After Prosecutor-General Huang Shih-ming (黃世銘) was referred to a disciplinary committee for his part in a wiretapping row, Minister of Justice Lo Ying-shay (羅瑩雪) promptly organized an internal task force to investigate. The pan-green camp wants the legislature to set up a document request committee, the pan-blue camp called for an investigation by the Control Yuan and the Taipei District Prosecutors’ Office has started looking into whether any illegal wiretapping occurred.
While the nation is gripped by complications stemming from multiple systemic failings, the authorities have been turning a blind eye to the abuse of wiretapping powers.
This affair has implicated the entire system of constitutional government on a scale never before seen, involving the president, the legislature, political parties, the justice and prosecutorial systems and even the lawyers. Even before all this commenced, the public was confused as to who should be conducting the investigation: The prosecutors’ disciplinary committee, the Ministry of Justice or a legislative committee? As for the Control Yuan, which could not even impeach a Keelung city councilor, the less said the better.
Although the political controversy was started when President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) used information obtained by the Special Investigation Division of the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office through wiretapping and leaked to him by Huang, politics should not distract from the main issue — the fact that the legality or otherwise of the wiretapping is, essentially, a legal issue.
The first consideration is the possibility of resolving the legal issue in the courts and using them to conduct an impartial, professional and thorough investigation.
It is important to clarify the truth behind the surveillance process to reach a final verdict on the legality or otherwise of the surveillance. How many warrants were used? How many people were listened to? What was the reason for each individual warrant and over what time frame did they apply? If these questions can be investigated by the courts, once the information has been reviewed and the defendants’ testimonies heard, the truth behind the whole process will gradually emerge. The results should be made public, so everyone can understand.
The next pressing issue concerns how the courts are to settle the question of the legality of the wiretapping. To focus on the objective question of this legality and to avoid the process becoming drawn out, the courts should consider Article 416 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (刑事訴訟法), which states that “a subject of a ruling may file a motion to withdraw or change [certain listed] rulings to the court in charge if [he or she] disagrees with the ruling made.” Although the list does not include surveillance, judges must provide for this based upon the principle of the right to a legal remedy as prescribed in the constitutional rulings and upon the two UN human rights covenants Taiwan has unilaterally ratified.
Basically, a line needs to be drawn when it comes to judicial cases involving legislative quarrels. Why do legislators who feel they are the victims of illegal surveillance not pursue the right to legal remedy to establish the legal precedent that rulings on the legality of wiretapping should involve subsequent judicial review? After all, even Ma, whose attempts to remove Legislative Speaker Wang Jin-pyng (王金平) have been frustrated, has learned something from this experience: It is the courts that get the final say in the legal aspects of political conflicts.
Lin Yu-hsiung is a professor in the College of Law at National Taiwan University.
Translated by Paul Cooper
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
As Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s party won by a landslide in Sunday’s parliamentary election, it is a good time to take another look at recent developments in the Maldivian foreign policy. While Muizzu has been promoting his “Maldives First” policy, the agenda seems to have lost sight of a number of factors. Contemporary Maldivian policy serves as a stark illustration of how a blend of missteps in public posturing, populist agendas and inattentive leadership can lead to diplomatic setbacks and damage a country’s long-term foreign policy priorities. Over the past few months, Maldivian foreign policy has entangled itself in playing