The Control Yuan has come under criticism that it is ineffective, that its members project a poor image and that President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) only nominates his own aides, creating the impression that the nominations are a reward for services rendered. The legislature did not accept Ma’s first, complete list of nominees, but turned 11 of them down. Although some media outlets and the opposition parties have called on Ma to refrain from appointing new nominees, he has submitted an additional list of 11 names to the legislature for approval.
Ma says it is his “unshirkable responsibility” to submit the list, yet doing so is meaningless, unnecessary and only serves to increase political turbulence.
Even former Control Yuan president Wang Chien-hsien acknowledged the institution’s inefficiency in several press conferences prior to stepping down, and he suggested that “it would be better if the Control Yuan were closed down.”
The cost of cases handled by Control Yuan members is NT$1.9 million (US$63,190) and major cases are often delayed or not dealt with for political reasons, as was apparently the case with the investigation of former prosecutor-general Huang Shih-ming (黃世銘).
If the Control Yuan issues a correction, the Cabinet just ignores it, as was the case with former Nantou County commissioner Lee Chao-ching (李朝卿) and the controversial retirement of civil servant Kuo Kuan-ying (郭冠英). Based on election concerns, there have been discussions recently about whether Lee should be reinstated, and Kuo’s retirement may soon be approved, allowing him to obtain a lifelong pension after just a few months in the job. If this is how the Cabinet treats the Control Yuan, nominating another 11 people will not do much to improve the situation.
The legislature also looks down on the Control Yuan. As soon as the list of additional names was submitted, the opposition criticized it, saying it lacked any outstanding candidates. Not even Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators could manage better than saying the list “is a bit less problematic” and will make things a bit easier. If someone can be nominated for a seat on the Control Yuan just because they are “a bit less problematic,” then the bar is set too low and we would do better without them.
The previous list of nominees was universally questioned and several candidates withdrew voluntarily before being questioned by legislators, which goes to illustrate that the Presidential Office’s preparations were not rigorous enough. The submission of the additional list showed that few lessons had been learned. The day after it was announced, and before it had been submitted to the legislature, the nomination of World Economics Society president Bert Lim (林建山) was questioned because of suspicions that his US doctor’s degree was illegitimate. Lim immediately requested the withdrawal of his nomination and a hurried statement said that “another additional list” would be announced as soon as possible.
Both the public and the media treat the Control Yuan as an appendix that could be done without, but the Ma administration thinks it is an important bargaining chip that helps it manipulate elections and public support, and that all seats must be filled, regardless of the quality of its members. Add to this the tense political atmosphere caused by the Nov. 29 nine-in-one elections and it becomes easy to imagine the legislature locked in a stalemate caused by conflict over the approval of the nominees, postponing approval of budget issues and legal bills.
When former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) was in power, the Control Yuan was out of commission for three years because the KMT blocked the approval of Chen’s nominations. Despite this, the government continued to operate normally and there were no public complaints. It is obvious that the Control Yuan is not a necessary institution and that Ma making such a big deal about the nominations is much ado about nothing.
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