The madness season began earlier this year.
Not the unofficial electioneering for the Nov. 29 elections that began months ago, but the madness of a political implosion that comes seemingly out of nowhere to haunt the halls of power for months on end.
A year ago Taiwan was slogging through the final weeks of the heat and humidity of August, blissfully unaware of what the following month would bring. On Sept. 6 the “September strife” erupted — triggered by President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) bid to oust Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) from his post by revoking his Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) membership.
That scandal began when the Special Investigation Division of the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office announced an investigation into Wang on allegations of unduly using his influence. The division’s press conference, held just hours after Wang had left for Malaysia to attend a wedding, triggered weeks of accusations, counterclaims, probes, more probes and lawsuits, much of which focused on the questions of who said what to whom and when.
Wang denied the allegations and said that Ma had been “misled.”
Now it is one week into what could be called the “August angst”: centered on the abrupt resignation/dismissal of former Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) deputy minister Chang Hsien-yao (張顯耀), followed by reports of an investigation into alleged misdeeds, including leaking information to China.
Once again there are questions about who said what and when — along with denials of allegations and warnings that Ma has been deceived. Chang has denied leaking information to Beijing or spying for it. He has said he fears that the president had been “hijacked” by a “small group of people.”
There has been a flurry of statements from the Executive Yuan, the MAC, council Minister Wang Yu-chi (王郁琦) and Chang amid rumors that Chang was replaced because of a conflict with Wang Yu-chi or because he somehow ran afoul of National Security Council Secretary-General King Pu-tsung (金溥聰), Ma’s longtime strong right hand.
King’s possible role in the saga is turning into a major issue, with Chang refusing to say directly if King is part of the “small group of people” he fears are influencing Ma. However, given the way King has been expanding his purview since taking up his post at the end of March, with controversial visits to the National Security Bureau, the National Police Agency, the Bureau of Investigation and other intelligence bodies, it would surprise no one to learn that he has been getting involved in the MAC as well.
The Executive Yuan’s move against Chang suffered a setback on Thursday, when the High Court Prosecutors’ Office rebuffed a request to investigate him, citing a lack of evidence that could put the case under the office’s jurisdiction. It seems the government suffered an own-goal, for the High Court prosecutors pointed out that since Ma’s government does not recognize China as a separate nation, Beijing could not be considered a “foreign government” for the purposes of a treason case.
The Taipei District Prosecutors’ Office yesterday decided it would investigate Chang for alleged violations of the National Security Information Protection Act (國家安全機密保護法). The public will now have to wait and see how this drama plays out and whether prosecutors decide there is evidence to indict Chang.
Irrespective of the outcome, Chang’s sacking has been an unholy mess that leaves few in authority looking good.
It is worth noting that the Chang saga began on Aug. 14, when Wang Yu-chi told him that he would have to resign. That is just one day after the Taipei District Prosecutors’ Office announced that Wang Jin-pyng had been cleared of allegations of influence peddling raised in September last year.
Obviously, it was time for a new scandal.
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