NATO says tens of thousands of Russian troops are massed on the border with Ukraine for a potential invasion, yet Western states still lack a strategy to stop Moscow from intervening in its former Soviet neighbors.
With military action to protect non-NATO states effectively ruled out, current and former officials say sanctions and isolation provide the best — and perhaps only — way to pressure Moscow. Ramping up the pressure on the rich and powerful around Russian President Vladimir Putin, they say, might in time push him toward a much more conciliatory approach.
However that, they concede, could prove a long game and some both in and outside government worry that a more isolated Russia may simply become both more nationalist and self-sufficient. Putting Putin under more pressure, they worry, may give him even more incentive to take a populist, more aggressive approach.
Ultimately, Moscow’s commitment to rebuild the former Soviet Union as its own unilateral sphere of influence may outstrip the determination of Washington and its European allies to stop it.
Experts say Moscow has been infiltrating its neighbors ever more deeply, building its influence among security forces, government officials and politicians. That, some say, allows it to stir up instability in locations such as eastern Ukraine, and create both confusion and potential preconditions to invade.
“What we’re seeing here is a new form of warfare and part of a concerted strategy,” said Chris Donnelly, a former senior adviser to NATO on Russia and now director of the Institute for Statecraft in London. “Either we stand up to it or we let it happen. So far the response has been totally inadequate.”
With Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea now largely seen as an irreversible fait accompli, many now see more confrontation over the years to come.
In a March 18 speech following the Crimea intervention, Putin made it clear he would be willing to use force to safeguard the interests of Russian-speaking minorities.
The breakup of the Soviet Union left about 25 million ethnic Russians outside the borders of the Russian Federation, concentrated in places such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Central Asian and Baltic states, and breakaway enclaves in Georgia and Moldova.
Tens of millions more — classified in their old Soviet passports as ethnic Ukrainians, Belarussians or others — speak Russian as their first language.
There may be little Western states can do to stop Moscow reabsorbing into the Russian Federation three breakaway statelets its military already occupies — Moldova’s Transdniestria region, and Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Nor is there political will to stop Russia going further if truly determined to do so. The only true red line, some say, is that attacking the NATO member Baltic states would trigger NATO’s self defense clause, and a wider war with the alliance and its nuclear super power the US.
“We are in new territory,” one Western official said on condition of anonymity. “Realistically, there is little the West can do to prevent Putin invading Ukraine or other non-NATO former Soviet states, except for applying diplomatic and economic pressure. The priority now is to deter any aggression against NATO.”
The strongest message Western states could send to Moscow, some experts suggest, is that for every move Russia takes to entrench its position in the areas it can control, the closer other countries near its orbit would move to the West.
That would mean greater economic support, possibly moves toward EU accession for European former Soviet states such as Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, and perhaps new energy and economic deals with Central Asia.
On Wednesday last week, Reuters reported that Kazakhstan — a reliable Russian ally that has publicly supported Moscow’s actions in Ukraine — is seeking alternative export routes for its oil if sanctions on Russia are tightened.
Building up and supporting such states to make them more resilient to Russian influence, though, is dependent on those governments themselves finding stability. With Ukraine still mired in political crisis and Russian influence growing across the former Soviet Union that could prove overly optimistic.
Further Russian action would probably wreck an informal agreement not to base significant US or Western European military forces in former Soviet Union-dominated Eastern Europe, particularly the three tiny Baltic states, the only parts of NATO and the EU that were directly ruled by Moscow.
Moscow has long complained the West went back on a pledge not to push the boundaries of NATO and the EU to Russia’s border. Now it could see NATO troops permanently based there.
The USS Donald Cook, a guided missile destroyer, entered the Black Sea on Thursday last week to participate in exercises “to reassure NATO allies.” A French intelligence vessel was also due to pass through the Bosphorus.
So far, though, economic pressure has been the only real weapon in the Western arsenal and its effectiveness as a deterrent is difficult to assess.
Sanctions imposed on a few dozen Russian figures by the US and EU over Crimea have been explicitly designed not to have wide-ranging economic consequences.
