Since the Taipei mayoral election in November last year, the spotlight of Taiwan’s news media has been frantically searching out two prime targets: Newly elected Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), and the alleged secret recipe of his election victory, “Internet troops” (網軍).
Despite these intriguing phenomena drawing widespread attention, it is abnormal and ridiculous that the focus of a whole nation’s media disproportionately concentrates on a local mayor in a transient frenzy. This parochial and short-sighted perspective has somewhat misled people about what is crucial — eclipsing truly exigent issues for Taiwan.
In contrast with the majority of people bewildered by dazzling limelight, prudent and sagacious political leaders can always look through to the essence of the reality, foresee future risks and opportunities and build an advantageous environment for their upcoming success.
In a similar vein, prospective leaders with ambition to lead the country should contemplate and design a comprehensive set of strategies for the nation’s future development in the context of fast-changing global geopolitics.
Facing an increasingly confident neighbor, Taiwan cannot afford to be governed in a political vacuum. Regrettably, since its landslide loss in last year’s nine-in-one elections, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) has fallen into a state of despair and is unable to rally its troops.
In a democracy, ruling and opposition parties have equal opportunities to be regularly voted into or out of power. As a political party in a democratic state, fractious infighting over policy is normal and tolerable. However, governing a country without a clear direction is dangerous and inexcusable.
However, this seems to be the case for Taiwan today. The staggering lack of popular support for President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration has left few positive expectations for its remaining term. One year from now, Taiwan is likely to experience another transfer of power.
Externally, political and strategic struggles among countries in the Asia-Pacific region will intensify. As a nation whose history has been heavily engraved by strong external powers, any distractions or miscalculations would jeopardize Taiwan’s national interests and further undermine its strategic position on the map of global politics.
While most Taiwanese are beguiled by never-ending domestic political drama, the political climate outside of Taiwan is changing fast. As sure as the recent dust storms from northern China which hit Taiwan, gathering storms of power politics are set to impact the nation. Political weather in Taipei hinges on a complex convergence of low and high pressures from Washington and Beijing.
The rise in civil movements and a possible change in leadership in next year’s elections might prove to be something of a bellwether, but any significant changes in the political weather of Taiwan are sure to be closely tracked by Beijing.
Only last week, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) publicly emphasized the importance of insisting on the so-called “one China” principle as a cornerstone of long-lasting peace in cross-strait relations. This remark has been broadly perceived as a warning to the Democratic Progressive Party’s presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), and her pro-independence political stance.
Furthermore, despite an economic slowdown, the Chinese government has announced that military spending will be increased by 10.1 percent to US$141.5 billion this year. This means that such spending is growing at a pace faster than the overall growth rate of the Chinese economy. This amount of spending on the People’s Liberation Army is building a modern military capable of defending China’s interests, while helping it become more confident and self-assertive regarding wider regional disputes.
China’s land reclamation projects in the South China Sea are rapidly expanding. The area of islands controlled by China in the Spratly Islands (Nansha Islands, 南沙群島) has surpassed the largest island, Itu Aba Island (Taiping Island, 太平島), which is controlled by Taiwan. The building of such infrastructure is likely to form a network of fortresses at sea and provide robust support for Beijing to firmly project its military clout over contested waters, eventually helping to provide sufficient military capabilities to establish its air defense identification zone in the South China Sea.
As China’s encroachment in the South China Sea accelerates, Taiwan’s prospects for territory in that region are reduced. Not only is Taiwan short of military force to defend its sovereignty claim, it has little geopolitical leverage when dealing with the other countries in that region that also lay claim to the disputed islands.
In light of China’s growing military muscle, the potential cost for US military intervention in the region will continue to rise. Washington would need to think long and hard before deciding to get involved.
In other words, as long as Beijing can gradually develop its military capabilities, effectively altering the cost-benefit calculation of US decision-makers when considering the option of military intervention, Beijing could achieve a strategic victory without even firing one bullet.
Against this backdrop, the fate of the nation does not look optimistic, since Washington might be forced to concede support for Taiwan in the wake of the costly consequences of a direct military clash with China.
Given that Washington’s attention has been distracted by two regional conflicts — in the Middle East and eastern Ukraine — plus the thorny issue of Iran’s nuclear capabilities and the erratic leadership in North Korea, the best hope for US President Barack Obama is to keep his promise of bringing US troops home from Iraq and Afghanistan, and, at best, to reach the basic framework of the Trans-Pacific Partnership by the end of his term.
Moreover, since last year’s APEC summit, China’s charm offensive of providing enormous loans and infrastructure projects to its neighboring countries has somewhat weakened the appeal of Washington’s “pivot” to Asia policy. With an upcoming presidential election in the US, the last thing the Obama administration wants is any unexpected instability in East Asia.
Therefore, the overall political climate in East Asia this year is likely to be the continued expansion of Chinese high pressure and a slow retreat of US low pressure.
Taiwan, in the path of China’s expanding storm, is looking increasingly isolated and vulnerable.
No matter who is elected president next year, they will face a more challenging situation than the current administration. Assuaging China’s fears, while at the same time easing Washington’s suspicion about Taiwan’s new political transition, is crucial for the new incumbent. Furthermore, facing a growing tension between the rise in awareness of Taiwanese identity and the shackles of maintaining the “status quo” externally, is sure to challenge future leaders.
Sun Tzu (孫子) said that judicious warriors fortify themselves to be invincible and then await opportunities from their rival’s vulnerability. Taiwan’s power does not simply lie with the military; it needs to be exercised in the diplomatic arena, and it needs to be contemplated now. After all, if failed experiences have shed any light on the future, it is that wishful thinking cannot pay off well in the ruthless theater of international politics.
Eric Chiou is an assistant Professor of National Chiao Tung University.
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