because it was associated with a cross-strait peace dividend. However, over the seven years during which President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has been in office, the promised peace dividend has not borne fruit. Even though there has been a dividend of sorts, it has been very limited and unevenly distributed, being concentrated in the hands of a minority of rich and powerful people.
With regard to foreign relations, Taiwan has had no option but to make compromises for the sake of the greater good, such as attending the World Health Assembly as an observer and the International Civil Aviation Organization as a guest.
As far as regional integration is concerned, the only breakthroughs Taiwan has made are the economic partnership agreements it has signed with New Zealand and Singapore. Since these two countries only represent 3.6 percent of Taiwan’s total foreign trade, these agreements hardly resolve the crisis of Taiwan’s marginalization.
As for economic interests, the elite comprador economy built up through a series of forums involving representatives of the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is very unpopular in Taiwan. It is a liability arising from the “1992 consensus” card, not an asset.
Cross-strait economic dealings have not brought economic benefits to the nation, and ordinary Taiwanese have gained little from it. The KMT-CCP forums and backroom cross-strait negotiations have concentrated on a rich and powerful minority, while causing worries about national security and the growing gap between rich and poor.
China need only look at the public opinion polls carried out in the nation to see the likely effects of playing the “1992 consensus” card. Recent polls show that only a little over 20 percent of people in Taiwan are satisfied with the Ma administration’s cross-strait policies. China should not misjudge the mood and imagine that threatening the DPP with the “1992 consensus” would work in its favor.
If a DPP president is elected without having bowed to such threats, it would cause cross-strait relations to sink into a stalemate. If the DPP and CCP do not have sufficient mutual trust to engage in dialogue, it will be very hard to maintain peaceful development across the Taiwan Strait.
China should pragmatically adjust its policies to engage the DPP in dialogue, and establish mutual trust and understanding. That is the only way in which a new model for peaceful cross-strait development can be found.
Tung Chen-yuan is a distinguished professor at National Chengchi University’s Graduate Institute of Development Studies.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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