A few days ago, Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) spokesman Yang Wei-chung (楊偉中) said that since the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) agrees that Taiwan should join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as soon as possible, they should stop blocking the cross-strait service trade agreement.
Yang also said that the DPP would be contradicting itself if it continues to oppose the agreement, while supporting entry into the TPP, an agreement of a higher level and wider scope than the service trade agreement.
However, a close look at Yang’s comments shows that the KMT still does not really understand why Taiwanese have doubts about the service trade agreement and that the KMT does not know what sort of trade liberalization Taiwanese want, which is disappointing.
The KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) are more responsible than anyone for the fact that most Taiwanese do not support the service trade agreement.
First, regardless of whether we look at the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) or the dozen or so other agreements signed between Taiwan and China prior to that, there was a big difference between what was said before and what was done after they were signed. Gains and losses are unavoidable in international negotiations, but how will the government be able to convince the public of an agreement’s virtues if the gains are always exaggerated while the losses always ignored?
Second, over the past few years, the pace at which China has been trying to spur unification and influence politics here using economic means has accelerated considerably because of the tacit approval of President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and his administration, which has helped China to make things worse.
Apart from the KMT trying to replace the so-called “1992 consensus,” which it knew the DPP would never accept, with a “one China” framework, Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) said in October last year that cross-strait political problems must not be passed down from generation to generation.
In other words, as Taiwan becomes more and more reliant on China in terms of trade, there is a high likelihood that we will lose even more say in cross-strait negotiations and that the KMT will increasingly lean toward China. This is another reason why Taiwanese are unwilling to support the service trade agreement.
Regardless of whether it is the TPP or the RCEP, as long as Taiwan is able to join under fair and equal conditions, and as long as the government has well-thought-out plans in place and provides the necessary assistance to affected industries, higher-level agreements will help transform and upgrade production modes in Taiwan.
Agreements with a broader scope will help balance out and remove some of China’s influence on Taiwan’s economy and society while increasing the nation’s autonomy and giving it more leeway to make policy decisions.
These are two key components that Taiwan desperately needs to examine and the two things that the service trade agreement cannot provide.
If the KMT continues to try to equate regional economic integration with the service trade agreement, it will not only be unhelpful to forging domestic consensus on the issue, but will allow the KMT to find excuses for possible CCP interference.
If the time needed to enter into either the TPP or the RCEP is further extended, Taiwan will be further isolating itself.
Huang Tzu-wei is a researcher at the Taiwan Thinktank.
Translated by Drew Cameron
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing
A group of Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) lawmakers led by the party’s legislative caucus whip Fu Kun-chi (?) are to visit Beijing for four days this week, but some have questioned the timing and purpose of the visit, which demonstrates the KMT caucus’ increasing arrogance. Fu on Wednesday last week confirmed that following an invitation by Beijing, he would lead a group of lawmakers to China from Thursday to Sunday to discuss tourism and agricultural exports, but he refused to say whether they would meet with Chinese officials. That the visit is taking place during the legislative session and in the aftermath