Both Washington and Brussels have threatened much tougher measures if Russian troops move into other parts of Ukraine. That risk has accelerated capital flight from Russia, hurting its economy, but only indirectly.
So far Putin has not sent troops in, but no one apart from the Kremlin leader himself can say for certain whether he has held back because of the threat to Russian prosperity from sanctions, or for other reasons.
Western states have been unwilling to define in detail what tougher sanctions would mean. That, some say, reduces the impact of the threat. Suggested steps, such as wide-ranging asset freezes or moves to wean Europe off Russian gas, would hurt Western states as well as Moscow.
Targeting Russian investors more widely as well as Putin’s personal wealth and canceling French export deals for two helicopter carriers could also be on the table, officials say. However, such moves would cost jobs, as well as potentially undermining financial markets and real-estate prices.
Still, supporters say tough sanctions have proved effective against Iran, bringing it to the table on nuclear issues.
“This is a timely wake-up call,” said Michael Leigh, former deputy head of external relations for the European Commission and now senior adviser to the German Marshall Fund. “With the West scarcely responding to Crimea, Putin may feel he has nothing to lose for further annexation. A couple of tough winters is a price worth paying.”
A Russian move into eastern Ukraine would almost certainly spark at least limited military conflict between Russia and Ukraine. How the West would react to that is currently very far from clear.
In Washington, US President Barack Obama faces calls to arm Ukraine, and step up training and other military links, but there is little real enthusiasm for direct involvement, much less a nuclear face-off with Moscow.
If a Russian invasion did spark a messy insurgency, the West might find itself gradually dragged into providing at least some covert support to Kiev or any other Western-leaning government in a similar position, but it would almost certainly remain extremely limited.
On April 1, NATO announced what it called “concrete measures” to boost Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. In reality, though, these appeared limited to ill-defined “capacity building” measures and boosting the size of NATO’s liaison office in the capital.
“It’s not that the West couldn’t stop it — a couple of brigades of NATO troops would almost certainly deter an invasion, but that isn’t going to happen,” said Dmitri Gorenburg, Russia analyst at the Center for Naval Analyzes, a US-government funded body that advises the military. “When it comes to pushing back Russia’s actions in the former Soviet Union, there is no strategy and there is no appetite.”
Two sets of economic data released last week by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) have drawn mixed reactions from the public: One on the nation’s economic performance in the first quarter of the year and the other on Taiwan’s household wealth distribution in 2021. GDP growth for the first quarter was faster than expected, at 6.51 percent year-on-year, an acceleration from the previous quarter’s 4.93 percent and higher than the agency’s February estimate of 5.92 percent. It was also the highest growth since the second quarter of 2021, when the economy expanded 8.07 percent, DGBAS data showed. The growth
In the intricate ballet of geopolitics, names signify more than mere identification: They embody history, culture and sovereignty. The recent decision by China to refer to Arunachal Pradesh as “Tsang Nan” or South Tibet, and to rename Tibet as “Xizang,” is a strategic move that extends beyond cartography into the realm of diplomatic signaling. This op-ed explores the implications of these actions and India’s potential response. Names are potent symbols in international relations, encapsulating the essence of a nation’s stance on territorial disputes. China’s choice to rename regions within Indian territory is not merely a linguistic exercise, but a symbolic assertion
More than seven months into the armed conflict in Gaza, the International Court of Justice ordered Israel to take “immediate and effective measures” to protect Palestinians in Gaza from the risk of genocide following a case brought by South Africa regarding Israel’s breaches of the 1948 Genocide Convention. The international community, including Amnesty International, called for an immediate ceasefire by all parties to prevent further loss of civilian lives and to ensure access to life-saving aid. Several protests have been organized around the world, including at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) and many other universities in the US.
In the 2022 book Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China, academics Hal Brands and Michael Beckley warned, against conventional wisdom, that it was not a rising China that the US and its allies had to fear, but a declining China. This is because “peaking powers” — nations at the peak of their relative power and staring over the precipice of decline — are particularly dangerous, as they might believe they only have a narrow window of opportunity to grab what they can before decline sets in, they said. The tailwinds that propelled China’s spectacular economic rise over the past