At an expanded meeting of the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) China Affairs Committee on Thursday last week, DPP legislative caucus convener Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘) said that the party’s cross-strait policies need to fit in with mainstream Taiwanese public opinion, and they must also be able to convince China and the international community.
Ker said that the DPP must come up with policy standpoints that will help it get back into government, facilitate interaction between the DPP and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and promote peaceful development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.
Ker suggested that the DPP should freeze the Taiwan independence clause in its charter, since that would be the only way to promote dialogue and mutual confidence between the DPP and the CCP and remove obstacles standing in the way of the DPP’s return to government, thereby allowing it to promote peaceful cross-strait development.
If the DPP approves Ker’s suggestion, it will have taken its first step toward finding a peaceful resolution to cross-strait relations.
The Taiwan independence clause is no longer in line with the political landscape.
When the DPP adopted the clause in 1991, Taiwan was not yet a democracy, so the DPP advocated writing a new constitution and establishing a Republic of Taiwan, subject to a referendum.
However, following the advent of democracy, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), in her former role as DPP chairperson, said that the Republic of China (ROC) and Taiwan were one and the same.
Her successor, current DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang (蘇貞昌), also said that Taiwan, through its democratization, is already a sovereign and independent nation.
If Taiwan is already a sovereign and independent country, and Taiwan and the ROC are two sides of the same coin, then there is by now very little justification or need to establish a Republic of Taiwan.
Moreover, the clause is not in keeping with Taiwan’s national interests. Taiwan is a sovereign independent nation whose national title is the ROC, and its sovereignty belongs to the 23 million people who live in this country.
This is the common understanding of Taiwan’s governing and opposition parties and also the general consensus of public opinion. In addition, it represents the actual situation of cross-strait peace and stability.
However, the DPP’s Taiwan independence clause could give the public the mistaken impression that after the party returns to government, it will write a new constitution in an attempt to establish the Republic of Taiwan.
The public worries that such a measure would cause the existing state of peace between China and Taiwan to break down. It would also provide China with an excuse to pressure the DPP government.
When former president Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) was first sworn in back in 2000, he assured the international community that he would not declare independence or alter the national title during his term in office.
Su, for his part, said that today’s most important task is national construction.
As can be seen, the DPP in government did not display any desire to push for a new constitution or the changing of national title.
Nonetheless, something is still causing the public to worry that the DPP would do those things if it were voted back into government.
In reality, the DPP is not just unwilling, but also incapable of pressing toward de jure independence for Taiwan.
When he was president, Chen said that de jure independence for Taiwan was unattainable. Only about 10 percent of the public is in favor of Taiwan declaring independence as soon as possible, and there is not much public support for the adoption of a new constitution or changing of the nation’s title.
Furthermore, adopting a new constitution and changing the national title would require the support of at least three quarters of the members of the Legislative Yuan. The DPP currently holds only one third of the legislative seats — a long way short of the numbers required to adopt a new constitution.
Even if the DPP were willing and capable of having a new constitution drawn up and establishing the Republic of Taiwan, would Taiwan then be able to take its place among other members of the international community? Would it enable Taiwan to establish diplomatic relations with the US and Japan and have a seat in the UN?
The truth is that adopting a new constitution and establishing a Republic of Taiwan would not just fail to resolve the dispute over Taiwan’s sovereignty and achieve the hoped-for result of participation in the international community, but could well lead to military countermeasures by China and rejection by the world’s major powers.
The DPP has neither the desire nor the ability to successfully promote a new constitution and establish a Republic of Taiwan, even if it were to get back into government.
International realities dictate that, even if it were to succeed in doing so, it would be of no help to Taiwan’s national interests.
In light of this, the Taiwan independence clause in the party’s charter has long ceased to be in keeping with Taiwan’s existing sovereignty and national interests or with mainstream public opinion in Taiwan — given that the proportion of public opinion in favor of keeping cross-strait relations as they are has for a long time stood at around 85 percent. The clause only serves to satisfy the dreams that some deep-green, strongly pro-independence people have about Taiwan’s national title and to soothe their unhappiness about the difficulties that Taiwan faces in its international relations.
However, the Taiwan independence clause is a key factor that may prevent the DPP from winning the right to govern and promote peaceful cross-strait development. The CCP continues to use a triple alliance of China, the US and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) to restrict the DPP’s chances of getting back into government and limit its policy options.
In a public opinion poll held in early February 2012, shortly after President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) was elected to serve a second term, 5.75 percent of respondents said that the issue of cross-strait relations had persuaded them to change their minds and support Ma’s re-election bid. Notably, cross-strait economic factors had persuaded 4.25 percent of voters to make the same decision. The survey also indicated that 2.8 percent of those who voted for Tsai, the DPP candidate, were worried that if she were elected it would have had a negative impact on Taiwan’s economy.
As economic relations across the Taiwan Strait continue to expand and deepen, more and more Taiwanese want to maintain stable cross-strait relations and communication, but they do not want to give up Taiwan’s sovereignty and values.
In the run-up to the elections to be held at the end of the year, the DPP must persuade the Taiwanese public that it can uphold Taiwan’s identity and values while also consolidating and developing cross-strait relations. For the sake of winning elections, the KMT has been able to emphasize Taiwan’s identity and abandon the goal of unification — at least in public.
DPP supporters should think about the fact that as long as the DPP is not in government, it will not be able to fully put forward its policies.
The DPP in opposition can only face the reality of cross-strait relations as they develop with the KMT in charge. The DPP is anxious about the way cross-strait relations are going, but it also feels unable to do anything about it.
Rather than sticking to the Taiwan independence clause, DPP supporters would do better to think about how to adjust the party’s political standpoints in such a way as to uphold Taiwan’s identity while also allowing the party to win elections. That would be the more pragmatic and intelligent course to take.
Tung Chen-yuan is a professor in National Chengchi University’s Graduate Institute of Development Studies.
Translated by Julian Clegg
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