On today’s page, Masahiro Matsumura, a professor of international politics and national security at St Andrew’s University in Osaka, questions the viability and advisability of the government’s proposed “T-Dome” missile defense system. Matsumura writes that Taiwan’s military budget would be better allocated elsewhere, and cautions against the temptation to allow politics to trump strategic sense. What he does not do is question whether Taiwan needs to increase its defense capabilities. “Given the accelerating pace of Beijing’s military buildup and political coercion ... [Taiwan] cannot afford inaction,” he writes.
A rational, robust debate over the specifics, not the scale or the necessity, of the government’s proposed national defense budget is precisely what should be happening in the legislature. Instead, through a series of obfuscations, distractions and delays, the opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) are preventing any review of the national defense budget. Their “solution” to the stalemate that is also holding up the review of the general budget is to divide it up for individual review, to ensure the efficient running of programs impacting the daily lives of Taiwanese. That is more due to the political imperative of not angering constituents of opposition-governed localities.
The visible hands behind the obstructionist behavior are KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文), KMT legislative caucus leader Fu Kun-chi (傅崐萁) and TPP Chairman Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌).
Beyond the presumed political machinations, there is also the suspicion that another, altogether more pernicious influence is at work: the invisible hand of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with its vested interest in obstructing any advancements in Taiwan’s ability to protect itself from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.
The suspicions have been highlighted in a report saying that Cheng has been approached to ensure that three requisites to a potential meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) within the next few months are fulfilled, including the obstruction of Taiwan’s defensive capabilities.
In an op-ed on this page (“Huang Kuo-chang: from Sunflower to saboteur”), former Hong Kong resident John Cheng outlines his reasons for questioning Huang’s methods, motivation and trustworthiness. He stops short of suggesting that Huang’s actions might be guided by the CCP, as some believe to be the case with Cheng Li-wun and Fu.
Today, Huang is expected to return from a whirlwind visit to the US. His surprise announcement on Sunday that he would be making a brief trip to Washington to meet with US officials for “an exchange of ideas” was met with disbelief and derision in equal measure from many political commentators, pan-green camp supporters and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) lawmakers.
Media personality Clara Chou (周玉蔻) asked why US officials would have time to meet with an opposition lawmaker with a pro-China stance who was about to vacate his seat in the legislature, when he would no longer be his party’s caucus leader. On Monday, lawyer Lin Chih-chun (林智群), a prominent figure in the pan-green camp, suggested that the highest-ranking US official Huang was likely to meet was an immigration officer at passport control. DPP Legislator Rosalia Wu (吳思瑤) mused that Huang simply wanted to attract attention to himself to create the perception of continued relevance following the return of TPP founder and former chairman Ko Wen-je (柯文哲).
There is a certain amount of politicking going on with the reactions, too. Huang is a bit player whose power as TPP chairman derives entirely from his usefulness to the KMT and whose methods are deeply problematic, at times verging on illegal or unconstitutional. However, although he would no longer be a legislator or party caucus leader as of Feb. 1, he would still be TPP chairman, and the party would still hold a decisive vote on the budget review process that must be completed before the end of the month.
That Huang has decided to drop everything at such short notice, at such an important moment, to rush off to Washington, suggests that he has been summoned — that White House officials recognize him to be in a decisive position to allow Taiwan’s defense budget to pass, and that he is a uniquely manipulatable actor who has shed deeply held positions.
That is, we might be seeing the effect of another pair of invisible hands at work.
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Every analyst watching Iran’s succession crisis is asking who would replace supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Yet, the real question is whether China has learned enough from the Persian Gulf to survive a war over Taiwan. Beijing purchases roughly 90 percent of Iran’s exported crude — some 1.61 million barrels per day last year — and holds a US$400 billion, 25-year cooperation agreement binding it to Tehran’s stability. However, this is not simply the story of a patron protecting an investment. China has spent years engineering a sanctions-evasion architecture that was never really about Iran — it was about Taiwan. The
In an op-ed published in Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) said that Taiwan should not have to choose between aligning with Beijing or Washington, and advocated for cooperation with Beijing under the so-called “1992 consensus” as a form of “strategic ambiguity.” However, Cheng has either misunderstood the geopolitical reality and chosen appeasement, or is trying to fool an international audience with her doublespeak; nonetheless, it risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s democratic allies and partners. Cheng stressed that “Taiwan does not have to choose,” as while Beijing and Washington compete, Taiwan is strongest when
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