The Control Yuan has come under criticism that it is ineffective, that its members project a poor image and that President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) only nominates his own aides, creating the impression that the nominations are a reward for services rendered. The legislature did not accept Ma’s first, complete list of nominees, but turned 11 of them down. Although some media outlets and the opposition parties have called on Ma to refrain from appointing new nominees, he has submitted an additional list of 11 names to the legislature for approval.
Ma says it is his “unshirkable responsibility” to submit the list, yet doing so is meaningless, unnecessary and only serves to increase political turbulence.
Even former Control Yuan president Wang Chien-hsien acknowledged the institution’s inefficiency in several press conferences prior to stepping down, and he suggested that “it would be better if the Control Yuan were closed down.”
The cost of cases handled by Control Yuan members is NT$1.9 million (US$63,190) and major cases are often delayed or not dealt with for political reasons, as was apparently the case with the investigation of former prosecutor-general Huang Shih-ming (黃世銘).
If the Control Yuan issues a correction, the Cabinet just ignores it, as was the case with former Nantou County commissioner Lee Chao-ching (李朝卿) and the controversial retirement of civil servant Kuo Kuan-ying (郭冠英). Based on election concerns, there have been discussions recently about whether Lee should be reinstated, and Kuo’s retirement may soon be approved, allowing him to obtain a lifelong pension after just a few months in the job. If this is how the Cabinet treats the Control Yuan, nominating another 11 people will not do much to improve the situation.
The legislature also looks down on the Control Yuan. As soon as the list of additional names was submitted, the opposition criticized it, saying it lacked any outstanding candidates. Not even Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators could manage better than saying the list “is a bit less problematic” and will make things a bit easier. If someone can be nominated for a seat on the Control Yuan just because they are “a bit less problematic,” then the bar is set too low and we would do better without them.
The previous list of nominees was universally questioned and several candidates withdrew voluntarily before being questioned by legislators, which goes to illustrate that the Presidential Office’s preparations were not rigorous enough. The submission of the additional list showed that few lessons had been learned. The day after it was announced, and before it had been submitted to the legislature, the nomination of World Economics Society president Bert Lim (林建山) was questioned because of suspicions that his US doctor’s degree was illegitimate. Lim immediately requested the withdrawal of his nomination and a hurried statement said that “another additional list” would be announced as soon as possible.
Both the public and the media treat the Control Yuan as an appendix that could be done without, but the Ma administration thinks it is an important bargaining chip that helps it manipulate elections and public support, and that all seats must be filled, regardless of the quality of its members. Add to this the tense political atmosphere caused by the Nov. 29 nine-in-one elections and it becomes easy to imagine the legislature locked in a stalemate caused by conflict over the approval of the nominees, postponing approval of budget issues and legal bills.
When former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) was in power, the Control Yuan was out of commission for three years because the KMT blocked the approval of Chen’s nominations. Despite this, the government continued to operate normally and there were no public complaints. It is obvious that the Control Yuan is not a necessary institution and that Ma making such a big deal about the nominations is much ado about nothing.
China badly misread Japan. It sought to intimidate Tokyo into silence on Taiwan. Instead, it has achieved the opposite by hardening Japanese resolve. By trying to bludgeon a major power like Japan into accepting its “red lines” — above all on Taiwan — China laid bare the raw coercive logic of compellence now driving its foreign policy toward Asian states. From the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas to the Himalayan frontier, Beijing has increasingly relied on economic warfare, diplomatic intimidation and military pressure to bend neighbors to its will. Confident in its growing power, China appeared to believe
After more than three weeks since the Honduran elections took place, its National Electoral Council finally certified the new president of Honduras. During the campaign, the two leading contenders, Nasry Asfura and Salvador Nasralla, who according to the council were separated by 27,026 votes in the final tally, promised to restore diplomatic ties with Taiwan if elected. Nasralla refused to accept the result and said that he would challenge all the irregularities in court. However, with formal recognition from the US and rapid acknowledgment from key regional governments, including Argentina and Panama, a reversal of the results appears institutionally and politically
In 2009, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) made a welcome move to offer in-house contracts to all outsourced employees. It was a step forward for labor relations and the enterprise facing long-standing issues around outsourcing. TSMC founder Morris Chang (張忠謀) once said: “Anything that goes against basic values and principles must be reformed regardless of the cost — on this, there can be no compromise.” The quote is a testament to a core belief of the company’s culture: Injustices must be faced head-on and set right. If TSMC can be clear on its convictions, then should the Ministry of Education
The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) provided several reasons for military drills it conducted in five zones around Taiwan on Monday and yesterday. The first was as a warning to “Taiwanese independence forces” to cease and desist. This is a consistent line from the Chinese authorities. The second was that the drills were aimed at “deterrence” of outside military intervention. Monday’s announcement of the drills was the first time that Beijing has publicly used the second reason for conducting such drills. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership is clearly rattled by “external forces” apparently consolidating around an intention to intervene. The targets of