In an op-ed published in Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) said that Taiwan should not have to choose between aligning with Beijing or Washington, and advocated for cooperation with Beijing under the so-called “1992 consensus” as a form of “strategic ambiguity.”
However, Cheng has either misunderstood the geopolitical reality and chosen appeasement, or is trying to fool an international audience with her doublespeak; nonetheless, it risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s democratic allies and partners.
Cheng stressed that “Taiwan does not have to choose,” as while Beijing and Washington compete, Taiwan is strongest when it pursues its own needs, using its agency to reduce regional tension and prevent conflict.
Her ideal approach is to maintain economic ties and expand exchanges with China under the “1992 consensus” and create “deterrence with dialogue” by setting up direct crisis communication channels with Beijing, while deepening technological cooperation and sharing a commitment to democratic values with the US.
She also claimed that the KMT recognizes the importance of deterrence, but said that “defense spending alone cannot create peace,” while only “cooperation with Beijing” can.
Cheng’s assumption that “Taiwan doesn’t have to choose” overlooks China’s rapid military expansion in the past decade and its shrinking of Taiwan’s international space through diplomatic isolation, economic pressure and military intimidation.
Cheng ignored that it is Beijing’s core and longstanding goal to annex Taiwan, and that it does not recognize Taiwan’s sovereignty nor accept Taiwan having the agency to choose its own path.
Her claim of the “1992 consensus” acting as a formula for “one China, with respective interpretations” and thus justifying engagement with China is also a lie, as Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) in 2019 explicitly said that the “1992 consensus” means “both sides of the Taiwan Strait belong to one China and will work together toward national reunification,” leaving no room for ambiguity.
Considering the geopolitical reality of an intensifying threat from authoritarian China and the efforts of a democratic alliance — primarily led by the US, the G7 members and the EU — to deter increasing coercion and military buildup, Taiwan “not choosing” is a choice in itself. Due to Taiwan’s free and democratic system, its critical position in the strategic first island chain and Indo-Pacific security architecture, and its irreplaceable role in the global democratic supply chain, it has already aligned itself with the democratic alliance. Therefore, Cheng’s suggestion of taking a “neutral” stance but advocating for cooperation with China, as well as the KMT’s persistent efforts to block or significantly cut the special national defense budget, is a signal of the KMT cozying up to Beijing while pulling away from Washington and the democratic alliance.
Furthermore, the KMT’s stance risks sending the wrong message to Taiwan’s democratic allies that it is not determined to defend itself and is unwilling to play its part in the democratic alliance’s collective resilience and security buildup. It could lead to the US, Japan and other democracies reconsidering their policies towards Taiwan and their willingness to act against China if a conflict breaks out.
While Cheng says that “cross-strait peace requires more than goodwill,” her plan to “engage economically and culturally with the mainland [China] while maintaining a democratic system and strategic partnerships” is wishful thinking and a misunderstanding (or purposeful omission) of the core meaning of “deterrence.”
Deterrence is the ability to alter an adversary’s cost-benefit calculus — where the perceived costs of aggression outweigh the potential gain — so that they decide against taking an undesired action, relying on capability (ability to punish or deny), credibility (believable resolve) and communication (clear messaging of consequences).
Cheng has distorted this theory by wishfully hoping on “communication” — not on the clear messaging of the costs of aggression, but on building closer contact and exchanges with Beijing while anticipating a goodwill response. At the same time, the KMT is weakening Taiwan’s capability and credibility to deter China’s annexation ambitions through its legislators’ actions.
History has shown that appeasement and yielding to aggressors to avoid conflict only embolden and feed their ambition, rather than ensuring peace. While Cheng’s claims seem rational, moderate and peace-loveing on the surface, they are full of geopolitical misjudgments and critical lies, and voters should carefully scrutinize the KMT lawmakers’ actions to understand their real agenda.
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