On Wednesday, while addressing a seminar hosted by the New Party-affiliated New Chinese Children’s Association celebrating the 70th anniversary of Japan’s World War II surrender, former premier Hau Pei-tsun (郝柏村) produced yet another astounding remark while offering his views on Taiwan, which essentially translated as “Taiwanese have no say concerning Taiwan’s future.”
“Normally speaking in terms of democracy, it’s correct to say that Taiwan’s future is decided by Taiwanese people,” Hau said. However, he added that in politics, being pragmatic is key.
“Taiwan’s future is the Republic of China’s (ROC) future, and the ROC’s future ought to be decided by all Chinese people,” he said.
In other words, Hau’s remarks were no different from that of China’s Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Fan Liqing (范麗青) in June when she said Taiwan’s future must be decided by all 1.3 billion Chinese.
Saying that Hau’s logic is skewed is a gross understatement.
China’s governance does not extend to Taiwan and Taiwan is not part of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) territory. Thus on what grounds should China decide Taiwan’s future? Taiwanese elect their own government, so why can they not decide their own future? Chinese people cannot even decide their own future, so what gives them the right to determine the future of Taiwan?
Assuming that Hau was employing the out-of-date definition of the ROC Constitution — which still proclaims ownership of the whole of China as well as Mongolia — to make his point, implying that Taiwan is just a part of ROC territory and that any changes made to the whole of the country must consider the opinion of the people of “mainland China,” is just ridiculous.
The international reality is that the PRC has been recognized as the sole legitimate representative of China at the UN. In other words, it is a sovereign entity. It is therefore absurd to suggest that the future of Taiwan should be decided by another country. Unless the Beijing authority recognizes the ROC Constitution and admits that its occupancy of “mainland China” is illegitimate, then Hau’s argument, that both the people China and the people in Taiwan belong to a single country called the ROC, is moot.
This is not the first time Hau has made controversial anti-democracy remarks.
In a speech in June last year, addressing a forum organized by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, Hau — ironically while speaking on the subject of democracy — proclaimed that Taiwan and China would inevitably be united and that Taiwan is not an independent, sovereign nation, adding that rhetoric such as “the ROC is Taiwan” is self-depreciation, “representing a step backward for democracy and a major obstacle to the quality of the nation’s democracy.”
In May this year, Hau called the Sunflower movement a coup d’etat, lambasting the students’ protest against the government’s handling of the cross-strait service trade agreement, saying it “did not deserve to be called a student movement” because it was characterized by what he termed riots and violence.
This outmoded former military leader’s twisted idea on the meaning and value of democracy is beyond comprehension. While through his speeches Hau may seek to posture himself as a paragon of democracy, what he in fact demonstrates is not only a genuine lack of understanding about democracy, but also a reflection of his anti-democratic and military character.
In short, only Taiwan can decide its future. Who cares what China thinks?
However, for Hau, who seems to attach great importance to what China thinks, maybe it would be best if he relocated to China, as apparently it is where his heart is.
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