An article by University of Chicago professor John Mearsheimer titled “Say Goodbye to Taiwan” in the March-April issue of the National Interest is thought-provoking. In his essay, first published online on Feb. 25, Mearsheimer predicts that in the face of China’s continued rise, Taiwan will have to give up even its present de facto independent status and seek a Hong Kong-style accommodation with Beijing.
Mearsheimer, who is a political scientist from the “offensive realism” school of international relations, did do his homework for the essay and studied local political attitudes carefully. For instance, he presents recent statistics showing that — assuming that China will not attack Taiwan — the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese, 80.2 percent, would opt for independence.
He also writes that: “… most Taiwanese would like their country to gain de jure independence and become a legitimate sovereign state in the international system. This outcome is especially attractive because a strong Taiwanese identity — separate from a Chinese identity — has blossomed in Taiwan over the past 65 years.”
However, he concludes that, in spite of locals’ strong desire that Taiwan be accepted as a legitimate sovereign state in the international system, China’s continued rise will make it increasingly difficult to resist Beijing’s pressure toward unification.
The main flaw in Mearsheimer’s reasoning is that he believes in the inevitability of an unfettered continuation of China’s rise. In his attempt to apply his theoretical construct to the real world, Mearsheimer neglects a number of important aspects, such as the push-back from Taiwanese, from the US and from other nations in the region against a rising and increasingly aggressive China.
In addition, China’s continued rise is by no means certain because its economic and political fundamentals are weak at best: The economy has been liberalized, but the Chinese Communist Party’s political control is as tight as ever and there are manifold bubbles — like housing and banking — waiting to burst. This fuels internal tensions which could derail China’s aspirations.
Yet Mearsheimer’s essay is an important wake-up call to global policymakers: If the present “status quo” and “one China” policies are maintained, there is an increasing likelihood that democratic Taiwan will be absorbed by its neighbor.
This would not only be highly undesirable for Taiwanese, but it would also fundamentally upset the regional balance of power.
Mearsheimer describes how control over Taiwan could greatly enhance Beijing’s ability to project military power. This would certainly cause deep anxiety in neighboring countries like South Korea, Japan and the Philippines. Mearsheimer concludes that China will try to dominate Asia in the way that the US dominates the western hemisphere.
Mearsheimer reveals the perception that Washington and Taipei’s current policies have brought about a reduction in cross-strait tensions is only a short-term fata morgana. These policies simply do not form a solid basis for longer-term stability. At some point, the democratic aspirations of Taiwanese will collide with the designs of Beijing, leading to sharply higher tensions.
To ensure that Taiwan remains among free, democratic nations and to maintain a stable and free Western Pacific, it is essential that the US, Asian democracies and Western Europe significantly improve economic and political ties with Taiwan. Perhaps it is time to promote a “Community of Democracies in East Asia.”
Nat Bellocchi served as chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan from 1990 to 1995. The views expressed in this article are his own.
A gap appears to be emerging between Washington’s foreign policy elites and the broader American public on how the United States should respond to China’s rise. From my vantage working at a think tank in Washington, DC, and through regular travel around the United States, I increasingly experience two distinct discussions. This divergence — between America’s elite hawkishness and public caution — may become one of the least appreciated and most consequential external factors influencing Taiwan’s security environment in the years ahead. Within the American policy community, the dominant view of China has grown unmistakably tough. Many members of Congress, as
The Hong Kong government on Monday gazetted sweeping amendments to the implementation rules of Article 43 of its National Security Law. There was no legislative debate, no public consultation and no transition period. By the time the ink dried on the gazette, the new powers were already in force. This move effectively bypassed Hong Kong’s Legislative Council. The rules were enacted by the Hong Kong chief executive, in conjunction with the Committee for Safeguarding National Security — a body shielded from judicial review and accountable only to Beijing. What is presented as “procedural refinement” is, in substance, a shift away from
After declaring Iran’s military “gone,” US President Donald Trump appealed to the UK, France, Japan and South Korea — as well as China, Iran’s strategic partner — to send minesweepers and naval forces to reopen the Strait of Hormuz. When allies balked, the request turned into a warning: NATO would face “a very bad” future if it refused. The prevailing wisdom is that Trump faces a credibility problem: having spent years insulting allies, he finds they would not rally when he needs them. That is true, but superficial, as though a structural collapse could be caused by wounded feelings. Something
The shifting geopolitical tectonic plates of this year have placed Beijing in a profound strategic dilemma. As Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) prepares for a high-stakes summit with US President Donald Trump, the traditional power dynamics of the China-Japan-US triangle have been destabilized by the diplomatic success of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Washington. For the Chinese leadership, the anxiety is two-fold: There is a visceral fear of being encircled by a hardened security alliance, and a secondary risk of being left in a vulnerable position by a transactional deal between Washington and Tokyo that might inadvertently empower Japan