Assuming the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) wins next year’s presidential election, the new administration should call for a non-binding referendum in which Taiwanes are asked a simple, straightforward question: Do you favor unification — yes or no? It should produce a large majority rejecting unification.
The referendum would be non-binding. It would not promote independence. It would be a mere affirmation of the inclination of Taiwanese already well-known to Beijing and Washington. Neither China nor the US has reason to oppose such a referendum.
The referendum would achieve three goals:
First, it would facilitate unity among the Taiwanese. To protect the nation’s hard-won freedom, democracy and higher standard of living, Taiwanese would come together to oppose unification regardless of their factions or party affiliation. Such a coalition would provide the DPP administration with a strong mandate to bargain with China.
Second, the referendum would put China — as well as the rest of the world — on notice that Taiwan’s new administration cannot accept the so-called “1992 consensus” (one China, no independence for Taiwan) or “one China, two systems” as the basis of future cross-strait negotiations. Future negotiations should be aimed at discussing all options for Taiwan’s future, including unification and independence.
Taiwan’s message to China would be clear: To achieve unification peacefully, it must strive to win the consent of Taiwanese. Consent will come only when Taiwanese have meaningful options from which to choose. Any attempt to impose unification by threat of force will only stiffen their resolve to resist.
Third, a resounding vote against unification should have significant impact on US policymakers, especially Taiwan’s friends in the US Congress, as well as public opinion in the US. The referendum should take place in the run-up to the US presidential election — from January next year to the beginning of November.
Over the past two decades, Washington’s China policy has been to accommodate Beijing by opposing Taiwanese independence, hoping that China would then be incorporated into the current US-led international order as “an important stake-holder.” Some even predicted that the capitalism currently espoused by Beijing would inevitably lead it to its transformation into a democratic state.
However, it is far more likely that China’s ultimate goal is to replace the US as the No. 1 world power and supplant the present world order with a new one that is China-centered. The annexation of Taiwan is one of China’s “core interests” and the first step toward achieving “the China dream.”
In searching for a compromise between war with China and abandonment of Taiwan, the US should find the idea of letting Taiwanese choose their own future as a fair and reasonable solution.
However, what specifically should Taiwan’s potential new administration negotiate with China?
Here is a suggestion: Taiwan should negotiate a moratorium with China whereby Taiwan would forgo de jure independence, while China would “freeze” unification by force for a period of, say, 25 to 35 years. At the end of the agreed-upon period, Taiwan would hold a second, binding referendum to choose between unification and independence — or any compromise acceptable to a majority of Taiwanese.
During the moratorium, China might emerge as a powerful, prosperous and harmonious country governed by the rule of law. By words and deeds, Beijing could demonstrate to Taiwanese why unification would be a better choice than independence.
Taiwanese, on the other hand, could watch closely how well China governs its own people. They might conclude that while Taiwan and China might be brothers, it is not necessary that the two must live together under the same roof. More likely, the people might say that two brothers living separately would have a better chance to be on friendly terms.
What if Beijing rejects self-determination for the nation? The “status quo” would continue with one major difference likely: no more President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) or the like willing to collaborate with Beijing on unification from inside Taiwan.
The nation’s potential new administration should feel free to begin extensive constitutional amendments, laying the foundation for the nation’s eventual de jure independence.
Will China invade? Before attacking, China should ask itself: Would the US concede Taiwan in the face of an unprovoked military invasion?
Edward Chen is a professor emeritus of history and international relations at Bowling Green State University in Ohio.
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