In recent years, China has repeatedly called for the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to establish a framework for the development of peaceful relations, based on the so-called “1992 consensus,” opposition to Taiwanese independence and the “one China” policy.
With the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) possibly gaining power in next year’s presidential election, China’s framework may collapse, creating a great challenge for Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平). In responding to the changing situation, China should establish a Taiwan-China communication channel and take the initiative to resolve the problem of Taiwan’s participation in international organizations.
Within the past seven years, there has been frequent interaction between the two sides — including the signing of 21 separate agreements — frosty diplomatic relations have thawed and there are fewer threats of military force from Beijing. Nevertheless, the foundations of the political rapprochement are extremely fragile, with the “1992 consensus” interpreted differently by either side.
Taiwan understands it to mean: “There is one China, for which each side has its own interpretation.” China, on the other hand, interprets the consensus as acceptance by the two sides of its “one China” principle and the simultaneous rejection of Taiwanese independence.
Devoid of a robust political foundation for agreement, it has been impossible for dialogue to be broadened into wider political discussion; hence discussions have been limited to trade and economics. If political issues were to be raised, China would demand that Taiwan accept the “one China” principle and reject independence to test the government and “establish political trust” between the two sides. Such a starting point for political discussions is a red line that neither Taiwanese nor the government are willing to cross.
In 2002, then-Chinese president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤), began to promote the establishment of a framework for the development of peaceful cross-strait relations based on a “1992 consensus” grounded in the “one China” principle. Following the inauguration of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) in 2008, both sides agreed — based on the “1992 consensus” with each side retaining its own interpretation — to promote discussions as a way forward, signing many functional agreements.
However, cross-strait discussions have always been limited to functional issues, unable to breakthrough into political discussion, which has led to political and military conflict remaining substantially unresolved and has restricted Taiwan’s participation in international bodies.
Since Xi assumed power in China in 2012, the stagnation of the cross-strait relationship has become plain for all to see. The two sides have not only been unable to enter into dialogue or compromise over Taiwan’s participation in international bodies and military conflict, but the rapid pace at which Taiwan has opened up its economy to China has left Taiwanese feeling decidedly anxious.
According to the Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey, released in March last year, half of the respondents believe the signing of the cross-strait service trade agreement with China to be detrimental to the sovereignty and security of Taiwan. In light of this, any future cross-strait political agreement will be a hard sell to Taiwanese.
In the seven years of Ma’s leadership, public opposition to “unification” has risen sharply, and at a much faster rate than during the years of DPP rule; something the Chinese find hard to understand and accept. An even greater challenge for Xi is the strong likelihood of a DPP victory in next year’s presidential election. If the DPP chooses to not adjust its China policy, then Hu’s 10-year labor of love — his framework for the development of peaceful cross-strait relations — will likely turn to dust. Xi would be asked to shoulder the responsibility for such an outcome, resulting in a power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP); a situation which would be disadvantageous to regional stability.
Fostering mutual trust and common understanding requires that the two sides construct a genuine framework for peaceful relations, with dialogue and interaction among all three parties — CCP, DPP and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). Likewise, the CCP should develop mechanisms for effective communication with the DPP. At the same time, China should take the initiative to solve the problem of Taiwan’s participation in international bodies.
This is the only way to reconcile the two sides, create a virtuous circle of cross-strait interaction and establish a framework for the development of peaceful cross-strait relations.
Tung Chen-yuan is a distinguished professor at National Chengchi University’s Graduate Institute of Development Studies.
Translated by Edward Jones
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